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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies inequality in several dimensions, with an emphasis on the analysis of
inequality within and between groups (including by social class, occupation and educa-
tion). It aims to identify factors that a¤ect inequality and how income and wealth are
distributed within society.
In the rst chapter, we examine the distributional e¤ects of savings externalities.
Incomplete markets models imply heterogeneous household savings behaviour which in
turn generates pecuniary externalities via the interest rate. Conditional on di¤erences
in the processes determining household earnings for distinct groups in the population,
these savings externalities may contribute to inequality. Working with an open economy
heterogenous agent model, where the interest rate only partially responds to domestic
asset supply, we nd that di¤erences in the earnings processes of British households with
university and non-university educated heads entail savings externalities that increase
wealth inequality between the groups and within the group of the non-university educated
households. We further nd that while the ine¢ ciency e¤ects of these externalities are
quantitatively small, the distributional e¤ects are sizeable.
In the second chapter we examine the distributional e¤ects of social pressure. In
particular, we develop a theoretical framework where the cross-sectional distributions of
hours, earnings, wealth and consumption are determined jointly with a set of expendi-
ture targets dening peer and aspirational pressure for members of di¤erent social classes.
We show existence of a stationary socio-economic equilibrium, under stochastic produc-
tivity and socio-professional class participation. We calibrate a model belonging to this
framework using British data and nd that it captures the main patterns of inequality,
between and within the social groupings. We discover a complex pattern of how peer and
aspirational pressure a¤ects within- and cross-group inequality depending on both group
i
membership and the inequality measure considered. A principal nding is that wealth and
consumption inequality increase within groups who aspire to match social targets from a
higher class, despite a reduction in within-group inequality in hours and earnings. Such
aspirations can thus lead to social frustration, associated with increases in the dispersion
of economic outcomes, and hence in the magnitude and likelihood of underachievement
in meeting consumption targets.
The third chapter seek to characterise the nature and cyclicality of household income
risk in Great Britain. This chapter establishes new evidence on the cyclical behaviour
of household income risk in Great Britain and assesses the role of social insurance pol-
icy in mitigating against this risk. We address these issues using the British Household
Panel Survey (1991-2008) by decomposing stochastic idiosyncratic income into its transi-
tory, persistent and xed components. We then estimate how income risk, measured by
the variance and the skewness of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent
component, varies between expansions and contractions of the aggregate economy. We
rst nd that the volatility and left-skewness of these shocks is a-cyclical and counter-
cyclical respectively. The latter implies a higher probability of receiving large negative
income shocks in contractions. We also nd that while social insurance (tax-benets)
policy reduces the levels of both measures of risk as well as the counter-cyclicality of the
asymmetry measure, the mitigation e¤ects work mainly via benets.
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INTRODUCTION
Motivation
Since the early work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1754), philosophers, scholars, politicians
and economists have endeavoured to understand and tackle the issue of inequality.1 Ar-
guments against inequality, mainly by a moral perspective, there exist in the work of
Adam Smith and John S. Mill, while Pareto (1896) is the rst to discuss income inequal-
ity in a more "technical" way. More recently, a considerable amount of research has
been conducted to investigate the economic causes and consequences of inequality. The
main ndings are that inequality dampens economic performance, triggers redistributive
policies, amplies the impact of aggregate shocks, distorts the e¤ects of a policy reform
and more importantly can a¤ect the coherence of the society (see e.g. Stiglitz (2012),
Cingano (2014), Ostry et al. (2014), Atkinson (2015), Krueger et al. (2016), Nolan et
al. (2018)). Many potential causes of inequality have been discussed, including uninsured
income risk, skill heterogeneity, risk-taking, policy, institutions, occupational choice and
initial conditions among others (see, e.g. Imrohoroglu (1989), Galor and Zeira (1993),
Aiyagari (1994), Quadrini (2000), Mookherjee and Ray (2003), Castaneda et al. (2003),
De Nardi (2004) Pijoan-Mas (2006), Benhabib et al. (2011), Angelopoulos et al. (2019)).
As a result, various approaches have been used to study income and wealth.
According to Mookherjee and Ray (2002), the theoretical analysis of income and wealth
inequality can be separated into three broad groups. The rst suggests that the ini-
tial conditions determine outcomes (see, e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and
Zeira (1993), Ray and Streufert (1993)). The second shows how inequality can be gener-
1In earlier societies "inequality was regarded as a normal condition and injustice as a personal misfor-
tune...rather than a social evil", see Trigger (2003, pp. 142).
1
ated through market or other mechanisms, even in the absence of stochasticity (see, e.g.
Ljungqvist (1993), and Mookherjee and Ray (2003), Genicot and Ray (2017)). The third
group, and the largest amongst the three, suggests that inequality is the outcome of a
combination of luck and choices under incomplete markets (see, e.g. Becker and Tomes
(1979), Davies (1986), Zhu (2019)). In the third group, we can also include the seminal
works of Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994) and all the subsequent litera-
ture based on these papers. This literature is sometimes called the "macroeconomics of
inequality" and examines the theoretical implications (mostly) quantitatively. This thesis
concentrates on this nal strand of the literature.
Within this framework, economists have added many new considerations to the bench-
mark model to examine factors that generate or amplify inequality. For example, the
e¤ects on inequality of higher idiosyncratic uncertainty, work e¤ort, occupational choice,
life cycle, bequests, economic policy and inheritance motives as well as di¤erences in
preferences have been considered. This thesis contributes to the macroeconomics of in-
equality literature by examining three topics: (i) the impact of savings externalities on
aggregate wealth inequality as well as inequality within and between skill groups; (ii) the
e¤ects of social pressure on aggregate as well as between and within socioeconomic groups
inequality; and (iii) cyclical variation in income risk.
The quantitative evaluation of these topics focuses on the United Kingdom (U.K.).
The U.K. experienced an increase in income inequality over the past last 40 years. Income
inequality was constantly increasing during the 80s, but stabilised at a much higher level
during the 90s. Many studies try to explain the trends of income inequality in the U.K.
(see, e.g. Jenkins (1995), Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016),
Atkinson and Voitchovskys (2011) and Beleld et al. (2017)) and most of them suggest
that the key driver behind the rise in income inequality, during the 80s, was earnings and
wage di¤erentials. Greater equality in investment and pension income along with higher
redistribution during the 90s and 00s stabilized its trend around its current levels (Gini
coe¢ cient of around 0.34 for net income, Beleld et al. (2017)).2
In contrast, the debate about wealth inequality in the U.K. is relatively older (Atkin-
son 1971). Due to poor documentation on wealth information, the research evidence is
relatively smaller compared to the analysis of income inequality. Nevertheless, Hills et al.
(2013) analyse the historical evolution of wealth inequality in the U.K. and suggests an
increase, though small, in wealth inequality from the late 70s to the mid 00s. Similarly,
a small increase in wealth inequality is suggested by Piketty and Zucman (2015) using
2In recent decades, labour income, as opposed to income from rents, has been more important in
explaining income inequality (see e.g. Picketty (2014)).
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inheritance tax data.3 Thus, it is fair to say that wealth inequality has been relatively
steady the last 40 or more years, especially if we compare it with the big long-run changes
in wealth inequality before the 70s, and especially before WWII (see Piketty (2015)).
Recently, new evidence for wealth inequality in Great Britain (GB) from the Wealth
and Assets Survey (WAS) has become available. The WAS is a longitudinal survey for
GB reporting information on earnings, income, the ownership of assets (nancial assets,
physical assets and property), pensions, savings and debt, as well as on socio-economic
characteristics of the respondents over ve waves between 2006 and 2016.4. In Table
1, we provide a current snapshot of household earnings, income and wealth inequality
in the U.K..5 In particular, we show four measures of aggregate inequality, the Gini
coe¢ cient, the mean over median ratio, the top 1% share, and the coe¢ cient of variation.
Furthermore, in Table 2, we show the distributions of wealth, earnings and income. The
evidence in Tables 1-2 indicate the similarities and di¤erences between earnings, income
and wealth inequality. In addition, in Figure 1, we plot the wealth share of the top 10%
of wealth distribution for the OECD countries, going from the smaller to the largest.
First, from Table 1 we see that wealth is more unequally distributed than earnings,
and in turn, earnings are more unequally distributed than income. The same result
holds independently of the aggregate measure of inequality. Second, all variables are
more equally distributed than their U.S. counterparts (see Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)),
and generally, the U.K. is standing around the middle of the distribution of wealth
inequality among the OECD countries, either in terms of the mean over median or top
10% shares (see Figure 1). Further note that the U.K. has lower wealth inequality than the
Netherlands, Austria, Germany or even Denmark (which is often perceived as a country
3Piketty and Zucman (2015) construct a measure of wealth inequality by the wealth share of the
top10% and top1%.
4Acknowledging that this might not be entirely accurate, we assume that the wealth inequality in
Great Britain (GB) is a very good proxy for the wealth inequality in the United Kingdom (U.K.). In
each chapter, we explicitly state which political union, U.K. or GB, we target for the analysis.
5Earnings are dened as the sum of labour income of all households members which can come from
either employment and/or self-employment. We dene income as the sum of labour income, minus taxes
plus government and private benets, plus capital income. We follow the vast majority of the literature
and dene wealth as net-worth, which is the sum of the net housing and net nancial wealth. We further
restrict the sample to the households of which the head is within the working age (25-60).
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with low inequality).6 Yet, the level of wealth inequality is high in absolute terms.
Table 1: Wealth distributions by group (WAS Data)
wealth earnings income
Gini 0.71 0.47 0.35
mean/median 2.26 1.21 1.19
T 1% 16.5 8.1 6.3
CV 2.34 1.18 0.86
Note: WAS refers to the average statistics of waves 3 of
the Wealth and Assets Survey.
Figure .1: Wealth Inequality across the OECD coutries.
Furthermore, in Table 2 and starting from wealth, we see that more than 50% of the
total wealth in the economy is held by the richest 10%, while the richest quintile holds
a staggering 70%. The top 1% holds a share of around 16% while the households in the
bottom of the distribution are net debtors. Consistent with Table 1, we see the richest
households in terms of income or earnings hold smaller shares of the total. However, the
richest quintile in terms of earnings receives almost 50% of the total earnings. Meanwhile,
the richest quintile in terms of incomes receives 41% of the total annual income. The mag-
nitude of the latter is rather surprising given the fact that income contains the equalising
e¤ect of taxes and benets. Note that a large number of households have zero earnings
6However, note that these values and comparison might change if it was possible to include some other
wealth components such as pension wealth (public and/or private).
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but positive income shares, which reects the sources of incomes other than earnings.7
Table 2: Wealth distributions by group (WAS Data).
net-worth earnings income
T 1% 16.4 8.1 6.3
T 10% 51.1 31.5 26.4
Q5 share 70.0 48.3 41.5
Q4 share 21.2 24.6 22.9
Q3 share 8.9 16.5 17.0
Q2 share 1.1 9.3 12.1
Q1 share -1.2 1.3 6.5
B 10% -1.1 0.0 2.4
B 0-1% -0.5 0.0 0.0
Note: WAS refers to the average statistics of waves 3
of the Wealth and Assets Survey.
A crucial aspect is also the relationship between wealth, earnings and income. To shed
light on this, in Table 3, we show the pairwise correlations between the three variables. We
see that income and earnings are highly correlated, which means that payments other than
earnings are on average, a small proportion of income. However, the correlation of wealth
with either earnings or income is relatively low, indicating that di¤erent mechanisms are
a¤ecting these variables.
On the one hand, earnings, which are the largest part of income, are highly variable
either for individual/household over time (idiosyncratic variability) or for the whole cross-
section (aggregate inequality). In total, the variability of income, i.e. labour income plus
income from other sources, depends on e¤ort, luck, ability, occupational choice, policy
and on uncertainty related to asset returns (see, e.g. Benhabib et al. (2015), Agol et al.
(2019)).8 On the other hand, wealth is a stock, and is a consequence of past incomes
and saving choices as well as inherited wealth. Thus, current income only a¤ects wealth
in the current period. Accordingly, to examine wealth inequality, we need to understand
how saving choices are made and how incomes evolve over time, and how both exogenous
forces and conscious choices lead to the rise and fall of fortunes. Since wealth inequality is
7The share of the bottom 1% of the income distribution is not zero, but a very small number, i.e.
0.005%.
8In the long run, inequality is also driven by a wide variety of factors such as: globalisation, techno-
logical change, nancial and monetary policy, labour market deregulation and de-unionisation, increasing
market power of rms in both product and labour markets, demographic changes, and changes in redis-
tributive policies (see Nolan et al. (2018)).
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likely to persist over time it is paramount to examine what factors play a role in shaping
it.
Table 3: Pairwise correlations (WAS Data)
net-worth earnings income
net-worth 1
earnings 0.36 1
income 0.47 0.92 1
The evidence in Tables 1, 2 and 3 speaks to a considerable strand in the literature which
attempts to identify and quantify the sources of economic inequality at the aggregate
level (for more detail see the methodology section in the end of the introductory chapter
and the reviews in Heathcote et al. (2009), Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015), and De
Nardi (2015)). The main idea is that households face idiosyncratic income risk, but due
to (partial) absence of insurance markets, these risks cannot be diversied or hedged
away. Therefore, as individuals experience di¤erent histories of shocks, there will be a
cross-sectional distribution of wealth-holdings. The variation in the distribution is called
wealth inequality. Naturally then, this literature has focused on the role of idiosyncratic
risk under market incompleteness in creating wealth inequality.
The model captures the qualitative properties of the wealth distribution well. However,
the quantitative properties t less well so consequently researchers considered the role of
initial conditions, among others, ex ante innate di¤erences in preferences or ability, hu-
man capital formation, occupational choice, access to markets (e.g. barriers to education
and borrowing), technological development (e.g. skill-biased technical change), aggregate
uctuations and labour market imperfections. Despite these signicant developments,
further analysis is still needed.
First, in this environment, where idiosyncratic shocks drive wealth accumulation, a
positive relationship between earnings and wealth inequality is expected. In other words,
higher earnings risk (and consequently higher earnings inequality) tends to increase wealth
accumulation via precautionary savings, thus spreading out the wealth distribution. The
importance of increased earnings risk/inequality in creating higher wealth inequality has
long been noted in the literature (see, e.g. Castaneda et al. (2003) and Benhabib et al.
(2017)). The main focus in this body of work is to explain the concentration at the top
of the wealth distribution. However, mechanisms that a¤ect whole distribution have not
been examined to the same degree. In this thesis we pursue the latter. Moreover, as
pointed out by Benhabib et al. (2017), in contrast to the expected relationship between
income risk and wealth inequality, idiosyncratic uncertainty is not signicantly correlated
with wealth inequality in the data. Thus, other factors that might a¤ect wealth inequality.
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An important example comes from the work of Davila et al. (2012) in which they show
the importance of pecuniary externalities for the e¢ ciency properties of general equilib-
rium. In their examples, the agents are ex ante equalsomething that might not happen
in the real world. For example, we know from empirical studies that neither earnings
risk or mean earnings are homogeneous across di¤erent sub-groups in the population (see,
e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Guvenen et al. (2014)).
That is to say, there might be permanent (ex ante) di¤erences between subgroups in the
population. Even though the case of permanent di¤erences have been considered in the
literature, their e¤ect on inequality depends on the problem at hand (see, e.g. Castaneda
et al. (1998) and Guvenen (2006)). However, the literature has not examined the role of
pecuniary externalities stemming from these permanent di¤erences. Thus, we try to un-
cover new insights about the real world and macroeconomic modelling by examining the
role of pecuniary externalities arising from permanent heterogeneity on shaping wealth
inequality.
Second, social economics research suggests that many choices that individuals make,
such as accumulation of productive skills, saving, type of occupation, are (at least in part)
a¤ected by societal factors which are beyond their control (see Benhabib et al. (2011) and
references therein).9 A recent study by De Giorgi et al. (2019) estimates consumption
network e¤ects in the Danish population. They estimate non-negligible and statistically
signicant endogenous and exogenous peer e¤ects. Even though there is no study for the
U.K. regarding consumption network e¤ects, there is implicit evidence that these are also
present in the U.K.. For example, Elliot and Leonard (2004) studied the behaviour of the
school kids and found that if their trainers are branded and expensive, the children believe
the owner is rich, seen as popular and able to t with their peers. More importantly, they
are seen as popular and able to t in with their peers. Thus, given the importance of
social pressure for inequality in earnings, income, and wealth, it is natural to include them
into formal economic analysis.
Although economists have acknowledged the potential importance of social and cul-
tural inuences in many areas in economics, this has been limited in the context of general
equilibrium models with incomplete markets. If substantial social or other factors are in
place, to understand aggregate outcomes, it is not enough to understand the individual
behaviour alone but requires the examination of the mechanisms that aggregate devel-
opments a¤ect the individual behaviour as well. Put di¤erently, there is a feedback
mechanism from the micro level to the macro level and vice versa, which makes it both
9For a psychologistsperspective see Payne (2017) and references therein. The main topic of the book
is the role of inequality and social comparison on causing distress, unhappiness and social evils.
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interesting and important to explore.
Third, the dynamics of labour income and wages are the foundation for analysing
the economic agentsdecision making since they are the key ingredient in the calibration
and computation of heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets models (see next section).
Income risk is the main "ingredient" to exploring the mechanisms used by families to
insureagainst labour market shocks and a¤ects their decisions either ex ante or ex post.
Therefore, there is a link between the literature of macroeconomics of inequality and the
literature of income dynamics.
The economic choices depend on whether the shocks are persistent (or permanent)
or purely transitory. Permanent shocks can be thought as job displacements, switching
employers or permanent health problems (disability) while the transitory shocks can be
thought as family structure changes, demand shocks, temporary health problems, unem-
ployment or even overtime hours (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for an excellent review
in the literature of income dynamics). This distinction also has policy implications. On
the one hand, if a policymaker aims to mitigate the e¤ects of permanent shocks, then
training programmes or induction programmes are required. One the other hand, if she
aims to mitigate transitory shocks, then benets and insurance schemes are in general the
appropriate instruments. Thus, the characterisation of income risk is a very important
issue.
On top of that, there is evidence from other studies for the U.S., Germany and other
countries which suggest that income risk is also cyclical (see Storesletten et al. 2004,
Guvenen et al. 2014, Busch et al. 2018).10 Moreover, income risk is not cyclical in
the usual fashion assumed in the theoretical literature, i.e. cyclical variability, but it
is cyclical in higher moments. These ndings changed the view of economists on how
signicant are the welfare losses from severe economic downturns. Furthermore, it also
changed the perspective of how losses are distributed across the population. For example,
in the context of macroeconomic modelling, the time-varying income risk can change the
policy suggestions for the mitigation of the business cycle e¤ects on welfare.
Considering the ideas mentioned above, in the rst two chapters we develop heteroge-
neous agents incomplete markets models to numerically evaluate the e¤ects on inequality
of pecuniary externalities coming from xed heterogeneity (Chapter 1) and social pressure
(Chapter 2). The third chapter tests the hypothesis of time-varying income risk in Great
Britain. The next section sets out the analytical contribution of each chapter.
10Note that in chapters two and three, we examine the stationary distribution of wealth, earnings
and consumption. For this purpose, we assume that the labour income risk in the UK is stationary
(time-invariant).
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Review of Chapters
In Chapter 1 we develop an open-economy incomplete markets model, where the interest
rate only partially responds to domestic asset supply, with xed di¤erences between groups
based on their level of education. Specically, we separate the household population
according to the educational attainment of the head of household. One group consists of
university degree holders, and the other group contains individuals without or any other
achievement below a university degree. We calibrate the model to the U.K. data, and
we show that the two groups di¤er signicantly in both mean earnings and risk. The
models predictions are in accordance with key stylised facts of wealth inequality in the
U.K.. Then, we examine how the asset supply of one group a¤ects the asset supply of the
other.
The key nding is that with this type of xed di¤erences, the model generates a
between-group pecuniary externality which works through prices (here the interest rate).
This externality works as an amplication mechanism to increase overall wealth inequality
and a¤ects the within-group inequality of each group. The savings of each group move the
market interest rate away from the level that would be the equilibrium outcome consistent
with the asset supply of each group. Consequently, households in the non-university and
university-educated groups lower and raise their savings respectively, which in turn im-
plies that within-group wealth inequality is increased for the non-university and decreased
for the university-educated. Note that the pecuniary externalities are those externalities
that work through the prices. Another way to think pecuniary externalities in macroeco-
nomics is as general equilibrium e¤ects. The main contribution of this chapter is that it
demonstrates that even though this kind of xed di¤erences does not matter consider-
ably for aggregate variables, they do matter for wealth inequality, and especially between
and within-group inequality. Another contribution is that the ex ante skill heterogeneity
helps the benchmark heterogeneous agent model predict inequality, which is closer to the
inequality in the U.K. economy.
Chapter 2 focuses on how social pressure, in the form of peer pressure or aspirations,
inuences economic choices and ultimately, inequality. The main contribution of this
chapter is the formal introduction of peer pressure into the incomplete markets model.
Peer pressure takes the form of household consumption compared to a social class-related
consumption target. The model is exible enough to accommodate di¤erent types of
social pressure. For example, we rst consider peer-pressure, i.e. pressure to conform to
a social-class related target for consumption, for example, the mean consumption of the
peers. Then, we consider aspirational pressure, which takes the form of setting the social
target to be a relevant measure (e.g. mean or median or 90th percentile) of a higher social
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group.
We do not formally model the emergence of peer pressure. Instead, we rst aim to
identify the properties of these social factors so that the existence of a socio-economic
equilibrium exists in this type of model. We rst show that given the social targets, the
household problem admits a unique household-level invariant asset-shock distribution. We
dene the socio-economic equilibrium in this model as when the aggregated consumption
choices of the households coincide with the social class-related consumption targets. We
then prove the existence of a stationary recursive socio-economic equilibrium theoretically.
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, we explore
multiplicity numerically and nd no evidence of it.
Then to characterise the e¤ect of peer pressure on the joint determination of aggregate
economic outcomes and inequality, we calibrate the model to the U.K. economy to examine
its predictions numerically. We nd that in stationary equilibria characterised by "keeping
up with the Joneses" type of peer pressure, when we consider groups with higher mean
wages, within-group inequality is lower in terms of hours and earnings, and higher in terms
of wealth and consumption relative to economies without peer pressure. In contrast,
for lower mean wage groups, within-group inequality is higher in terms of wealth and
consumption and lower in terms of hours and earnings. At the same time, between-group
inequality is lower for hours, earnings and consumption, but higher for wealth.
Compared with peer pressure, aspirational pressure allows the groups with the higher
aspirations (lower mean wage groups) to close the gap with the top mean wage group
in terms of hours, earnings and consumption, while this increases in terms of wealth.
However, within-group wealth and consumption inequality are higher, despite a reduction
in within-group inequality in hours and earnings. Therefore, the improvement in aver-
age wealth that is implied by higher, above class, aspirations, can be associated with an
increase in social dissatisfaction, as a result of increased inequality. In general, social pres-
sure determined with reference to a group of peers, directly (peer pressure) or indirectly
(aspirational pressure), has di¤erential e¤ects on households incentives to work and save,
thus implying non-uniform e¤ects on wealth and earnings inequality.
Chapter 3 examines the cyclicality and nature of income risk in GB. We measure idio-
syncratic risk as the variance and skewness of the shocks to the idiosyncratic component
of household income. We use parametric methods to characterise the distribution of the
shocks and to examine the relationship between these moments and aggregate uctua-
tions. To achieve this, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for
1991-2008, and we nd that the variance is a-cyclical and left-skewness is counter-cyclical.
The latter implies a higher probability of receiving large adverse income shocks in con-
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tractions. This result is similar to the ndings for other countries, e.g. U.S., Germany
and Sweden (see Busch et al. (2018)), but it is a new nding for GB.
Furthermore, we assess the role of social insurance policy in mitigating the cyclicality
of household income risk. We nd robust evidence that both social insurance instruments,
tax and benets, reduce the levels of both variance and skewness, as well as the counter-
cyclicality of skewness. However, the mitigation in risk coming from benets is more
signicant than the reduction coming from taxes. This e¤ect in GB is distinct from results
for the U.S., Germany and Sweden reported in Busch et al. (2018), which emphasised
the importance of taxes in reducing income risk. In contrast, we found that cyclical
asymmetric income risk was reduced mainly via benets policy, conrming the importance
of this instrument in mitigating income volatility and inequality previously noted by other
U.K. studies using di¤erent methods than those employed here (see, e.g. Blundell and
Etheridge (2010) and Beleld et al. (2017)).
Methodology
In Chapters 1 and 2, we seek to examine sources of wealth inequality. Thus, to explore and
analyse wealth inequality, we need models that predict a wealth distribution endogenously.
The neoclassical growth with perfect markets and idiosyncratic uncertainty is not the
appropriate tool for this purpose. The reason is that in this model the initial distribution
of wealth persists forever, and hence, the model predicts zero social or economic mobility
(see Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000)). Or to put it with Aiyagaris own
words "With complete insurance markets, there would be no rags-to-riches or riches-to-
rags stories of individual fortunes and misfortunes." (Aiyagari (1997)). However, evidence
suggests considerable mobility of individuals across the wealth and income distributions
(see, e.g. Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)).
The solution is to incorporate household heterogeneity in terms of luck, i.e. idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty, into macroeconomic models used for dynamic analysis. Even though
the key idea can be traced back to the 70s-80s (see Bewley (1986)), more intensive
research on heterogeneous-agents macroeconomic models started in the 1990s (see e.g.
the key contributions of Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998))
and developed vastly in recent years (see e.g. the reviews in Heathcote et al. (2009),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2018), Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015), and De Nardi (2015)).
The key ingredients of heterogeneous agents incomplete markets models include: (i)
a continuum of agents; (ii) uncertain agent earnings (or endowment) which follow an
exogenous stochastic process, and; (iii) incomplete markets. The rst assumption is to
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ensure that the choices of a single individual do not a¤ect the aggregate. Without this
assumption, each idiosyncratic shocks is also aggregate. The typical assumption for the
earnings process is that it follows a Markov process. Typically, this process is time-
invariant, and aggregate earnings are constant across time. Every period, each household
receives idiosyncratic earnings. So, even though the agents are identical, in the sense that
they have the same preferences and stochastic processes and face the same prices, they
di¤er because of the di¤erences in their realised earnings, i.e. every period, some agents
are lucky and get high earnings, while others are unlucky and get low earnings. The third
assumption means that there no insurance markets, so the agents cannot fully insure
against earnings shocks. In the framework of complete markets, the agents would insure
each other against the earnings shocks. Here instead, the agents can only partially self-
insure against earnings shocks by borrowing and lending one-period obligation contracts
(bonds) which yield a riskless return (i.e. there are many more goods (states), than
markets). Furthermore, there are tight limits on how agents can borrow.
Under idiosyncratic income risk, each individual will be exposed to a di¤erent history
of shocks in di¤erent periods. In turn, the agents accumulate wealth (bonds) to diversify
or hedge away this risk partially. Thus, even though the agents are ex ante identical
(i.e. same preferences, constraints, technology, opportunity and uncertainty), because
they cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic risk so that they make di¤erent choices, i.e.
they di¤er ex post. Therefore, as individuals experience di¤erent histories of shocks, there
will be a cross-sectional distribution of wealth-holdings. Under certain assumptions for
preferences and the exogenous process for income, the optimal household decision yields a
stationary distribution. So, the central prediction of the model is an endogenously derived
wealth distribution. Moreover, even though the aggregates are constant, the agents move
freely within the distribution. The main advantage of these models is that it allows us
to analyse wealth distribution (and other variables depending on the model assumptions)
and examine the implications of this heterogeneity. However, the main disadvantage is
that the problem at hand becomes more complicated to solve since we need to calculate
the whole distribution of wealth holdings.11 To close the model, for a general equilibrium,
there are extra clearing conditions which have to be met, with the most typical example
being the asset market clearing condition.
The benchmark incomplete markets model, as described above, can capture qualitative
properties of the wealth distribution, but quantitatively it underpredicts the extent of
inequality, both overall (e.g. as captured by measures such as the Gini index) and at
11There is also the possibility of aggregate risk induced by aggregate shocks, but for the purposes of
this thesis, we assume that there is no aggregate risk.
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the top end of the wealth distribution. The literature has explored several extensions
aimed at improving the models predictions relating to wealth inequality (see, e.g. the
reviews in Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) and Krueger et al. (2016)). Naturally, the rst
approach in creating higher inequality was to calibrate models with higher idiosyncratic
uncertainty (see, e.g. Castaneda et al. (2003), Hubmer et al. (2016), Benhabib et al.
(2017)). Other factors have been explored as well such as: (i) work e¤ort (Pijoan-Mas
(2006)); (ii) occupational choice (Quadrini (2000)); (iii) life cycle considerations (Huggett
(1996)); (iv) bequests and inheritance motives (De Nardi (2004)), and; (v) di¤erences
in preferences (e.g. Krusell and Smith (1998)). The case of ex ante di¤erences, i.e.
permanent di¤erences between the agents have also been considered, but their e¤ect on
inequality depends on the problem at hand (see e.g. Castaneda et al. (1998) and Guvenen
(2006)).
Typically, in most of the papers in this literature, the existence of stationary equilibria
is just assumed or shown computationally and not established rigorously. Several attempts
have been made to show the existence of stationary general equilibria in this class of
models. Bewley (1986) and Huggett (1993) show existence for no production economies
but under di¤erent assumptions. Bewley (1986) does not allow the agents to borrow and
assumes an endowment process that is a stationary Markov with nite state space while
Huggett (1993) allows for borrowing and considers a Markovian endowment process with
two states and positive auto-correlation.
For economies with production, Aiyagari (1994) was the rst to provide a proof of
existence, though informal. He allows for borrowing and assumes that labour e¢ ciency
shocks are i.i.d, but the proof requires the assumption that the utility function is bounded.
Miao (2002) shows the existence of stationary general equilibrium in an Aiyagari (1994)
economy without a boundedness condition for the utility function (but imposing other cur-
vature restrictions). However, his proof requires strong assumptions on the monotonicity
and smoothness of the income process, which are particularly di¢ cult to show in prac-
tice. Recently, Açikgöz (2018) shows existence in an Aiyagari (1994) economy under the
assumptions that the income process is a generic multiple-state (but nite) irreducible
aperiodic Markov chain and the utility function is unbounded. Nevertheless, the proof
requires that the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion tends to zero as consumption goes
to innity. Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) also show the existence of stationary general
equilibria, not only for Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models but also for a more general class
of models. They assume that the idiosyncratic income process follows a Markov process
with the Feller property and compact support. However, they also assume that the choice
set for assets is exogenously bounded.
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Marcet et al. (2007) show the existence of a stationary general equilibrium for a model
with production and endogenous labour supply. However, the results are shown only for
the case in which: i) for the labour e¢ ciency process follows a monotone two-state Markov
chain, and; ii) the utility function is separable and homogeneous. Zhu (2018) extends the
results of Marcet et al. (2007) to a model with more general utility assumptions and
multiple-state Markov chain without the need of monotonicity. Nonetheless, the proof
requires the boundedness of the utility function and the transition matrix to have only
positive entries.
In Chapter 1, we specify a heterogeneous agent model with permanent di¤erences
between agents, in which there are two groups of agents which form the total population
in the model. Individuals in each group face a group-specic earnings process, resulting in
di¤erent mean earnings as well as risk levels across both groups. Both groups contribute
to the production of goods, and they interact via the asset market (i.e. via the interest
rate) and the labour market (i.e. via the wage rate). Finally, the economy trades in
global nancial markets taking the interest rate as given but pays a risk premium on top
of a risk-free interest rate (see, e.g. Kraay and Ventura, (2000) or Schmidt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) for debt-elastic interest rate). The risk premium is a function of the foreign
asset position relative to GDP. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to consider
an open economy in this class of models in a tractable way, where the interest rate only
partially responds to domestic asset supply, and we show that such an open-economy
general equilibrium exists.
In Chapter 2, we build on Zhu (2018) and we extend the notion of equilibrium in the
context of heterogeneous agent models by taking into account the social interactions stem-
ming from social pressure (peer or aspirational pressure). In our framework, aggregate
outcomes and inequality are determined by individual responses to uninsured idiosyn-
cratic income shocks and socio-economic class participation, as well as social pressure.
Importantly, the extent of social pressure is an equilibrium outcome, determined jointly
with the distributions of the economic outcomes that it contributes to.12 The equilibrium
is obtained when household-level decision-making is consistent with the aggregate-level
social targets. Put di¤erently, the equilibrium is obtained when the consumption target
for each group equals the respective moment of the distribution of consumption that arises
under the whole set of consumption targets. This chapter contributes methodologically to
12Note that we do not depart from methodological individualism which is the foundation of the methods
employed in economics and implies that "all explanations must run in terms of the actions and reactions
of individuals" (Arrow (1994)). In our framework, social pressure arises from targets set by the social
groups and determined jointly with the distributions of the economic outcomes that it contributes to.
This approach is consistent with modern, "microfounded" economic analysis and also consistent with the
work in the Handbook of Social Economics, edited by Benhabib et al. (2011).
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the literature on heterogeneous agent models in two respects. First, we extend the notion
of equilibrium in the context of heterogeneous agent models by taking into account the
social interactions stemming from peer and aspirational pressure. Second, we suggest an
algorithm to compute the equilibrium and search for a uniqueness for the model with peer
and aspirational pressure.
Chapter 3 is empirical and employs statistical parametric methods to characterise in-
come risk in GB. Quantitative macroeconomists have recently adopted the models of earn-
ings processes as a key ingredient in the calibration and estimation of heterogeneous-agent
incomplete-markets models. The earning dynamics literature is motivated by Friedmans
permanent income hypothesis and aims to distinguish between permanent and transitory
shocks to income. Empirically this is not an easy task and is a key challenge is this
eld. There are two leading views about the nature of the income process in the current
literature. The rst suggests that individuals are subject to extremely persistent shocks,
almost random walk, under the assumption that they face similar life-cycle income proles
(conditional on some observable characteristics like experience, education, gender). The
second approach suggests that individuals are subject to shocks with modest persistence,
under the assumption that facing life-cycle proles that are individual-specic and can
leave space for heterogeneity in initial conditions. Typical examples of the rst approach
are Abowd and Card (1989), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Blundell and Etheridge (2010)
while for the second approach are Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Haider (2001)
and Storesletten et al. (2004).
Storesletten et al. (2004) went one step further. They examined the cyclicality of
income risk in the U.S.. The novelty is that they have exploited the available informa-
tion embedded in the variability in incomes. Intuitively, if the agents face persistent
income shocks, the current income variance is informative about the past shocks they
have faced. Also, if the properties of the income shocks are cyclical as well, then under
certain assumptions, we can test their cyclicality. This approach has been extended to
higher moments, skewness and kurtosis, to examine the asymmetries and the "possibility"
of extreme shocks Busch et al. (2016).
There are also alternative approaches in the literature to characterise idiosyncratic
income risk and its cyclicality. One approach examines the nature and the properties of
idiosyncratic income risk quantitatively and in a parametric-free way (see, e.g. Guvenen
(2014), Angelopoulos et al. (2017), Busch et al. (2018)). Even though this approach
has the advantage of imposing minimal restrictions on the data, it also has drawbacks.
First, the researcher can exploit only information about the sample period (in contrast
to Storesletten et al. 2004 and Busch et al. 2016), which means that other than the
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U.S. there is limited availability of panel datasets with a time dimension long enough to
examine cyclical variation. Second, the results cannot be used straight away to calibrate
heterogeneous agent models and require one more step to do that, i.e. to calibrate a
process to have the same properties to the parametric-free estimates. Arellano et al.
(2017) and De Nardi et al. (2018) follow another approach. They employ an innovative
quantile-based panel data framework to study the nature of income persistence and risk.
Nevertheless, concerning our question at hand, namely cyclicality of income risk, this
approach has the drawback that the researcher can exploit only information about the
sample period. Thus, in this thesis, we follow the parametric approach, and mainly, we
follow Storesletten et al. (2004) and Busch et al. (2016).
Formally, a typical specication for the labour income process is the addition of three
components, a life cycle component, a deterministic part depending on invariable char-
acteristics (such as the region of living, education, gender), and an idiosyncratic unex-
plained component. The most important component in this literature is the unexplained
part since this is used (typically) to calibrate the macroeconomic models of inequality.
The standard assumption for this unexplained component is that consists of two parts, a
persistent component, which can be a random walk or a very persistent AR(1) process,
and a transitory component which is a mean-reverting stochastic process. Moreover, these
processes can be allowed to vary across time, cohorts or age.13
The properties of the permanent component or the corresponding transitory compo-
nent in labour earnings and disposable income variance can be estimated using parametric
econometric methods. In particular, we perform the estimation using the Minimum Dis-
tance Estimator (MDE) proposed by Chamberlain (1984), as it is the standard tool of
estimation in this literature. The main idea is that we try to match the theoretical sta-
tistical moments of the model with the estimated statistical moments of incomes in the
data. Using Theorems and results from Newey and McFadden (1994), it can be shown
that the MDE estimator is consistent and asymptotically Normal.
Standard errors can be calculated either by using asymptotic theory or by using the
Bootstrap and in particular, the block bootstrap. The procedure proposed by Hall and
Horowitz (1996) is a resampling procedure and draws from the original samples at the
individual level, so the time dimension is not a¤ected. The time dimension is critical in
our estimation because we want to measure the autocorrelation of incomes. Thus, the
randomisation over the time dimension would have destroyed the temporal relationship
of incomes. The resulting condence intervals account for arbitrary serial dependence,
13Allowing them to vary in all three dimensions, age, time and cohort, results in perfect collinearity,
which is known as the age-period-cohort identication problem.
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heteroskedasticity, and additional estimation error induced by the use of residuals from
the rst stage regressions.
On the contrary, to have robust standard errors with asymptotic theory, one would
need to make brave assumptions about the types of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
something that the block bootstrap does in a parametric free way. Thus, we choose to
use the block bootstrap. Furthermore, we use bootstrap tests to examine the di¤erence
in risk (variance and skewness) between denitions of income to unveil the e¤ects of taxes
and benets separately. To the best of our knowledge, this type of bootstrap tests has
not been implemented in this literature before.
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CHAPTER 1
SAVINGS EXTERNALITIES AND
WEALTH INEQUALITY
1 Introduction
Following the contributions by Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1989), Huggett (1993) and
Aiyagari (1994), an extensive literature has examined wealth inequality under idiosyn-
cratic earnings shocks when agents cannot fully insure against uncertain income streams.
In this framework, market incompleteness implies, via precautionary savings behaviour,
ine¢ cient asset accumulation at the aggregate level. Moreover, di¤erent histories of earn-
ings shocks received by individuals imply heterogenous choices for asset accumulation,
generating wealth inequality in the stationary equilibrium. The benchmark incomplete
markets model features ex ante identical agents whose earnings are determined by the
same stochastic process, leading to di¤erences in savings. This heterogeneity in savings
entails pecuniary externalities via the interest rate. For example, Greewald and Stiglitz
(1986) in a model of incomplete markets and imperfect information and more recently
Davilla et al. (2012) in an incomplete markets model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks
study the e¢ ciency implications of these savings externalities.
When economic agents are not ex ante identical, but instead belong to di¤erent groups
distinguished by a key characteristic such as productivity, saving externalities can link
behaviour in one group of agents with outcomes in another. In particular, signicant
di¤erences in the level of productivity and earnings risk between groups of households
could thus imply pecuniary externalities leading to sizeable wealth inequality between
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and within groups, in addition to potential e¤ects on e¢ ciency. Here, we examine sav-
ings externalities arising from skill heterogeneity, and analyse its implications for wealth
inequality and e¢ ciency in the U.K.. To the best of our knowledge, these issues have
not been simultaneously addressed in the literature more generally nor have they been
confronted for the U.K..
We focus on skill heterogeneity motivated by empirical evidence which documents
di¤erences between economic agents with respect to their earnings processes. For example,
this evidence shows that earnings risk is not homogeneous across di¤erent groups in the
population (see e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Chang and Kim (2006)) nor are
mean earnings the same (see e.g. Heathcote at al. (2010) and Blundell and Etheridge
(2010)). We approximate di¤erences in ability and skills at the beginning of working life
with university education since empirical evidence shows strong wage and earnings premia
for university educated workers (see e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and OECD (2012)
for the U.K.). Moreover, data from the Understanding Society Survey (USoc) 2009-2017
(University of Essex, 2018), suggests clear di¤erences in earnings risk between the group
of households whose head is university educated or not. As we explain in our analysis
below, the stochastic component of income for university educated households has a higher
variance and exhibits more persistence than for the non-university educated.1
To investigate how group heterogeneity in mean earnings, risk exposure and persistence
(implying saving externalities) contributes to wealth inequality and to the e¢ ciency of
the resource allocation in the U.K., we specify an incomplete markets model with state-
dependent (Markovian) stochastic earnings processes and let households belong to one
of two groups. These groups di¤er in their earnings processes, both in the state-space
and in the transition matrix for idiosyncratic earnings shocks. We calibrate the aggregate
model using British data and estimate the earnings processes using USoc which is the
latest extensive panel dataset for the U.K.. We then evaluate the models predictions
using wealth data from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) 2006-2016 (ONS, 2018).2
Naturally, any e¤ects from savings externalities work via the interest rate in general
equilibrium, and are strongest in a closed economy framework. However, the interest rate
in the U.K. is largely determined in international nancial markets. Thus, we model the
U.K. as an open economy, where the domestic interest rate di¤ers from a global xed
interest rate by a function of the net foreign asset position of the country (demand minus
1Analysis of the importance of skills and education for inequality in a historical context for the US
can be found in Goldin and Katz (2008). Several studies have also documented di¤erences in earnings
risk between groups associated with university education (see e.g. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and
Hagedorn et al. (2016)).
2The WAS dataset covers Great Britain only. For consistency, we use the sub-sample for Great Britain
from USoc below. However, the results are very similar if we used the whole sample from USoc.
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supply of assets), capturing premia charged by the international nancial markets.3 Using
recent advances in theoretical research (see e.g. Acikgoz (2018)), we show that this model
has a well-dened partial equilibrium with a unique invariant wealth distribution for each
type of household given prices. We further show that an open economy general equilibrium
exists, and that for the parameter values chosen in the calibration this is unique.
We nd that the model predicts wealth inequality both within and between the univer-
sity and non-university educated groups that is consistent with the data. More specically,
the university educated group has signicantly lower within group wealth inequality than
the non-university educated group, despite having more persistent and volatile stochastic
earnings processes. The model e¤ectively matches the di¤erence in the wealth Ginis be-
tween the two groups that are observed in reality and predicts a mean wealth ratio that is
close to the data. Therefore, the predictions of the model regarding empirical facts that
are of particular interest in this analysis are notably good. As is commonly found using
this class of models, the model under-predicts the extent of income inequality at the very
top end (top 1 percent). However, it produces very good predictions for the remaining
distribution, especially up to the top 5 percent.4
The mechanism by which the pecuniary externalities work to a¤ect inequality is as fol-
lows. Earnings di¤erences, both in terms of mean earnings and idiosyncratic uncertainty,
imply di¤erent asset supply functions for the two groups. The equilibrium interest rate
is determined by the per capita asset supply function, which is higher (lower) than the
asset supply functions for the university (non-university) educated. In other words, the
savings of each group move the market interest rate away from the equilibrium level that
would be consistent with the asset supply of each group. Consequently, households in the
non-university and university educated groups lower and raise their savings respectively.
This in turn implies that within group wealth inequality is increased for the non-university
and decreased for the university educated, conditional on the earnings shocks that the
households in each group receive.
We quantify the e¤ects of the externalities and nd that, on average, the two groups
increase (university) or decrease (non-university) their equilibrium wealth by about 5 to
6 percent as a result of savings externalities, compared with the counterfactual where
3The mechanism linking the domestic interest rate to the international rate and domestic conditions
to close an open economy model is motivated by Kraay and Ventura (2000) and Schmidt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003)).
4The standard incomplete markets model featuring stochastic labour income, one asset and ex ante
identical agents captures qualitative properties of the wealth distribution, but quantitatively it under
predicts the extent of inequality, especially at the top end of the wealth distribution (see e.g. De Nardi
(2015), Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) and Krueger et al. (2016) who also review extensions that can
improve the models predictions in this respect).
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the interest for each group was not a¤ected by the actions of the other group. This
implies that between group inequality, measured as the ratio of mean wealth, increases by
approximately 11 percent. Drilling down below the average e¤ects, externalities induce
signicant changes in wealth accumulation within each group. For example, the rise and
fall in average wealth holdings for the university and non-university groups respectively is
roughly 8 to 9 percent for the top quintile and 5 to 7 percent for the bottom quintile. In
contrast, for the middle three quintiles, wealth changes range from about 0 to 4 percent.
Finally, we nd that the ine¢ ciency e¤ects of the externalities are much smaller than the
distributional e¤ects since they contribute to an over accumulation of average assets of
about 0.8 percent at the aggregate level.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We rst present the model and data/calibration
in Sections 2 and 3 respectively. The model is discussed in some detail to formally intro-
duce the economic environment and clarify the economic quantities used later. We next
examine the quantitative implications of the model. We rst evaluate the predictions of
the model with respect to between and within group wealth inequality in Section 4. We
then study the pecuniary externalities mechanism, focusing on its equity and e¢ ciency
implications in Section 5. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 6.
2 A model with ex-ante heterogeneity
We next develop a model emphasising skill di¤erences, pecuniary externalities and wealth
inequality. To this end, we consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of
innitely lived agents (households) distributed on the interval I = [0; 1]. Time is discrete
and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Households di¤er in their level of skill. In particular,
there are two levels of skill, high and low, and households are randomly and permanently
allocated to one of the two. This implies that there are two types of households, high
skilled (university educated, u) households, which belong to a set Iu  I and low skilled
(below university educated, b) households which belong to a set Ib  I, such that Iu[Ib =
I and Iu\Ib = ;. The proportions of high and low skilled households are given respectively
by nu and nb = 1   nu. Therefore, there is ex ante heterogeneity in the population
determined by the skill level of the household, which is assumed to be given.
All households have exogenous labour supply and derive utility from consuming one
good that can be acquired by spending either labour income or accumulated savings.
Households are identical in their preferences. However, their labour income depends
on their skill level, since it determines their productivity. More specically, households
predictable earnings component di¤ers, reecting their di¤erent skill. This implies that the
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two groups of households face di¤erent e¤ective wage rates. In addition, each household is
subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which a¤ect labour income, by determining the residual,
unpredictable earnings component. Households draw idiosyncratic shocks independently
from a Markov chain which di¤ers for high and low skill households. Both the state-space
and corresponding transition matrix di¤er across the two household types, implying that
the level of labour income and the size and persistence of productivity shocks di¤er for
each household type, reecting di¤erent opportunities and earnings risk.
There is a single asset in the economy implying that households cannot fully insure
themselves against shocks to labour income. We examine and compute a stationary
equilibrium, in which aggregate quantities are constant. In what follows we present the
problem for a typicalhigh skill educated household and the problem for a typicallow
skill educated household.
2.1 Households
Households have di¤erent skill levels h, h = u; b. Denote the idiosyncratic component of
labour income of a typical household h = u; b at time t by sht , so that labour income is
given by whsht , where w is an average wage rate. Therefore, the idiosyncratic earnings
shock sht contains shocks that may a¤ect work hours in a time period and/or household
productivity.5 The idiosyncratic earnings shock follows a Markov chain. In particular, we
assume that the process sht is an m-state Markov chain with state space S
h and transition
matrix Qh. The state space Sh = [sh1 ; s
h
2 ; :::; s
h
m] is ordered according to s
h
1 > 0, s
h
j+1 > s
h
j ,
j = 1; :::;m   1 and has the natural -algebra Sh made up of all subsets of Sh. The
elements of the transition matrix Qh are denoted h
 
sht+1jsht

= Pr(sht+1 = s
h
j0 jsht = shj ).
We follow Acikgoz (2018) and assume that h
 
sh1 jsh1

> 0 and that the Markov chain is
irreducible and aperiodic, i.e. there exists a k0 2 N such that

h
 
sht+1jsht
(k)
> 0 for all 
sht+1; s
h
t
 2 Sh and k > k0. This implies that the Markov chain has a unique invariant
distribution, with probability measure that we denote by h.
Households earnings shock sht is observed at the beginning of period t. They also
receive interest income from accumulated assets raht , and use their income for consumption
and to invest in future assets, subject to the budget constraint for each h = u; b:
cht + a
h
t+1 = (1 + r) a
h
t + w
hsht , (1.1)
where ch  0, aht   h and  h < 0 denotes a borrowing limit on the household. The
5Examples include the quality of the match between employer and employee, health shocks, or changes
in personal circumstances.
29
set comprising aht is dened as Ah = [ h;+1). The prices (interest rate r and wage
rate w) are assumed to be xed and non-random quantities. This holds if the households
actions take place in a stationary equilibrium, which is dened below. Households assess
consumption streams with an intertemporal discount factor  2 (0; 1), using a per period
utility function u(cht ). The utility function u : [0;+1) ! R is bounded, twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.6 Furthermore, it satises the
conditions lim
c!0
uc(c) = +1, lim
c!1
uc(c) = 0 and lim
c!1
inf  ucc(c)
uc(c)
= 0. These assumptions are
typically employed in the literature of partial equilibrium income uctuation problems
(see e.g. Miao (2014, ch. 8)) and in the literature relating to incomplete markets with
heterogeneous agents in general equilibrium (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) and Acikgoz (2018))
to ensure a well-dened stationary equilibrium. The assumption that lim
c!1
inf  ucc(c)
uc(c)
= 0
implies that the degree of absolute risk aversion tends to zero as consumption tends to
innity.
The interest rate and wage rate are taken as given and satisfy r >  1 and w > 0.
Moreover, as has been shown (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Miao (2014, ch. 8) and Acikgoz
(2018)), a necessary condition for an equilibrium with nite assets at the household level
in this class of models is that (1 + r) < 1. Borrowing limits are imposed following e.g.
Aiyagari (1994), i.e. assets must satisfy:
aht   h, where
h = min
h
;
sh1 
hw
r
i
, if r > 0 or
h = , if r  0,
(1.2)
and  > 0 is arbitrary parameter, capturing an ad hoc debt limit. This restriction implies
that even if the nancial markets have the power to conscate all of the income of the
household, they would never lend so much that the household reaches an asset position
where its lifetime labour income (assuming the worst earnings shock is always realised)
was not su¢ cient to repay debt. This requires that  rh + whsh1  0.
The problem of the typical household h = u; b is summarised as follows. For given
values of (w; r) and given initial values (ah0 ; s
h
0) 2 AhSh, the household chooses plans 
cht
1
t=0
and
 
aht+1
1
t=0
that solve the maximisation problem:
V h(a0; s0) = max
(cht ;aht+1)
1
t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tu(cht ), (1.3)
6Boundedness is not needed for equilibrium (see Acikgoz (2018)). In the calibration and computation
below we will use a CRRA utility function which is not bounded below. However, we will work there
with a compact set for assets, needed for computation, which, given the continuity of the utility function,
implies boundedness.
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subject to (1.2), where  2 (0; 1), and cht  0 is given by (1.1). To obtain the dynamic
programming formulation of the households problem, let vh
 
aht ; s
h
t ;w; r

denote the op-
timal value of the objective function starting from asset-earnings state
 
aht ; s
h
t

and given
the interest and wage rate. The Bellman equation is:
vh
 
aht ; s
h
t ;w; r

=
= max
aht+1   h
cht  0
fu(cit) + 
P
sht+12Sh
h
 
sht+1jsht

vh
 
aht+1; s
h
t+1;w; r
g.
(1.4)
In this case, we aim to nd the value function vh
 
aht ; s
h
t ;w; r

and the policy functions
aht+1 = g
h
 
aht ; s
h
t ;w; r

and cht = q
h
 
aht ; s
h
t ;w; r

, which generate the optimal sequences 
aht+1
1
t=0
and
 
cht
1
t=0
that solve (1.3).7 Standard dynamic programming results imply
that the policy functions exist, are unique and continuous.
Following e.g. Stokey et al. (1989, ch. 9), we dene h [(a; s) ; AB] :  Ah  Sh  B  Ah Sh! [0; 1], for all (a; s) 2 AhSh, AB 2 B  AhSh, to be the transition
functions on
 Ah  Sh, induced by the Markov processes  sht 1t=0 and the optimal policies
gh
 
aht ; s
h
t

.8 The transition function is given by:
h [(a; s) ; AB] =

Pr
 
sht+1 2 Bjsht = s

, if gh (a; s) 2 A
0, if gh (a; s) =2 A

. (1.5)
In this setup, Proposition 5 in Acikgoz (2018) implies that the Markov process on the
joint state-space
 Ah  Sh with transition matrix h has, for each h = u; b, a unique
invariant distribution denoted by h (AB). Furthermore, Proposition 6 in Acikgoz
(2018) implies that assets for the typical household tend to innity when (1 + r) ! 1.
Moreover, Theorem 1 in Acikgoz (2018) implies that the expected value of assets using
the invariant distribution is continuous in the interest rate, r.
2.2 General equilibrium in an open economy
We analyse the general equilibrium in an open economy, following Angelopoulos et al.
(2019) in modelling the latter within a heterogeneous agent model.
7In what follows, we suppress the explicit dependence of the value and policy functions on aggregate
prices to simplify notation.
8For any set D in some n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn, B (D) denotes the Borel  algebra of D.
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Firm
A representative rm operates the technology to transform borrowed assets from the
nancial market to capital to be used in production, and an aggregate constant returns
to scale production function, using as inputs the average (per capita) levels of capital K
and employment L. The production function is given by Y = F (K;L) and is assumed to
satisfy the usual Inada conditions. More specically, F is continuously di¤erentiable in
the interior of its domain, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satises: F (0; L) = 0,
FKL > 0, lim
K!0
FK(K;L) ! +1 and lim
K!1
FK(K;L) ! 0. The capital stock depreciates
at a constant rate  2 (0; 1). The rm takes the interest and wage rate as given and
chooses capital and employment to maximise prots, which gives the standard rst order
conditions, dening factor input prices equal to the relevant marginal products:
w = @F (K;L)=@L, (1.6)
r = @F (K;L)=@K   . (1.7)
Open economy setup
The economy trades in global nancial markets taking the interest rate as given, which
implies that aggregate household savings, As, can be above or below the capital demanded
by rms, K. The di¤erence between domestic savings and domestic capital will give rise
to a non-zero net foreign asset position, NFA  K As, for the domestic economy. Given
the countrys net foreign asset position, the country makes interest payments to foreign
households equal to rNFA, where r is the interest rate at which the country can borrow
from abroad. This determines the economys aggregate resource constraint as:
Y = C + I + rNFA,
where C is aggregate consumption and I is aggregate investment.
We assume that each country pays a risk premium on top of a risk-free interest rate
r. The risk premium is a function of foreign debt (see, e.g. Kraay and Ventura, (2000) or
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for debt-elastic interest rate). In particular, we assume
that the risk premium is positively correlated with foreign debt relative GDP i.e. with
NFA over output:
r = r +  

exp

NFA
Y

  1

, (1.8)
for 0 <  < r + , which is well dened for r > r    . The parameter  measures the
elasticity of the country specic interest rate premium relative to the net foreign asset
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position.9 The requirement that r > r    is automatically satised for a country with
negative net foreign assets when  > 0, as is the case in the calibration for the U.K.
below. Household optimisation and (1.8) jointly dene a constraint set for the interest
rate in general equilibrium, Rge, given by r 2 Rge =

r    ; 1

  1

.
General equilibrium
In Appendix A we dene formally the stationary general equilibrium in the open economy
and show existence. We also present the computational algorithm. Note that while
uniqueness of general equilibrium cannot be guaranteed in general, as is commonly the case
in this class of models (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) and Acikgoz (2018)), it is straightforward
to conrm uniqueness for a specic calibration. We compute asset demand, as well as the
invariant cross-sectional distribution and mean of asset supply for a typical household,
for a range of interest rates consistent with the model, and conrm that the demand and
supply curves intersect once (see Figure 2 below).
3 Data and calibration
We approximate the skill level of the households with the education level of the head of
the household. More specically, we consider two groups of households, those whose head
has university education, and those whose head does not.10 At the age of 25, which is the
minimum age for heads of households in our sample, the education level is predetermined
for the households in the sample, hence all households belong to one of the two types.
We estimate the parameters relating to the Markov processes for the idiosyncratic
shocks for the university and non-university groups of households using data on net labour
income from USoc. We use net labour income as the relevant quantity to calibrate the
earnings processes, as this measure coheres well to earnings in the model. We then evaluate
the predictions of the model regarding wealth inequality against data form the WAS.
3.1 Earnings dynamics
Household net labour income is our main measure of income that we use to estimate
the extent and persistence of idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty since wealth inequality is
9Note that  < r + , implying r    >  , ensures that domestic rms demand is nite in the
international market, and also guarantees that r >  1.
10See also Blundell et al. (2008) for a similar classication of households into two groups. Note that
we also control below for the educational level of the spouse as part of potential observable variation of
earnings within the groups of "university" and "non-university" groups of households.
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measured using household-level data.11 We estimate the parameters pertaining to idio-
syncratic earnings uncertainty separately for the university and non-university educated
groups.
3.2 USoc data
USoc is a large longitudinal survey which follows more than 25,000 households (on aver-
age in the rst 8 waves) in the U.K.. USoc provides extensive information on sources of
income for individuals and households, as well as on socio-economic characteristics, de-
mographics and even health condition of the respondents. Data collection for each wave
takes place over a 24-month period and the rst wave occurred between January 2009
and January 2011. Even though the periods of waves overlap, the individual respondents
are interviewed around the same time each year. Thus, there is no respondent who is
interviewed twice within a wave or a calendar year (see Knies (2018)). Our main sam-
ple consists of the General Population Sample plus the former British Household Panel
Survey sample (BHPS), and we exclude the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample and the Immi-
grant and Ethnic Minority Boost Sample. For consistency with the WAS dataset, we also
drop the households located in Northern Ireland. The inclusion of the boost samples and
Northern Ireland sample, or the exclusion of the former BHPS sample does not change
our results either quantitatively or qualitatively.
We dene net labour income as gross household labour income for employment or self
employment net of taxes and national insurance contributions, plus social benets and
private transfers. Households are dened as the family or group of individuals who live in
the same residence. The head is dened as the member of the household in whose name
the accommodation is owned or rented, or is otherwise responsible for the accommodation.
We focus on households whose the head is between 25-59 years and report positive net
labour income. Furthermore, we trim the top and bottom 0.5 percent of observations of
net labour income distribution in each year, to avoid extreme cases or possible outliers in
recorded income. Then, we only keep households who are in the sample for at least three
consecutive periods. The nal sample consists of 38,844 observations from 7,665 unique
households. In Appendix B, we report more information on the net labour income series
and sample selection process.
11Note that in what follows, net labour income and earnings are used synonymously.
34
Idiosyncratic shocks
To focus on the idiosyncratic component of income, we follow the literature (see e.g.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Blundell et al. (2008), and Blundell and Etheridge (2010))
and assume that household net labour income is composed of three components, an el-
ement capturing aggregate conditions common to all households, a deterministic part
depending on observable characteristics and the idiosyncratic component. By denoting
the natural logarithm of the measure of income in period t as yhi;t, for h = u; b, we assume
that it follows the process:
yhi;t = D
h
t + g(xi;t) + "
h
i;t, (1.9)
where g(xi;t) is a linear deterministic function of the observables, xi;t, i.e. g(xi;t) =
bhxi;t. The vector of parameters for each h is given by bh and xi;t is a set of dummy
variables for experience (approximated by age), region of residence, gender of the head of
household, marital status and the educational level of the spouse (if married). Note that
the educational level of the spouse is dened in a similar way to the heads i.e. University
educated and below University educated. Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010) we
also include as a regressor the logarithm of the household size. Function Dht captures
the aggregate conditions common to all households and is specied as calendar year time
e¤ects, i.e. Dht =
P2017
t=2009 1td
h
t , where 1t is an indicator function which is one when a
household i is present at time t and zero otherwise.
For the region dummies we use the U.K. Government O¢ ce Regions classication
which corresponds with the highest tier of sub-national division in England, Scotland and
Wales. Furthermore, following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and to be consistent with
our model, we estimate (1.9) separately for the households whose head has University
education and those households whose head does not. Finally, since in our econometric
analysis we employ household quantities for the arguments in (1.9), we dene all the
variables, apart from the spouses educational level, in terms of the head of the household.
We next retain the residuals "hi;t for each t as a proxy for the unobserved component of
yhi;t and assume that they are determined by an exogenous AR(1) process (see e.g. Chang
and Kim (2006)):
"hi;t+1 = 
h"hi;t + 
h
i;t+1, (1.10)
where
h < 1 and hi;t is a white noise process with variance  h2. We further assume
that the AR(1) process is covariance-stationary with a zero mean and variance
 
h"
2
=
(h)
2
1 (h)2
.12
12We have also modelled the idiosyncratic component as consisting of a persistent and transitory
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Following Chang and Kim (2006, 2007), we estimate (1.10) via OLS and we summarise
the results for the Uni, Non-Uni and the whole sample in Table 1. This table shows that
the estimated variance of shocks to net labour income for the Uni group is higher than
that for the Non-Uni group. We approximate (1.10) by a discrete state-space process, by
applying Rouwenhorst s (1995) method to build a Markov chain with 15-states (see e.g.
Kopecky and Suen (2010) and Krueger et al. (2016)).
Table 1: Markov Process Parameters
Uni Non-Uni
 0.715 0.692
CI90 [0.703,0.727] [0.684,0.700]
p
1 2
0.445 0.431
The model predictions regarding earnings inequality in the stationary distribution
resulting from this approximation are summarised in Table 2, which shows the Gini coef-
cient, Coe¢ cient of Variation (CV) and variance of logarithms predicted by the Markov
Chains with their counterparts calculated using the residuals earnings from equation (1.9).
The AR(1) model and 15-state approximation capture well the quantitative di¤erences in
within group earnings inequality, as well as the overall level of earnings inequality in each
group.
Table 2: Earnings Inequality
Data Model
Uni Non-Uni Uni Non-Uni
Gini 0.230 0.226 0.244 0.237p
V arLog 0.459 0.439 0.445 0.431
CV 0.448 0.429 0.464 0.448
3.3 Wealth inequality
The WAS is a longitudinal survey for GB reporting information on earnings, income,
the ownership of assets (nancial assets, physical assets and property), pensions, savings
and debt, as well as on socio-economic characteristics of the respondents over ve waves
between 2006 and 2016.13 The sample corresponds to the households included in the wave,
but the interviews in each wave are carried over a two year period, with the respondents
providing information for the year of the interview.
component, but we found that this does not improve the models approximation of residual earnings
inequality, nor its predictions with respect to wealth inequality.
13The WAS does not provide information for Northern Ireland.
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An important feature of WAS is that it uses a probability proportional to sizemethod
of sampling cases. This means that the probability of an address being selected is propor-
tional to the number of addresses within a given geographic area, with a higher number of
addresses being selected from densely populated areas. The design of WAS recognizes the
fact that wealth is highly skewed, with a small proportion of households owning a large
share of the wealth. Thus, WAS over-samples addresses likely to be in the wealthiest
10 percent of households at a rate three times the average. Moreover, the large overall
sample size (around 20,000 households) provides robust cross-sectional estimates. These
features ensure both good coverage of the very wealthy and more precise estimates of
overall household wealth. However, as in similar surveys, the very rich (e.g. Forbes 400)
are not typically included and this can a¤ect the estimates of the top 1 percent.
We harmonise the denition of the household and of the head of household as it is
dened in the previous section. We select household heads between 25-59 years of age.
We discard the households with imputed net income or missing educational information.
We use household net worth as our measure for wealth. It is the sum of assets minus
debt for all household members.14 Net worth also admits a substantial proportion of
the population which have negative current wealth. Details on the wealth data are in
Appendix B, which includes key statistics summarising the wealth distributions for all
ve waves in Table B1.
3.4 Model parameters
The model parameters that do not relate to the Markov chains are summarised in Table
3. Regarding preferences, following the literature we use a CRRA utility function:
u(c) =
c1 
1   , (1.11)
and set  = 1:5, which is the mid-point of values typically employed in calibration studies
for the U.K. (see also Harrison and Oomen (2010) who econometrically estimate  = 1:52).
The annual depreciation rate is set to  = 0:0983 which implies that the capital over
income ratio, given the interest rate (see below), is 2.5 at the equilibrium.15 We use
a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale with respect to its
inputs:
Y = AKL1 . (1.12)
14We do not add pension wealth to our measure of net-worth. This allows us to maintain comparability
with the innite horizon incomplete markets literature that generally excludes pension wealth. Further
note that pension wealth is highly imputed in WAS.
15This is also very close to the values in Faccini et al. (2013) and Harrison and Oomen (2010).
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We normalise A = 1 and set  to 0:3 (see, e.g. Faccini et al. (2013) and Harrison and
Oomen (2010)). The value of nu is set to 0:3 based on information on the percentage
of university educated households in either WAS dataset or USoc dataset. Finally, we
make use of the ratio of the predicted earnings components between the two groups to
obtain the ratio u/ b. We further normalise b to be equal to one. Note that for the
computation we normalise the aggregate labour supply to one, and hence, the units of u
and b do not matter, but only the ratio. Moreover, we set the international interest rate,
r, to 0:0215 which is the average value of the real short-term yields in the data for 17
countries for the period 1990-2013 (see Carvalho et al. 2016).
Conditional of the above parameters, we calibrate ,  and  to match the following
data: (i) the value of debt over GDP Kt At
Yt
= 8:1 percent which is the average value in the
data for U.K. for the period 1990-2013 in the extended External Wealth of Nations Mark
II database (see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)); (ii) the percentage of indebted
households (i.e. those with zero or negative net-worth) in the WAS data, which is 18:5
percent; and (iii) the interest rate in equilibrium, r = 0:0217, which is the average value
of the real short-term yields in the data for U.K. for the period 1990-2013 (see Carvalho
et al. 2016). However, note that given Kt At
Yt
= 8:1 percent and r = 2:17 percent, and
given r = 2:15 percent;  is determined by  = r r

[exp(NFAY ) 1]
. Therefore, in e¤ect we
calibrate  and  to match Kt At
Yt
and the percentage of indebted households.
Table 3: Model Parameters
   A  nu   r
 u=b
0.9718 1.50 0.0983 1.00 0.30 0.30 1.33 0.0024 0.0215 1.461
4 Wealth inequality: model vs. data
We rst examine the models predictions regarding wealth inequality within and between
the groups of university and non-university educated and compare these to the data for
the U.K.. We summarise the data and model predictions for key statistics of wealth
inequality in Table 4, following standard practice in the choice of these statistics, see e.g.
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) and Krueger et al. (2016).
We complement this Table by Figure 1, which provides a graphical representation
of the wealth distributions using the quintile measures of the proportion of total wealth
owned by households in the relevant quintile (the rst column) and the Lorenz curves (the
second column). We also report summary measures of wealth inequality at the aggregate
level in the last rows of Table 4 to contextualise the discussion on within and between
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group wealth inequality.
Table 4: Wealth distributions by group
WAS Data Model
Uni Non-Uni Uni Non-Uni
Q1 share -0.006 -0.015 -0.015 -0.051
Q2 share 0.037 0.003 0.066 0.045
Q3 share 0.101 0.075 0.154 0.148
Q4 share 0.205 0.226 0.272 0.283
Q5 share 0.663 0.712 0.523 0.575
T 90-95% 0.136 0.153 0.133 0.144
T 95-99% 0.191 0.205 0.139 0.155
T 1% 0.155 0.148 0.050 0.056
Gini 0.661 0.731 0.545 0.633
au/ab 2.270 1.873
Gini Total 0.720 0.615
Note: "WAS Data" refers to the average statistics over
waves 1-5.
The rst two columns in Table 4 summarise wealth distributions in the data, by
presenting the averages of the relevant quantities across the ve waves of WAS. The main
observation is that households whose head is university educated (denoted as Uni) has
lower wealth inequality than households whose head is not university educated (non-Uni).
This can be seen in Table 4 by comparing the wealth distributions (approximated by the
quintile statistics), wealth ownership at the upper tail and the Gini indices.
The quintile shares suggest a relatively smaller concentration of wealth in the lower
three quintiles and a relatively higher concentration of wealth in the upper two quintiles
for the non-university educated. Given the implied spread between the lower and upper
parts of the wealth distributions, all of these observations suggest that wealth inequality is
higher for the non-university than for the university educated groups, which is conrmed
by the summary Gini measures. Further note that the group of university educated has
higher wealth on average, compared with the non-university educated, i.e. the relative
wealth ratio, au/ab, is at 2.27 on average across the ve waves of data.
The next two columns in Table 4 summarise the predictions of the model in Section
2 and calibrated in Section 3. The calibration implies an average wealth ratio of Uni to
Non-Uni households predicted by the model of about 1.9, which is consistent with (but
lower than) between group wealth inequality in the data. Importantly, the model coheres
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Figure 1: Quintle Shares and Lorenz Curves of the Wealth Distribution by Group
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with key properties of within group wealth inequality for the two groups, i.e. higher wealth
inequality for the Non-Uni group relative to the Uni group. This result can be seen by
comparing the Gini indices, but is more comprehensively demonstrated by examining
the relative rankings of the measures of wealth ownership for the two groups. The model
predictions track those in the data. When the quintile shares are higher in the data for the
Uni group (the Q1, Q2 and Q3 shares), they are also higher in the model. Whereas, when
the quintile measures are higher in the data for the Non-Uni group they are also higher
in the model. Overall, the model predicts a Gini index for the non-university educated
that is signicantly higher than the respective index for the university educated.
The models predictions regarding the extent of wealth inequality relative to the data
are close for both groups, with the exception of the predictions for the top 5 percent,
and especially the top 1 percent, where the model signicantly underestimates wealth
inequality, consistent with other models of this class in the literature. The rst column
in Figure 1 shows the wealth distribution approximated by the quintile shares for the
USoc calibration in Table 4. Both show that the model magnitudes are similar to the
data for both groups. The second column of Figure 1 suggests that the level of predicted
inequality within each group is lower compared with the data, reecting that overall the
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model quantitatively under-predicts the extent of wealth inequality. This can also been
seen by referring to the Gini index implied by the model for the aggregate economy in
the last row of Table 4.
In contrast to the WAS data, the model predicts slightly higher wealth concentrations
for the top 1 percent of the Non-Uni relative to the Uni groups. However, a closer look at
each of the WAS waves shows that the wealth concentration ranking for the top 1 percent
is not consistent over all the waves (see Appendix B). For example, in the rst three
waves, wealth ownership by the top 1 percent is higher for the Non-Uni while it is higher
for the Uni in the last two waves.16 In contrast, the ranking of the remaining statistics
between the two groups in Table 1 does not change over the waves. On the other hand,
the models predictions regarding the relative ranking of the group wealth concentrations
in the top percentiles below the top 1 percent (i.e. the shares owned by the top 90-95
percent and 95-99 percent) are very similar to the data.
Overall, the models predictions regarding wealth inequality capture the main di¤er-
ences between the two groups and the overall extent of inequality, for the majority of the
distribution. As is well known in the literature, this class of standard incomplete markets
models does not match quantitatively the extent of wealth inequality that we observe in
the data with respect to wealth ownership at the very top end.
5 Equality and e¢ ciency implications
We next quantitatively analyse the equality and e¢ ciency implications of the pecuniary
externalities associated with the skill heterogeneity in an open economy context for the
U.K..
5.1 Equality
We rst examine the mechanism by which pecuniary externalities generates wealth in-
equality and then evaluate the e¤ects of these quantitatively. In particular, we investi-
gate the importance of savings externalities in generating the within and between group
inequalities that we observe in Table 4, by comparing inequality and key aggregate quan-
tities for the model analysed above with those obtained in articial economies. In these
economies the two types of households do not interact via the nancial market, thus
16For example, the ratios of the Non-Uni top 1 percent to the Uni top 1 percent for Waves 1-3 are
1.029, 1.13 and 1.06 respectively. Whereas the corresponding ratios for Waves 4-5 are 0.812 and 0.873
respectively.
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eliminating the pecuniary externalities working via the interest rate.17
Figure 2: General Equilibrium
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We start with the model analysed above and in Figure 2 we plot the asset supply curves
for a typical household in both groups of university and non-university educated, as well
as the asset supply and demand functions for the aggregate economy.18 We summarise
key quantitative information relating to this Figure in Table 5 under the column "Base".
In addition, we add in Table 5 key statistics that capture model predicted earnings and
wealth inequality. More specically, we report the earnings inequality that is implied by
the calibration in Section 3 and the wealth inequality in general equilibrium. The general
equilibrium is obtained at the intersection point of the aggregate-level supply and demand
curves for assets, giving an interest rate of r = 0:0217 and capital stock of a = 3:583.
17Strictly speaking, the economies without market interaction also shut down externalities via the wage
rate. To control for this, we have repeated the experiments in this section by adjusting the wage rate
for each group to be the same as in the baseline economy, and the results are very similar quantitatively,
suggesting the savings externalities in this model economy work predominantly via the interest rate and
not via wages.
18Note that the group-level and aggregate-level supply and demand functions are in per capita units.
Thus, they refer to mean asset supply and demand functions.
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Table 5: Pecuniary externalities and inequality per group
Base NIu NIb
r 0.0217 0.0212 0.0220
a 3.583
au 5.317 5.015
ab 2.839 2.980
Wealth Gini Uni 0.545 0.555
Wealth Gini Non-Uni 0.633 0.620
Notes: (i) the NIh models are based on the same earning processes
as in the Base model; (ii)au
ab
=2.27 in the data; (iii) a

u
ab
=1.87 for the
model; and(iii) a

u
ab
=1.68 for NI.
In Figure 3, we again plot the supply and demand curves for this model, which provide
the equilibrium (already shown in Figure 2) when the two groups interact via the market
in a single economy. We complement this by plotting the asset supply curves for a typical
household in each group, which capture mean asset supply per group, together with the
mean asset demand curves that would apply if these two groups did not interact. In
other words, we treat the two groups as separate economies, each populated with the ex
ante identical university or non-university educated agents. We denote these as NI (non-
interaction) supply and demand. The intersection points of the respective asset supply
and demand curves represent the equilibrium interest rate and assets in the absence of
group interaction, which are reported in Table 5 under the NIh, h = u; b columns. The
asset supply curves for a typical household in each group in the Base model encapsulate
their optimal policy functions and thus choices for savings given aggregate outcomes under
market incompleteness. Therefore, from Figure 3 and Table 5, we can see that in the Base
model the equilibrium interest rate r = 0:0217 implies mean assets for the Uni group
that are equal to au = 5:317 and for the Non-Uni group that are equal to a

b = 2:839.
Hence, compared with the case where the groupssavings do not a¤ect each other (i.e.
r = 0:0212 ) au = 5:015 and r = 0:0220 ) ab = 2:980), the asset supply of the other
group in the general equilibrium of Base economy, works to lower (increase) the interest
rate for the Non-Uni (Uni) groups respectively.
Viewed from the perspective of the Non-Uni (Uni) group, the reduction (increase) in
the interest rate resulting from pecuniary externalities, reduces (increases) their respec-
tive incentives to save.19 Hence, mean assets are reduced (increased) for the Non-Uni
19Note that the (decrease) increase in the interest rate also creates income, in addition to substitution,
e¤ects. In this case, the substitution e¤ects dominate in terms of mean savings (see also below for a
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Figure 3: Externalities From Skill Heterogeneity
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(Uni) group, leading to an increase in the ratio of mean wealth by about 11 percent. In
turn, this under-accumulation (over-accumulation) of assets works to increase (decrease)
wealth inequality in each group, by increasing (decreasing) the exposure to earnings vari-
ability. To illustrate the e¤ect of the change in the interest rate on asset accumulation
and inequality for a given group (in partial equilibrium), we plot in Figure 4 mean assets
and the within group Gini index for wealth inequality for a range of interest rates, holding
earnings risk and all other parameters xed, for the non-Uni group. As can be seen, an
increase in the interest rate, ceteris paribus, increases mean group savings and decreases
within group inequality.
Therefore, the asset supply of each group creates savings externalities in the nancial
market which a¤ects inequality in the other group. To quantify the externalities e¤ect,
we rst summarise in Table 5 wealth inequality for the two groups in these two scenaria.
Comparing the NIh equilibria to the Base model equilibrium, the latter implies higher
wealth inequality within the non-university educated, and lower wealth inequality within
the university educated. We then further decompose the changes in the Gini index for
the two groups in Table 5 into the changes in wealth implied per quintile.
decomposition).
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Figure 4: Interest Rate Comparative Statics (non-Uni Group)
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In Table 6, we report mean wealth per quintile for the Base economy and for the NIh
equilibria, and the percentage change due to pecuniary externalities. As can be seen,
within the Uni (non-Uni) group, the top and bottom quintiles have signicantly higher
(lower) wealth accumulation under externalities (i.e. about 8 to 9 percent and 5 to 7
percent respectively), whereas the middle three quintiles have lower changes in wealth
(i.e. about 0 to 4 percent). Note that the increase in the interest rate generates income
and substitution e¤ects for a typical household in the Uni group and the results indicate
that the substitution e¤ects dominate at the tails of the distribution, whereas the income
e¤ects are stronger in the middle. The changes in the tails are strong enough to determine
the positive change in the mean, shown in the last line in Table 6.
The situation is reversed for the non-Uni group. For example, for the bottom quintile
and the top two quintiles the decrease in the interest rate, due to pecuniary externalities,
implies lower wealth accumulation (the e¤ects are bigger for the top and bottom quintile).
For the second and third quintile, the income e¤ects dominate so that asset accumulation
increases. However, the decrease in the other three quintiles is stronger and determines
the negative change in the mean for the group. On average, the two groups increase
or decrease their equilibrium wealth by about 5 to 6 percent as a result of pecuniary
externalities. For example, given average net worth of £ 273,000 for the Uni group and
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£ 121,000 for the non-Uni group across the ve waves in the WAS, the results suggest that
pecuniary externalities contributes to the average asset accumulation of the Uni by about
£ 16,500 and decreases the average asset accumulation for the non-Uni by about £ 6,000.
Table 6: Mean assets per quintile by group
Base NI % change

NI Base
jNIj

Uni Non-Uni Uni Non-Uni Uni Non-Uni
aQ1 -0.495 -0.717 -0.530 -0.684 6.60 -4.82
aQ2 0.637 0.959 0.665 0.938 -4.21 2.24
aQ3 2.107 2.716 2.162 2.707 -2.55 0.33
aQ4 4.968 4.752 4.974 4.864 -0.12 -2.30
aQ5 19.37 6.486 17.80 7.074 8.82 -8.31
a 5.317 2.839 5.015 2.980 6.02 -4.76
5.2 E¢ ciency
We next investigate the e¢ ciency e¤ects of savings externalities and whether they lead to
higher or lower aggregate savings compared with an equivalent market allocation where
externalities are not present.
The model in Section 2, taking the international markets and skill heterogeneity as
part of the institutional setup, incorporates two main sources of ine¢ ciency. The rst
ine¢ ciency arises irrespective of ex ante skill heterogeneity (i.e. even in the case of ex
ante identical households), as a result of incomplete nancial markets, which imply that
idiosyncratic earnings shocks lead to income and savings inequality and precautionary
savings. This has been analysed extensively in the literature (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) for
theoretical and quantitative analysis in the class of general equilibrium models). These
heterogeneous savings imply pecuniary externalities between the households, working from
high savers to low savers and vice versa, via the nancial markets and, in particular, the
interest rate. The e¢ ciency implications of pecuniary externalities incorporated in incom-
plete market models have been noted since Greewald and Stiglitz (1986) and examined in
detail in Davila et al. (2012), who have shown that, depending on the stochastic environ-
ment, they can work to increase or decrease aggregate savings relative to a constrained
e¢ ciency benchmark where savings are chosen optimally to maximise aggregate welfare.
The second ine¢ ciency arises because of skill heterogeneity, and also works via the
interest rate. In this framework, as we saw in the previous sub-section, the higher savings
of the high skill group tends to decrease the market interest rate, thus a¤ecting savings of
the low skill group (and vice versa for the savings of the low skill group). Here, we examine
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whether externalities tend to increase or decrease aggregate savings relative to a situation
where in the same market economy savings are chosen optimally without externalities
due to skill heterogeneity, and thus whether (and by how much) externalities generates
additional ine¢ ciency at the aggregate level.
To this end, we compute the aggregate quantities that characterise the equilibrium
of an economy where consumption and savings are chosen to maximise the utility of a
typical household in an economy with ex ante identical agents, i.e. of households who face
the same earnings process, implying that they face the same mean earnings and earnings
risk. This model is solved for the same parameter values as the model with the skill
heterogeneity, except for those pertaining to the common stochastic process governing
earnings for the ex ante identical household. To obtain these, we set u = b = ,
implying  = 1, and assume that the earnings process for the typical household is given
by:
"i;t+1 = "i;t + i;t+1, (1.13)
where 2 = n
u
 
u
2
+ nb
 
b
2
and  =
nuu(u" )
2+nbb(b")
2
nu(u" )
2+nb(b")
2 . This gives  = 0:699 and
2" = 0:435.
The results from this economy are summarised in Table 7 under the column "Identical".
We also repeat for convenience in Table 7 the respective quantities from the base model.
As can be seen, pecuniary externalities implies an increase in mean assets by about 0.8
percent compared to a model economy that eliminates this ine¢ ciency. Given an average
mean net worth across the four waves in the data from the WAS of about £ 166,000,
this implies that about £ 1,300 of the average wealth accumulation is driven by pecuniary
externalities. Compared with the inequality implications, the in-
Table 7: Ine¢ ciency
Identical Base
r 0.0217 0.0217
a 3.556 3.583
e¢ ciency arising from savings externalities is much smaller.
6 Conclusions
This paper set out to quantify the inequality and ine¢ ciency implications of externalities
due to the heterogenous savings behaviour of di¤erent groups in the population. To this
end, we developed an open economy incomplete markets model with state dependent
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(Markovian) stochastic earnings processes and ex ante heterogeneity corresponding to
being university educated or not. The two groups were allowed to di¤er in their earnings
processes, both in the state-space and in the transition matrix for idiosyncratic earnings
shocks.
Using the Understanding Society and the Wealth and Assets Survey for Great Britain,
we found that this model predicted wealth inequality both within and between the uni-
versity and non-university educated groups that was consistent with the data. Although
the university educated group faces higher risk in terms of the persistence and volatil-
ity of the idiosyncratic component of net labour income, the model predicts that it has
signicantly lower within group wealth inequality, consistent with the data. In fact, the
model predicted a di¤erence in the wealth Ginis between the two groups that is similar to
that observed in the data and, more generally, it produced very good predictions for the
wealth distribution up to the top 5 percent. Moreover, the models predictions regarding
between group inequality, captured by the mean wealth ratio, were close to the data.
The savings of the two groups generate pecuniary externalities which work via the
nancial market to increase (decrease) savings for the university (non-university) educated
groups. This leads, at the aggregate level, to an ine¢ cient increase in the accumulation of
assets, which we nd to be relatively small quantitatively, at about 0.8 percent. However,
externalities also lead to an increase in inequality between the groups, and within the
group of non-university educated, and to a decrease in wealth inequality within the group
of university educated. These e¤ects are sizeable with the ratio of mean wealth between
the two groups increasing by approximately 11 percent due to the savings externalities.
Moreover, there is a heterogeneous response in wealth accumulation within the groups,
leading to the signicant within group inequality e¤ects. For example, the rise and fall in
wealth for the university and non-university groups respectively was 8 to 9 percent for the
top quintile and 5 to 7 percent for the bottom quintile. Overall, therefore, the inequality
implications of pecuniary externalities are much bigger than their e¤ects on e¢ ciency.
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7 Appendix A
We dene a stationary recursive equilibrium following e.g. Miao (2014, ch. 17) and
Acikgoz (2018).20
Stationary Recursive General Equilibrium
For h = u; b, a Stationary Recursive Equilibrium is stationary distributions h (AB),
policy functions aht+1 = g
h
 
aht ; s
h
t

: Ah  Sh ! Ah, cht = qh
 
aht ; s
h
t

: Ah  Sh ! R+,
value functions vh
 
aht ; s
h
t

: Ah  Sh ! R, and positive real numbers K;w (K) ; r (K)
such that
1. The rm maximises its prots given prices, so that the latter satisfy (1.6) and (1.7).
2. The policy functions aht+1 = g
h
 
aht ; s
h
t

and cht = q
h
 
aht ; s
h
t

solve the households
optimum problems in (1.4) given prices and aggregate quantities, and the value
functions vh
 
aht ; s
h
t

solve equations (1.4).
3. h (AB) is a stationary distribution:
h (AB) =
Z
AhSh
h [(a; s) ; AB]h (da; ds) ,
for allAB 2 B  AhSh, where h [(a; s) ; AB] :  Ah  Sh B  Ah Sh!
[0; 1] are transition functions on
 Ah  Sh induced by the Markov process  sht 1t=0
and the optimal policy gh
 
aht ; s
h
t

.
4. When h (AB) describe the cross-section of households at each date, i.e. h (AB) =
h (AB), markets clear. In particular, the labour market clears, i.e. L = Ls = 1,
where
Ls = nuu
X
j2Su
suj 
u
 
suj

+ nbb
X
j2Sb
sbj
b
 
sbj

,
20Aggregation over the households can be obtained by using the methods discussed e.g. in (see e.g.
Uhlig (1996) and Al-Najjar (2004), Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)).
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the world asset market clears, i.e.
r = r +  

exp

K   As
F (K;L)

  1

,
where
As = nu
Z
AuSu
gu (a; s)u (da; ds) + nb
Z
AbSb
gb (a; s)b (da; ds) ,
and the goods market clears, which, using factor input market clearing, implies:
F (K; 1)  K   r(K   A) =
= nu
R
AuSu q
u (a; s)u (da; ds) + nb
R
AbSb q
b (a; s)b (da; ds).
Following standard arguments (commonly used in this class of models since Aiyagari
(1994)), it can be shown that continuity of the asset supply and demand functions at
the aggregate level with respect to the interest rate as well as the limit properties of
supply and demand for assets, imply that a general equilibrium exists.21 Using results in
Acikgoz (2018) and adapting arguments from Angelopoulos et al. (2019), we can show
the existence of a general equilibrium in the open economy with a unique stationary
distribution at the household level that also determines aggregate quantities.
Proposition 1
For  su¢ ciently large,  >  min satisfying K
Y
(r) > ln

r r+ min
 min

, a stationary
recursive general equilibrium exists.
Proof: The properties of the production function imply that the wage rate is a
monotonic function of the interest rate, and, given that L = 1, K is a decreasing function
of r, as are the ratios Y and K
Y
. Given the interest rate, rm demand implies a demand
for assets over labour via (1.8), given by:
Ad =

K
Y

  ln

r   r +  
 

Y ,
which is a continuous function in r. When r r
+ 
 
is small enough such that K
Y
>
ln

r r+ 
 

, dA
d
dr
< 0. Moreover, when r ! 1

  1, Ad ! Amin < +1, whereas when
r ! r  , Ad ! +1. Given r (and w (r)), there is a unique partial equilibrium, implying
a unique aggregate supply of assets, As. As shown in Acikgoz (2018), this is continuous
21A general proof of existence of equilibrium for this class of models can be found in Acemoglu and
Jensen (2015).
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with respect to r and when r ! 1

  1, As ! +1.22 Moreover, when r !  1, As ! 0.
Therefore, an intersection point of the supply and demand curves As and Ad exists. 
Note that the su¢ cient condition  > min is easy to satisfy for realistic calibrations for
developed economies, where the interest rate r does not di¤er much from the international
interest rate and the capital to output ratio is higher than two, implying values for min
in the third decimal point above zero.
Computation
To compute the stationary general equilibrium, we implement the following algorithm:
1. Guess a value for rn, which, given the rst-order conditions (1.6) and (1.7) implies
a value for Kn, Y n and wn.
2. Calculate the demand for domestic assets to labour implied by the international
asset markets via (1.8), given by
An = [Kn   ln (rn   r + ) + ln]Y n.
3. Given rn and wn, solve the typicalhouseholdsproblem to obtain gh
 
aht ; s
h
t

, for
h = u; b.
4. Use gh
 
aht ; s
h
t

and the properties of the Markov processes
 
sht

to construct the
transition functions hKj . Using 
h
Kj
, calculate the stationary distributions h.
5. Using h, compute the aggregate values of As (rn) that is supplied by the domestic
economy and the updated value of
rn

= r + 

exp

Kn   As (rn)
Y n

  1

.
6. If jAs   Anj < ", where " is a pre-specied tolerance level, a stationary open economy
general equilibrium has been found. If not, go back to step 1, and update rn+1 =
(1  &) rn + &rn with 0 < &  1.
To solve the household problem we use the Endogenous Grid Method (Carroll (2006)).
To implement this algorithm we rst choose amin =  . We then let amax = 50, which
implies that, in the solution, the probability of asset holdings greater than 40 is less than
22For details see Acikgoz (2018), Theorem 1. Further note that continuity of mean assets with respect
to the interest rate, for each type of household, also implies continuity for the weighted average between
households.
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3:1  10 5. We discretise the space of household assets amin; amax with a log scale by
allowing for 1000 points. We have found that the obtained wealth distribution is robust
to increasing Kmax up to 100 and to decreasing it down to 40.
8 Appendix B
The WAS started in July 2006 with a rst wave of interviews carried out over two years
to June 2008. The WAS interviewed approximately 30,500 households including 53,300
adult household members in Wave 1. The same households were approached again for
a Wave 2 interview between July 2008 and June 2010. In this wave 20,170 households
responded (around 70 percent success) including 35,000 adult household members. Waves
3-5 covered the periods between July and June for the years 2010-12, 2012-14 and 2014-16
respectively. After Wave 2, due to sample attrition, the WAS started implementing boost
samples in each wave to keep the number of interviewed households around 20,000 and
35,000-40,000 adult household members.23
USoc is a large longitudinal survey which follows approximately 40,000 households
(at Wave 1) in the U.K.. USoc covers a wide range of social, economic and behavioural
factors making it relevant to a wide range of researchers and policy makers. Data collection
for each wave takes place over a 24-month period and the rst wave occurred between
January 2009 and January 2011. Note that the periods of waves overlap, but the individual
respondents are interviewed around the same time each year. Thus, there is no respondent
who is interviewed twice within a wave or a calendar year (see e.g. Knies (2018)).
8.1 Demographics (WAS)
1. Head of the Household: We dene the head of household as the principal owner
or renter of the property, and, when there is more than one head, the eldest takes
precedence. This follows the reference person denition in USoc. We use of the
following variables: (HhldrW), (HiHNumW), (DVAGEw) and/or (DVAge17w).
2. Education level: There are two educational attainment variables in the WAS.
The rst is the TEAw, which is the age that the individual completed education.
The second is the EdLevelw which is a derived variable of the education level and
represents the highest educational level that respondent has achieved. EdLevelw
provides three categories: (i) degree level or above; (ii) below degree qualications
23The WAS and USoc data sets employed in this paper refer to the free "End User Licence" versions
of the datasets (i.e. WAS: SN-7215 and Understanding Society: Waves 1-8, 2009-2017, SN: 6614).
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(iii) no qualications. The TEAw has the disadvantage that it cannot distinguish
the type of qualication that the respondent had achieved. Moreover, 33 percent of
the TEAw observations of working-age adults have either missing values or partial
answers. Thus, we choose to work with the EdLevelw which is a derived variable
and has only 2,942 missing values, i.e. around 2.7 percent of working-age adult
observations. However, using EdLevelw, we note that there are respondents for
whom educational attainment changes in a way that indicates misreporting. For
example, for some respondents, there is an increase of educational attainment just
for one wave and then a return back to the previous level of education in subsequent
waves. Thus, we have chosen to make some corrections to the educational level
when a respondents educational attainment changes. In particular, if we observe
a respondent for all the 5 waves, we replace her educational attainment with the
level that was reported the most times across the 5 waves. We follow a similar
procedure if a respondent changes her educational attainment just once. More
specically, we require the respondents being present in the sample for at least
3 waves and we use the most commonly recorded education level across waves.
These corrections were applied to 4,873 observations out of 107,320 total amount
observations of adult respondents (around 4.5 percent) and only half of these 4,873
observations correspond to a head of a household. Despite these corrections, the
results are very similar when they are not made.
8.2 Denition of wealth (WAS)
1. Net property wealth:24 is the sum of all property values minus the value of all
mortgages and amounts owed as a result of equity release. (HPROPWW).
2. Net nancial wealth: is the sum of the values of formal and informal nancial
assets, plus the value of certain assets held in the names of children, plus the value
of endowments purchased to repay mortgages, less the value of non-mortgage debt.
The informal nancial assets exclude very small amounts (less than £ 250) and the
nancial liabilities are the sum of current account overdrafts plus amounts owed on
credit cards, store cards, mail order, hire purchase and loans plus amounts owed
in arrears. Finally, money held in Trusts, other than Child Trust Funds, is not
included. (HFINWNTW_sum)
3. Net Worth: is the sum of the net property wealth and net nancial wealth.
24All monetary values are expressed in 2012 prices as measured by CPIH.
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Table B1: Wealth Inequality in Great Britain
Gini sd
mean
mean
median
top 10% au
ab
WAS (wave 1)
Uni 0.644 1.948 1.846 0.460
Non-Uni 0.702 1.972 2.073 0.480 2.085
Total 0.696 2.121 2.000 0.492
WAS (wave 2)
Uni 0.632 1.697 1.798 0.442
Non-Uni 0.714 1.983 2.404 0.481 2.148
Total 0.699 1.977 2.140 0.487
WAS (wave 3)
Uni 0.655 1.995 1.997 0.476
Non-Uni 0.733 2.488 2.619 0.507 2.247
Total 0.718 2.385 2.301 0.516
WAS (wave 4)
Uni 0.691 2.854 2.267 0.522
Non-Uni 0.748 2.315 3.410 0.530 2.499
Total 0.742 3.048 2.733 0.555
WAS (wave 5)
Uni 0.685 2.359 2.281 0.514
Non-Uni 0.761 2.400 3.849 0.538 2.372
Total 0.742 2.628 2.817 0.547
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8.3 Sample selection (WAS)
Table B2: WAS Sample selection, household observations per selection step
selection step Uni Non-Uni Total
1. Whole sample of households 110,963
2. Drop households with misreported age variable 110,937
3. Drop households with duplicate hh grid numbers 110,910
4. Keep if headsage 25, 59 59,457
5. Drop if no or misreported heads educational info 17,490 41,056 58,546
6. Drop if earnings of household members are imputed 17,037 40,235 57,272
Average net worth obs per wave 3,407 8,047 11,454
Table B2 shows the various sample selection steps. The household heads must be
between 25-59 years of age, have full information for the relevant demographic information
and their household earnings should be reported and not imputed.
8.4 Demographics (USoc)
1. Head of the Household: We use the USoc denition of the head of household.
The head of household is dened as the principal owner or renter of the property,
and, where there is more than one head, the eldest takes precedence. (whrpid, where
the prex w denotes wave)
2. Education level: We have used the variable whiqual_dv. To examine the potential
heterogeneity of earnings risk in the main text, the sample is split into degree holders
and non-degree holders. The former are the individuals who hold either a Higher
Degree or 1st Degree, while the latter are the individuals who hold other highers
or A-levels/AS level/Highers or GCSE/O level/other qualication or they have no
qualications.
3. Marital Status: Marital status of the head of the household. (wmastat_dv)
8.5 Denition of net income (USoc)
Household net labour income: is dened as household net labour earnings plus benets,
plus private transfers. It is equal to household total annual earnings, plus social bene-
ts, plus annual transfers income minus taxes, NI contributions. Private transfers income
totals all receipts from other transfers (including education grants, sickness insurance,
maintenance, foster allowance and payments from TU/Friendly societies, from absent
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family members). Social benets income totals all receipts from state benets including
national insurance retirement pensions. Household Net Labour Income=Net Labour In-
come (hhmnlabnet_dv) + Private Transfers (hhmnprben_dv and hhmnmisc_dv) +
Public Benets (hhmnsben_dv).
8.6 Sample selection (USoc)
Our sample selection for USoc is reported in Table B3. The household heads must be be-
tween 25-59 years of age, report non-zero net income and their household earnings should
be reported and not imputed. Moreover, the head must not have missing values for region
and educational attainment. We trim the top and bottom 0.5 percent of observations of
net labour income distribution in each year, to avoid extreme cases or possible outliers
in recorded income. We also require the households to be observed with positive incomes
for at least 3 consecutive waves. As in the WAS, we exclude Northern Ireland.
Table B3: Households and household members USoc
selection step Uni Non-Uni Total
1. Whole sample 208,200
2. Drop proxy & non-full interviews 157,187
3. Original sample & BHPS sample 122,193
4. Drop if no heads educational info 122,023
5. Drop if heads region missing 121,977
6. Drop if heads region is N. Ireland 121,958
7. Keep if headsage 25, 60 68,003
8. Drop if heads marital status missing 67,913
9. Drop if gross labour income is missing or imputed 59,043
10. Drop if net labour income is zero 17,273 40,860 58,133
11. Drop top and bottom 0.5% of observations 17,107 40,461 57,568
12. Drop if they change educational groups 16,770 40,192 56,962
13. keep if present at least at 3 consecutive waves 11,783 27,061 38,844
Average obs per wave 1,472 3,383 4,855
Number of unique households 2,250 5,415 7,665
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF PEER AND
ASPIRATIONAL PRESSURE ON
INEQUALITY
1 Introduction
There is a signicant body of research examining the importance of social inuences on
economic outcomes (see e.g. Benhabib et al. (2011) for an overview of this literature).
A subset of this literature has focused on the role of group pressure to achieve socially
determined economic targets.1 This has been motivated by long-standing theories of
relative consumption and/or income, related to a desire for status (see Veblen (1899),
Duesenberry (1949)), and empirical evidence that the implied social inuence on ones
preferences matters for economic decision making, including consumption, savings and
labour supply choices (see e.g. He¤etz and Frank (2011) and De Giorgi et al. (2019)). At
the same time, an extensive literature, building on the contributions by Bewley (1986),
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), shows that under incomplete markets, the distribu-
tion of these choices across individuals, in response to the idiosyncratic shocks that they
receive, leads to hours, earnings, wealth and consumption (HEWC) inequality.
Combining the ideas underpinning these two strands of research, it is natural to expect
1See e.g. Akerlof (1980), Jones (1984), Abel (1990), Cole et al. (1992), Bernheim (1994), Gali (1994),
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Postlewaite (2011) and Roussanov (2010)
for examples in game theory, labour, macroeconomics, growth, nance, and reviews of the literature. A
comparison of our work relative to the literature is the next section.
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that social pressure should contribute to the patterns of observed inequality. There is
a growing literature which theoretically examines the link between socially determined
reference points (including those related to status-seeking and aspirations) with inequality
and persistent poverty (see e.g. Becker et al. (2005), Mookherjee et al. (2010), Ray and
Robson (2012), Dalton et al. (2016), Genicot and Ray (2017)). However, the distributional
e¤ects of socio-economic class-related peer and aspirational pressure, under stochastic
productivity and class participation, have not been examined.2
This paper aims to ll this gap, focusing on a quantitative analysis of the distributional
e¤ects of these forms of social pressure on HEWC across the socio-economic spectrum both
between and within the socio-economic classes. This allows us to examine heterogeneity in
the e¤ects of social pressure on inequality across social groups and economic outcomes, and
thus obtain more information on the socio-economic implications of changes in the form
and strength of social pressure. Such change may arise with socio-economic developments
that characterise our times (e.g. greater social interaction and widespread access to social
media) or as a result of intentional long-term policy interventions to instigate societal
change (e.g. policies to support integration and condence, or to provide role models and
success stories, to increase aspirations). In particular, we are interested in identifying:
(i) social groups that, following changes in social pressure, are more likely to experience
increases in the dispersion of economic outcomes, despite potential material benets in
absolute terms; and (ii) economic outcomes in which we observe divergence/convergence
between groups.
1.1 Theoretical framework and data t
The theoretical framework we develop incorporates: (i) persistent, idiosyncratic shocks
to productivity and socio-economic class participation, determining social mobility in
addition to wages; (ii) exible forms of peer and aspirational pressure related to class-
relevant consumption targets, which are determined in equilibrium by the aggregation of
relevant household-level consumption choices; and (iii) endogenously determined cross-
sectional distributions of HEWC. A households utility depends, in addition to its own
consumption and leisure, on a socially determined target that is given by some aggregate
measure of consumption (e.g. the mean or any percentile) of their peersconsumption
(i.e. of households in their own socio-economic class), or of members of other socio-
2This is despite empirical evidence on (i) the strength of social pressure from the group of peers on
savings, consumption and e¤ort choices (see e.g. Brown et al. (2008), Mas and Moretti (2009), Mugerman
et al. (2014), and De Giorgi et al. (2019)), and (ii) the extent and importance of the idiosyncratic
component of earnings (see e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a review of this research and Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) regarding evidence for the UK).
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economic classes (allowing, e.g., for upward lookingaspirations). Since households face
the prospect of upward or downward mobility, the whole set of social targets matter for
each individuals decision making, albeit with implicit weights determined by its current
state and the conditional probabilities determining social mobility.
The exibility in the determination of the consumption targets permits the study of
varying strengths of peer pressure, and of di¤erent forms of aspirations. Motivated by
empirical evidence in e.g. De Giorgi et al. (2019), who estimate signicant keeping-
up-with-the-Jonesese¤ects of co-workersaggregate consumption on a households own
consumption, the group of peers is dened as the group of households who have the same
type of occupation. Moreover, existing research (see e.g. Appadurai (2004), Ray (2006),
Dalton et al. (2016), Genicot and Ray (2017)) has analysed the importance of di¤erent
forms of upward lookingaspirations for decision making and economic outcomes. We
di¤erentiate between aspirations that are constrained to conform to peer behaviour and
those where a household aspires to achieve outcomes typically associated with higher
income classes.
In our framework, inequality is determined by individual responses to uninsured idio-
syncratic shocks (dened here to include the social class shocks), as well as social pres-
sure. In turn, the extent of peer or aspirational pressure is an equilibrium outcome,
determined jointly with the distributions of the economic outcomes that it contributes
to. The equilibrium is obtained when household level decision-making is consistent with
the aggregate-level social targets. In other words, when the consumption target for each
group equals the respective moment of the distribution of consumption that arises under
the whole set of consumption targets.
We show existence of a stationary socio-economic equilibrium where social pressure
targets are xed quantities and are jointly determined with the (invariant) cross-sectional
distributions. This extends the stationary equilibrium results in Bewley (1986) - Huggett
(1993) - Aiyagari (1994) models (BHA) of wealth, earnings and consumption inequality
(see e.g. Acikgoz (2018) and Zhu (2018)). The socio-economic equilibrium in our model
is a generalisation of the stationary equilibrium concept in the Pijoan-Mas (2006), Marcet
et al. (2007), and Zhu (2018) version of the BHA incomplete markets models with en-
dogenous labour supply. We build on the approach in Zhu (2018) and show that under
peer pressure a stationary socio-economic equilibrium exists and it is characterised by a
unique household-level invariant asset-shock distribution.3
We then show that quantitative analysis based on this framework can match the styl-
ised patterns of inequality between and within the professional groups that we observe
3The latter property of the equilibrium is very helpful in that it facilitates a feasible computation.
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in the data for Great Britain. We consider four professional groups, based on the Na-
tional Statistics Socio-Economic Classication (NS-SEC) (see Rose and OReilly (2005) for
more detail). These groups are denoted as routine(including routine and semi-routine
occupations), intermediate(including clerical, sales and service, as well as lower super-
visory and technical occupations), lower professional(including lower management and
professional occupations) and higher professional (including higher management and
professional occupations). We choose these groups because the classication generates a
discernible pattern for between and within group inequality. Using data on the distribu-
tion of: (a) hours and earnings from the Understanding Society dataset; (b) wealth from
the Wealth and Asset Survey; and (c) consumption from the Living Cost and Food Survey,
we nd that: (i) mean hours, earnings, wealth and consumption increase with professional
classes which have higher mean wages; (ii) within group hours, earnings and wealth in-
equality varies substantially between the groups, and decreases for groups with higher
means. In contrast, within group consumption inequality does not vary much between
groups; and, (iii) overall inequality (across the whole sample) is highest for wealth and
lowest for consumption, as is typically found in the data (see e.g. Quadrini and Rios-Rull
(2015) for the U.S.). We calibrate the model using data on professional class and wage
dynamics from the Understanding Society dataset and, based on available econometric
evidence from De Giorgi et al. (2019), peer pressure that implies keeping-up-with-the-
Jonesesand jealousymotives. Social targets are determined by the mean consumption
of the socio-economic group to which the household belongs. We nd that the model cap-
tures the main patterns of inequality in the data in hours worked, earnings, wealth and
consumption, between and within the professional classes.
1.2 Peer pressure
We use our framework to shed light on the contribution of "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses"
peer pressure on inequality in HEWC, between and within the socio-economic groups
that we consider. Intuition suggests that social pressure to achieve a target that sum-
marises behaviour in ones own class, which is implied by keeping-up-with-the-Joneses
peer pressure, should create incentives to induce within-cluster convergence and, likely,
cross-cluster divergence.4 In other words, groups become more sharply distinguishable,
while the individuals within the groups become more similar, as a result of the pressure
4Indeed, this is consistent with the results in Genicot and Ray (2017), who link aspirations-dening
social targets to a type of clustering that is characterised by within-cluster convergence and cross-cluster
inequality, when the clusters are dened based on similarity in terms of income. Likewise, Luo and Young
(2009) nd that a common preference for social status across the whole distribution (i.e. when there is
"one cluster") implies a reduction in wealth inequality.
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to conform to targets that di¤er between groups. While these e¤ects are present in the
economy that we consider, we uncover a richer interaction between peer pressure and
distributional outcomes, characterised by the co-existence of (i) between group conver-
gence in some outcomes with divergence in others; and (ii) within-group divergence for
some groups and in some outcomes, with convergence for others. We nd that, as a
result of "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure, within group hours and earnings
inequality falls for the higher mean wages groups and within group wealth and consump-
tion inequality reduces for the lower mean wage groups. In contrast, within group wealth
and consumption inequality increases for the higher mean wage groups and within group
hours and earnings inequality rises for the lower mean wage groups. Hence, the inequality
e¤ects of peer pressure to meet social targets are not uniform across social groups. At the
same time, between group inequality increases for hours, earnings and consumption, but
falls for wealth.
The complexity in the e¤ects of peer pressure summarised above arises because we
study an environment with stochastic productivity and social transitions (which implies
that all agents acknowledge that with some probability all social targets might become rel-
evant), which distinguishes earnings from asset income. The prospect of upward mobility,
associated with stochastic socio-economic class participation, embeds an upward looking
element in peer pressure. Under peer pressure, the prospect of upward mobility implies
a possibility for increased peer pressure. Thus, it stimulates savings, working to decrease
between group wealth inequality and further contributing to the asymmetric change in
within group inequality across groups and economic outcomes.5 The added realism in our
framework implies that, following changes in the type of peer pressure, the interaction
of intra- and inter-temporal decision margins (under idiosyncratic productivity and the
prospect of upward mobility) imply di¤erential e¤ects of social targets across groups. This
leads to the asymmetric pattern of both convergence and divergence, between and within
groups, depending on social class and the inequality measure considered.
1.3 Aspirations
Peer pressure incorporates an aspirational element, because it instills a desire to match a
pre-specied level of success. We investigate the e¤ects of a stronger aspirational aspect of
peer pressure, associated with group members targeting the consumption of more success-
ful members of their groups, instead of the "typical" member. We nd that such social
5Stochastic socio-economic class participation also embeds a risk of downward mobility, which works
in the opposite way to lower savings for the higher mean wage groups, further enhancing the e¤ects
described here.
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behaviour is associated with signicant and positive e¤ects, on average, for all groups. It
is related with falls in within group inequality as well as in the gap between the highest
mean wage group and the other groups regarding hours and earnings. On the other hand,
between and within group inequality in consumption and wealth do not change much and
do not follow an obvious pattern. On balance, when aspirations are determined within the
social class, there are positive implications of a more strongly aspirational peer pressure
for hours and earnings, without signicant and clear e¤ects on wealth and consumption.
The form of aspirations discussed above can be thought of as more a result of pressure
from peers to meet a group-level target (and is thus reecting a form of social conformism),
rather than a situation where an agent truly aspires to behaviour associated with "higher
classes". We aim to understand the potentially di¤erent inequality implications of aspira-
tions that are constrained by pressure to conform to peers, from an aspiration to succeed
by doing better than the peers. To this end, we exploit the exible form of target func-
tions employed in the theoretical framework when comparing these two types of social
pressure. We dene above-peer aspiration as the situation where the social target is the
mean consumption (or relevant percentile) of the socio-economic group that has a higher
mean wage than the group of peers.
We nd that above-peer aspiration, compared with peer pressure, has positive e¤ects
on mean quantities for all socio-economic classes. However, while it allows the groups
with the raised aspirations (lower mean wage groups) to close the gap with the top mean
wage group in hours, earnings and consumption, it increases the gap in terms of wealth.6
However, when focusing on the three lower mean wage groups, for which there are truly
"higher" aspirations, by disentangling asset income as a source of income from hours and
earnings, we nd that wealth and consumption inequality within-groups increases under
higher aspirations. This is despite a reduction in within-group inequality in hours and
earnings and thus highlights the importance of allowing for idiosyncratic earnings variation
and the insurance value of wealth when examining wealth inequality. Therefore, the
improvement in average material wealth that is implied by higher, above class, aspirations,
can be associated with an increase in social dissatisfaction, as a result of an increased
dispersion in the magnitude and probability of underachievement.
6The wealth inequality result has similarities to results in Genicot and Ray (2017), where stronger
aspirations increase between group wealth inequality. However, in our model, this result is obtained even
when aspirations have monotonic e¤ects on savings, and is driven by an upper bound of aspirations to
the level of peer pressure for the higher socio-economic class. In e¤ect, there is a direct non-monotonic
increase in aspirations across the classes that drives the specic result here.
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2 Related literature
Our framework and analysis builds on the class of models with idiosyncratic shocks and
incomplete markets, which, following the contributions by Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993)
and Aiyagari (1994), has been used to study quantitatively wealth inequality in a station-
ary equilibrium (see e.g. Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) and Benhabib et al. (2017) for
reviews and extensions; and Acikgoz (2018) for a proof of existence of stationary equilib-
rium under persistent shock processes in the benchmark model with exogenous earnings).
Our extension is based on generalisations as in e.g. Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Marcet et
al. (2007) and thus on a framework where HEWC inequality are jointly determined in
response to exogenous shocks. Zhu (2018) shows existence of stationary equilibrium in
the benchmark model with endogenous earnings and persistent productivity shocks.
Our modelling framework contributes to this research by adding peer pressure in an
environment with professional mobility, dening a socio-economic equilibrium, and es-
tablishing its existence and its relevance for quantitative analysis of between and within
group inequality.7 An additional di¤erence relative to the quantitative analyses in the lit-
erature relates to the characterisation of productivity shocks. Agents in our model receive
shocks that determine their occupation type and their productivity in their occupation.
In the model calibration, we use Understanding Society data to measure transitions from
any occupation type, and any productivity level, to any other.
Existing research has introduced social e¤ects in the form of keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses relative consumption considerations in representative agent dynamic general
equilibrium models, to study their e¤ects on macroeconomic outcomes and asset pricing,
following the contributions by e.g. Abel (1990), Gali (1994) and Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). Instead, we are interested in the joint determination of distributions with socio-
economic targets and we work in an environment with heterogeneous agents, who are
subjected to idiosyncratic shocks and pressure from a specic group of peers. We focus
on peer pressure associated with consumption targets. In our framework each social
group has its own target, where all targets are jointly determined in equilibrium with
the distribution for consumption for all groups and we establish existence of such a socio-
economic equilibrium.8 Roussanov (2010) introduces status seeking related wealth targets
in the utility function in a model with heterogeneous agents but does not study peer
pressure. Instead, the social target in Roussanov (2010) is average wealth across the
whole distribution, and the model is used to quantitatively examine the e¤ect of such
7Note that when dening the socio-economic equilibrium, social targets that inuence economic deci-
sions are determined jointly with the distributions that they a¤ect.
8Note, given social mobility, all social targets matter for any individual agents decision making.
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social factors on nancial decision-making and portfolio allocations.
Peer pressure, and analysis of the resulting socio-economic equilibrium, has been ex-
amined rigorously in static settings (e.g. Akerlof (1980), Jones (1984), Bernheim (1994),
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2010) and Ghiglino and Goyal (2010)), and in conjunction
with income inequality (e.g. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)). We take the individuals
desire to conform to socially-dened targets as given, and focus on the joint determination
of inequality in HEWC with the level of the social targets (and thus the extent of peer
pressure), in an environment where the agents are subjected to idiosyncratic productivity
and social class shocks.
There is also a signicant literature that has examined the importance of status seek-
ing, aspirations and relative consumption considerations for economic growth and in-
equality, including the e¤ect of such social factors on savings and growth, the qualitative
properties of the distribution of wealth and/or income over generations and the possibil-
ity of poverty traps in the process for development (see e.g. Cole et al. (1992), Hopkins
and Kornienko (2006), Ray and Robson (2012), Genicot and Ray (2017), who also review
further contributions in this literature). In addition, the joint determination of inequal-
ity with occupational mobility has been theoretically examined in the literature, (e.g.
Mookherjee and Ray (2003)) and quantitatively (e.g. Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006)) without social pressure, and in a theoretical analysis of skill acquisition
under aspirations in Mookherjee et al. (2010).
Our analysis complements this research, by: (i) focusing on the group of peers de-
termined by (stochastic) socio-economic class participation, as opposed to proximity in
measures of income to determine social pressure, either from peers, or in the form of
above-peer aspirations (see e.g. Genicot and Ray (2017, p. 494) on the novelty of such
extensions); (ii) examining the joint determination of the distributions of HEWC with the
set of social targets, in a stationary equilibrium and under stochastic productivity; and
(iii) focusing explicitly on a framework to be used for quantitative analysis in an empir-
ically relevant model, calibrated using data on the distributions of idiosyncratic shocks,
to examine the interplay between peer pressure and inequality between and within the
socio-economic class, as well as the e¤ect of changes in the aspirational value of social
targets on these inequalities.
We focus on cross-sectional distributions with individual-level stochasticity and dy-
namics within a stationary equilibrium, and do not examine dynamics in aggregate quan-
tities (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Benhabib et al. (2015) for analysis
of stationary stochastic equilibrium). Moreover, since we are interested in the e¤ects of
social pressure on inequality under the possibility of upward or downward mobility, and
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not on the e¤ects of social pressure on mobility, we keep the latter as a stochastic process
which we calibrate to the data for the quantitative analysis. It would of course be a very
interesting, and non-trivial, extension to this framework to analyse a situation where the
prospect of upward mobility interacts with the prospect of increased peer pressure to de-
termine jointly cross-sectional distributions, in addition to decision making that inuences
class participation.9
3 A general theoretical framework
We consider an economy that is composed of a continuum of innitely lived agents (house-
holds) distributed on the interval I = [0; 1]. Households derive utility from consumption
and leisure and by comparing their consumption with that of their di¤erent socio-economic
groups, which can be the group of their peers. We dene peers to be all the members of
the same socio-economic group. Participation in a socio-economic group is determined by
a stochastic process at the level of the household, which also determines the households
returns to hours worked. Households draw idiosyncratic shocks independently from each
other and cannot fully insure against shocks to labour income, because nancial markets
are incomplete. More specically, there is a single asset in the economy. We examine
stationary equilibria in which aggregate quantities are constant. Time is discrete and
denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
3.1 Households
Each household is endowed with one unit of time which is allocated between leisure
and labour. We do not explicitly model di¤erences in labour productivity and earnings
between household members and assume for simplicity that the household o¤ers a uniform
labour supply. Each household wishes to maximise her expected lifetime utility:
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct; lt; Ct), (2.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the time discount factor, c is consumption, l is leisure and C is a
quantity capturing the property of the consumption distribution to which the household
compares their level of consumption to derive utility. At the level of the household,
the social targets are taken as given. Households may di¤er in the reference value for
9See e.g. Piketty (1995) and Benabou and Ok (2001) for examples of studies where the prospect of
upward mobility can a¤ect choices, in those cases relating to the demand for redistribution.
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consumption, but they are identical in their deep preferences.
Idiosyncratic shocks
The household is subject to idiosyncratic shocks that determine its professional class (or
occupation type) and its productivity within that professional class, thus determining
the overall labour e¢ ciency of the household. We assume that the household can work
in M professional classes (reecting, e.g., higher and lower managerial or professional
occupations, lower supervisory and intermediate jobs, or a routine and semi-routine jobs),
and within each class there are N productivity states. For example, a household may
work as a highly productive lower supervisory worker, thus earning more income than the
average lower supervisory worker, or it may be a manager not meeting her targets and
thus earning less than the average manager. The (M;N) specication may also capture
the e¤ect of the second earner in a household. In particular, we can let the M states
capture the professional or socioeconomic class of the household, as determined by the
higher earner/head of the household, and in turn allow the N states to determine the
households total earnings, from all members, within the M professional class. Together,
M and N capture labour e¢ ciency of the household, which, in conjunction with labour
supply and the wage rate per labour e¢ ciency unit, w, determine labour income. At the
household level, and in a stationary equilibrium, w is constant and exogenously given.
The stochastic process for the joint distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (zt)1t=0 is a
Markov chain with transition matrix Q and state space Z = [z1; z2; :::; zH ], H = M N ,
where for h = 1; :::H, zh  zm;n for all m = 1; :::;M and all n = 1; :::; N . The elements
of the transition matrix Q are denoted  (zt+1jzt), and
P
zt+1
 (zt+1jzt) = 1 for all zt 2 Z.
Additionally, we assume that  (zt+1jzt) > 0 for all zt; zt+1 2 Z. Hence, the Markov chain
has a unique invariant distribution, with probability measure that we denote by .
The stochastic process (zt) determines labour income as well as consumption related
peer or above-peer pressure, by determining the relevant target level for relative consump-
tion comparisons. Denoting e(zt) : Z ! E = [e1; e2; ::; eH ]  [e (z1) ; e (z2) ; ::; e (zH)] as
labour e¢ ciency, labour income is given by we(zt)(1   lt). The elements zh in Z can be
ordered such that 0 < emin = min (E) <    < emax = max (E). Moreover, socio-economic
class participation is determined by s (zt) : Z ! [1; :::;M ], where s (zm=j;n) = j, for
j = 1; :::;M , and implies a reference point for consumption, relative to which individ-
ual level consumption is compared. In particular, C(zt)  C(s (zt)) : Z ! eC, whereeC = C1; C2; ::; CM	. The elements in eC can refer to di¤erent percentiles or the mean of
the distribution of consumption for the di¤erent classes.
At the level of the household, eC is given. However, in equilibrium, the reference points
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Cj are determined endogenously by the distribution of consumption in the specic class
that the individual compares its consumption to. Note that this setup implies that there
is a unique transition matrix Q that determines the evolution of both stochastic processes
e(zt) and C(s (zt)).
Peer and above-peer pressure
The social target can be dened as capturing pressure from ones peers to achieve a target
related to group behaviour, or as capturing aspirations to achieve a target related to more
successful groups. Under peer pressure, C can be, for example, the average consumption
of the group of peers, or any percentile of that distribution that forms the appropriate level
of comparison. Consistent with empirical evidence from De Giorgi et al. (2019), which
suggests that the peer pressure e¤ects are determined by the professional environment,
we assume that the reference group, the peers, is the professional, socio-economic class to
which the household belongs. Hence, under peer pressure, professional class determines
the reference point for consumption, in addition to a¤ecting labour income. In particular,
under peer pressure, the function C(s (zt)) is given by:
C(s (zt) = j) = Cj, for j = 1; :::;M .
Alternatively, the social target may capture the aspirations of the household to achieve
a consumption level of households of "higher", in terms of economic outcomes, socio-
economic classes. Under such above-peer aspirations, C can be, for example, the average
consumption of groups of households from classes with higher consumption, or any per-
centile of that distribution. In this case, the function C(s (zt)) is given by:
C(s (zt) = j) = Cj+1, for j = 1; :::;M   1,
C(s (zt) = M) = CM , for j = M .
We assume that the instantaneous utility function u(c; l; C) satises:
Assumption 1
u : R+ [0; 1]R+ ! R is bounded and twice continuously di¤erentiable; u(c; l; C) is
strictly increasing in (c; l) and strictly concave in (c; l; C); lim
c!0
u1(c; l; C) = +1, 8l 2 [0; 1]
and 8C  0, and lim
l!0
u2(c; l; C) = +1, 8c  0 and 8C  0; u12  0 i.e. consumption and
leisure are normal goods and complementary to each other.
The assumptions regarding leisure follow from Zhu (2018). Under peer pressure, the
marginal e¤ect of C determines its type: (a) either @u
@C
< 0 ("jealousy"), or @u
@C
> 0
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("admiration"), and, (b) either @
2u
@c@C
> 0 ("keeping-up-with-the-Joneses"), or @
2u
@c@C
< 0
("running-away-from-the-Joneses"). When peer pressure is consistent with jealousy and
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (see e.g. Gali (1994), Dupor and Liu (2003), and De Giorgi
et al. (2019)), it creates incentives to increase consumption and under save. When peer
pressure is consistent with admiration and running-away-from-the-Joneses (see e.g. Dupor
and Liu (2003) and Roussanov (2010)), it creates incentives to decrease consumption.
Under above-peer aspirations, the marginal e¤ect of C satises @u
@C
< 0 and @
2u
@c@C
> 0.
Compared with the specications of aspirations in Mookherjee et al. (2010), Dalton et
al. (2016) and Genicot and Ray (2017), we focus here on the aspiration to achieve the
consumption level of the higher, in terms of income, socio-economic class relative to ones
own class.
Optimal choices
There is a single risk-free asset in the economy, which generates interest income from
accumulated assets rat, where r is the interest rate and a denotes assets. Households
labour e¢ ciency shock e(zt) is observed at the beginning of period t. Households use their
income for consumption and to invest in future assets at+1. Moreover, the households
cannot borrow assets from other households and thus at+1  0.10 Thus, the households
budget constraint is:
ct + at+1 = (1 + r) at + we(zt)(1  lt), (2.2)
with c  0 and at+1  0. The households state can be described by (a; z) 2 AZ, where
A = [0;+1). The interest rate and wage rate are taken as given and satisfy r >  1
and w > 0. To allow for an equilibrium with non-degenerate distributions in economic
outcomes, we assume that (1 + r) < 1 (see e.g. Marcet et al. (2007) and Zhu (2018)).
Taking prices and consumption targets as given, and given initial values (a0; z0) 2
AZ, the household chooses plans (at+1)1t=0, (ct)1t=0 and (lt)1t=0 that solve the maximisation
10Since the household can choose to set l = 1, the natural borrowing limit in this context is zero.
We could allow for borrowing, if, for example, we made the additional assumption that even under zero
labour income, net household income is positive (reecting for example family support and/or public
transfers). To keep the exposition compact we do not introduce such assumptions.
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problem:
V (a0; z0) = max
(ct;at+1;lt)
1
t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct; lt; C(s (zt))),
s:t:
ct + at+1 = (1 + r) at + w(1  lt)e(zt), (2.3)
ct; at+1; lt  0,
1  lt.
To obtain the dynamic programming formulation of the households problem, let V

at; zt; eC
denote the optimal value of the objective function starting from asset-productivity state
(at; zt) and given the values of the reference points eC.11 The Bellman equation is:
V

at; zt; eC = (2.4)
= max
at+1  0
ct; lt  0
1  lt
fu(ct; lt; C(s (zt))) + 
X
zt+12Z
 (zt+1jzt)V

at+1; zt+1; eCg;
where ct + at+1 = (1 + r) at + w(1  lt)e(zt):
As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, building on analysis in e.g. Stokey et al.
(1989), Miao (2014) and Acikgoz (2018), and applying results from Zhu (2018), it can
be shown that there exists a unique value function V

at; zt; eC that solves the problem
in (2.4) and policy functions at+1 = g

at; zt; eC, ct = q at; zt; eC and lt = l at; zt; eC,
which generate the optimal sequences
 
at+1
1
t=0
, (ct )
1
t=0 and (l

t )
1
t=0 that solve (2.3), with
properties including the following. The functions g(a; z; eC) and l(a; z; eC) are continuous
and weakly increasing in a, and the function q(a; z; eC) is continuous and strictly increasing
in a, while l(a; z; eC) = 1 8z 2 Z, when a is su¢ ciently large. Moreover, there is an upper
bound for asset accumulation, denoted by a, and there is X = [0; a]  Z such that if a
household starts with state (a; z) in X, then the agent stays in X, and if a household
starts outside of X, it will arrive in X almost surely. Finally, by dening the transition
11To simplify notation, we suppress the explicit dependence of the value and policy functions on the
interest and wage rates.
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function  eC as:

eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] =
 (z0jz) , if g a; z; eC 2 A0
0, if g

a; z; eC =2 A0

, (2.5)
for all (a; z) 2 X, A0  fz0g 2 B (X), the process f(a; z)g1t=0 with transition matrix  eC
has a unique invariant distribution 
eC on X.
3.2 Socio-economic equilibrium
We dene a socio-economic equilibrium given prices, where consumption reference points
are consistent with household-level actions. Since there is a unique invariant distribution
at the household level, 
eC , which the same for all households,  eC is also the cross-sectional
distribution.12 Therefore, the distributions of consumption, assets and labour supply per
socio-economic class are invariant.13 Thus, in a stationary equilibrium, given prices,
(w; r), there are M consistency conditions, which will determine the elements in eC = 
C1; C2; ::; CM

:
Cj = R

q

at; zt; eC : s (zt) = j , for j = 1; :::;M , (2.6)
where the function R () refers to the relevant percentile of the distribution of consump-
tion that denes the benchmark reference point for class st. When the reference point
is determined by the mean consumption of the households in the social class that the
household belongs to, the M consistency conditions will determine:
Cj =
 
1

m=j
!Z
X

q

a; z; eC : s = j eC(da; dz), for j = 1; :::;M , (2.7)
where 
m=j
denotes the proportion of households that experience socio-economic class
m = j and is obtained as the relevant marginal distribution of the unconditional joint
distribution .
12See e.g. Uhlig (1996), Al-Najjar (2008) and Acemoglu and Jensen (2016) for versions of the Strong
Law of Large Numbers that apply in this class of models.
13Note that since the unconditional joint distribution 
eC(a; z) is invariant, the marginal distributions

eC
j (a; z)  
eC (fa; z : s = jg) =PNn=1  eC(a; zj;n), for j = 1; :::;M , are also invariant.
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Equilibrium and existence
We formally dene a stationary recursive equilibrium with peer pressure given aggregate
prices, which we term as socio-economic equilibrium.14
Definition: Stationary Recursive Socio-economic Equilibrium
For given prices r and w, a Stationary Recursive Socio-economic Equilibrium is an
aggregate stationary distribution 
eC on X, policy functions at+1 = g

at; zt; eC : X !
A, ct = q

at; zt; eC : X ! R+ and lt = l at; zt; eC : X ! [0; 1], value function
V

at; zt; eC : X ! R, and positive real numbers in eC, such that:
1. Given the values in eC, the value function and the policy functions g at; zt; eC, ct =
q

at; zt; eC, and lt = l at; zt; eC solve the typical households optimum problem
in (2.4).
2. Given the values in eC,  eC is a stationary distribution under the transition function

eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] implied by households decision rules (determined by (2.5)). In
particular, 
eC satises:

eC([0; a] fz0g) =
Z
X

eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] eC(da; dz),
for all (a; z) 2 X, A0  fz0g 2 B (X).
3. When 
eC describes the cross-section of households at each date, the reference points
in eC =  C1; C2; ::; CM are given by the relevant percentiles of the distribution of
consumption across the relevant social class in (2.6) or by the means in (2.7).
Proposition 1: A stationary recursive socio-economic equilibrium exists.
Proof: To show that an equilibrium allocation of
 
C1; C2; ::; CM

, i.e. of the elements
of the set eC, dening a stationary recursive socio-economic equilibrium exists, we use a
xed point theorem. In particular, dene the set C  Rm as the Cartesian product
C = [0; cmax]  [0; cmax]      [0; cmax]. Note that for a given set eC there is always an
upper bound for consumption which is implied by the upper bound on assets, a eC , and
is given by cmaxeC = (1 + r) a eC + wemax. We dene cmax as the maximum of all possible
cmaxeC s. Thus, C is compact and convex, so that eC 2 C. Dene the operator T ( eC) : C ! C
14We also investigate later potential additional e¤ects of social pressure on inequality via endogenously
determined prices in the context of the calibration for the UK, by dening and establishing existence of
a general equilibrium in an open economy setup.
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to be given by the set of equations in the right hand side of (2.6) or (2.7). Lemma 1
in Appendix B establishes continuity of the policy function ct = q

at; zt; eC in eC, and
thus continuity of the operator in (2.6). Moreover, Lemma B in Appendix 2 establishes
continuity of the integrals in (2.7) in eC, thereby establishing that the operator in (2.7) is
continuous. Then, Brouwers xed point theorem applies and implies that an allocation 
C1; C2; ::; CM

to solve (2.6) or (2.7) exists. 
We describe an algorithm to solve iteratively for this stationary equilibrium after we
discuss the calibration of the model below. As is commonly the case with equilibrium in
heterogeneous agent models, although existence of equilibrium can be shown, we cannot
show that the equilibrium is unique in general (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Miao (2014), Zhu
(2018) and Acikgoz (2018)). In this model, this happens because changes in the reference
points,
 
C1; C2; ::; CM

, need not have monotonic e¤ects on household policy functions.
For example, in the applications below, we nd that an increase in Cm tends to increase
consumption for households in the mth social group. However, we also nd that the
increase in Cm also lowers consumption, to increase savings, for those is other groups who
face the prospect of moving to that group and are thus faced with the prospect of higher
peer pressure. In our applications, we have numerically explored the potential multiplicity
of solutions for the set of parameter values that we use to calibrate the model. We have
found a unique equilibrium for the set of parameters considered.15 This is discussed in
more detail below.
4 Data and stylised facts
We use British data on wages, hours worked, earnings, wealth, consumption and pro-
fessional class participation, to calibrate the model and evaluate its predictions. In this
section, we summarise the key properties in the data, To capture the uncertainty in labour
productivity (wages) and socio-economic class participation, we use data from the Under-
standing Society Survey 2009-2017 (University of Essex, 2018), hereafter UnSoc. Data on
the distributions of wealth are obtained from the Wealth and Assets Survey (ONS, 2018),
hereafter WAS, on earnings and hours from the UnSoc, and consumption from the Living
Cost and Food Survey (ONS, 2017), hereafter LCF.16 Details on the data and sample
selection are reported in Appendix C.
15This is similar to the variations of the Aiyagari (1994) model solved in the literature, in that although
uniqueness typically cannot be established, a unique equilibrium for common calibrations is the norm.
16The WAS dataset covers Great Britain only. For consistency, we use the sub-sample for Great Britain
from UnSoc and LCF below. However, the results are very similar if we use the whole sample from UnSoc
and LCF.
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4.1 Social class, wages and hours
We rst calculate the socio-economic transition matrix and productivity risk within socio-
economic classes. We make use of the UnSoc data, which is the latest longitudinal dataset
for the U.K. containing information on individuals and households from 2009 to 2017 (8
waves). We keep households when the head17 is an employee and, if there is a spouse who
also works, when she/he is also an employee. We drop the households if either the head
or the spouse (if any) is self employed. We keep households when both the head and the
spouse (if any) have non-missing usual gross earnings per month at the current job and
non-missing number of weekly hours normally worked. However, we keep households if
one of the two spouses does not work i.e. if there is a spouse with zero earnings and zero
hours. We also drop the households with positive incomes but reported zero hours. We
further restrict the dataset by retaining households where the head of the households is
aged 25-59 and dropping observations with missing values for socio-economic class (to be
dened below).18 To approximate the households e¤ective wage, we rst translate the
usual gross earnings per month at the current job to weekly gross earnings by multiplying
by 12 and dividing by 52, and then, we divide the sum of weekly gross earnings of the
spouses by the sum of typical total weekly hours of the spouses.19 We drop the top 0:5%
and the bottom 0:5% of the observations with positive households e¤ective wage, to avoid
extreme cases (e.g. possible outliers in e¤ective wages) which may a¤ect results (see e.g.
Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for similar treatment). This e¤ectively means that we
drop households that appear to be working for less than half the minimum wage. Finally,
we keep those households that have at least two consecutive observations with positive
household e¤ective wage.
We approximate the socio-economic class of the household with the higher of the
professional classes of the head or of the spouse. We use the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classication (NS-SEC), which is the o¢ cial socio-economic classication in
the U.K.. In particular, starting from the Eight Class NS-SEC, we create the follow-
ing groups in which we can allocate all heads and spouses: "Higher management and
professionals occupations" (denoted Higher Professional), "Lower management and pro-
fessional occupations" (denoted Lower Professional), "Intermediate occupations (clerical,
17We follow the ONS denition for the Household reference person (HRP) to dene the head of the
household. In particular, the HRP is the owner or renter of the accommodation in which the household
lives. If there are multiple owners or renters, it is the eldest of them.
18Details on sample selection are in Appendix C. For similar sample selection criteria in terms of
focusing on employees and working age groups, see, e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Heathcote et al.
(2010)).
19Constructing an e¤ective wage by dividing earnings by hours worked is common (see e.g. Blundell
and Etheridge (2010), Blundell et al. (2007) or Bayer and Juessen (2012) for household e¤ective wage).
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sales, service) and lower supervisory and technical occupations" (denoted Intermediate),
"Routine and semi-routine occupations" (denoted Routine). The rst group merges two
separate categories in the o¢ cial NS-SEC since the higher managerial groups are small
after the exclusion of employers. The third group is made up of two groups in the o¢ -
cial NS-SEC categories, "Intermediate occupations (clerical, sales, service)" and "Lower
supervisory and technical occupations", which we have added into one group because the
statistics that we examine below for these two groups do not di¤er signicantly, so that,
for the purposes of our analysis, these two groups are observationally equivalent. For simi-
lar reasons, we add in one group the two groups "Routine occupations" and "Semi-routine
occupations".
To approximate productivity risk within the socio-economic class, we rst partial out
the variation in wages between workers and over time that is not due to the professional
class, but to other observable characteristics. Second, we discretise residual wages within
each professional class. To implement the rst step, we follow Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) and calculate the wages net of the predicted component based on observable char-
acteristics. In particular, we consider a regression:
lnWit = Xit + Zit + it, (2.8)
where Xit includes a constant term, a quadratic in experience approximated by age,
dummies for region of residence, dummy for gender and time xed e¤ects. Moreover, Zit
contains a set of dummy variables for the socio-economic classes as dened above. We do
not include a variable for education because it is highly correlated to the socio-economic
class and it will absorb all the di¤erences between the groups. We pool the data and run
an OLS regression to estimate the parameters. Then, we dene the measure of residual
(log) wages as:
lnfWit = lnWit   Xit. (2.9)
To implement the second step, we discretise the distribution of these residual wages,
for each wave, by rst splitting the households into the M = 4 groups according to their
socio-economic class. Then, within each group we split the ordered wage distribution
into N = 3 parts each containing a third of the socio-economic class. Thus, in each
wave, we also allocate each household into one of the H = 4  3 = 12 groups. We track
transitions of households between the four professional classes and between the 12 wages
states, and calculate the transition matrix for socioeconomic class (capturing underlying
social mobility) and for wages (corresponding to the Q matrix in the model) by creating a
pooled sample of all transitions over the 8 waves. The wage transitions matrix (reported
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in Appendix C) has higher probabilities along the diagonal, ranging between 0.55 to 0.77,
and is associated with a unique stationary distribution. To derive the relevant state space
E (also reported in Appendix C), we rst calculate mean wages for each group h 2 H in
each wave and then we calculate the average over the waves, which we normalise to one.
The stationary distribution associated with the modelled stochastic process for wages
predicts a coe¢ cient of variation of 0.419 and a Gini index of 0.235, which are close to
the respective statistics in the data, i.e. 0.483 and 0.257.
The social mobility transition matrix accompanying wage transitions (where R, I,
LP and HP refer to Routine, Intermediate, Lower Professional and Higher Professional
respectively), is given by:26666664
R I LP HP
R 0.9146 0.0577 0.0221 0.0056
I 0.0427 0.8746 0.0681 0.0146
LP 0.0125 0.0284 0.9218 0.0374
HP 0.0033 0.0111 0.0574 0.9282
37777775 . (2.10)
The diagonal of this matrix shows that there is high probability of remaining in the
same professional class and thus is indicative of low social mobility. This is in line with
previous ndings on transitions between professional groups in the U.K. using the British
Household Panel Survey (Upward and Wright (2007)), which is the precursor of UnSoc,
and with evidence on occupational and wealth mobility in the U.S. (see e.g. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)).
We also summarise in Table 1 the means and the Gini index per professional group
of residual wages (normalised) and of the typical hours worked.20 As can be seen, higher
mean wages moving up the professional classes are generally accompanied by higher within
class wage inequality (for the highest wage group the Gini does not increase relative to
the second highest). Regarding typical hours worked, the relationship is reversed. In
particular, groups with higher typical hours worked on average are characterised by a
lower inequality in terms of hours. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between mean
20Typical hours in Table 1 are obtained by dividing usual weekly hours (the sum of hours worked by
both spouses) by Ns*14*7, where Ns is the number of the spouses (i.e. assuming that a worker has up
to 14 hours a day to choose to allocate to work or leisure).
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wages and mean hours suggesting that on average higher wages encourage higher work.
Table 1: Summary statistics of wages & hours worked
NS-SEC Mean Gini
E¤ective wages
routine and semi-routine 0.623 0.184
intermediate low supervisory 0.814 0.202
lower management and professional 1.081 0.212
higher management and professional 1.398 0.203
total 1.000 0.257
Average typical hours worked
routine and semi-routine 0.296 0.223
intermediate low supervisory 0.330 0.152
lower management and professional 0.346 0.127
higher management and professional 0.346 0.121
total 0.333 0.153
Source: Understanding Society, own calculations. We report the
average statistics over waves 1-8. All monetary values are expres-
sed in 2015 prices as measured by CPIH.
4.2 Earnings, wealth and consumption inequality
We summarise the data predictions on earnings, wealth and consumption inequality be-
tween and within the professional classes in Table 2. Details on the data and samples are
in Appendix C.21 We calculate the mean of the relevant quantities (normalised so that
the mean across the whole sample is one) and the within group Gini index for the four
groups. A comparison of the means across groups provides an indication of between group
inequality.
As expected, mean earnings, wealth and consumption increase with professional classes
that have higher mean wages. However, within group earnings and wealth inequality
decreases, whereas within group consumption inequality does not vary much between
groups. Note that overall inequality is highest for wealth and lowest for consumption, as
is typically found in the data (see e.g. Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) for the U.S.). In
this case, this is evident both in terms of the Gini for the whole sample and by noting
21The measure of consumption includes non-durable goods, services and semi-durable goods. To have
a user-cost measure of housing, we follow Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and include rent, mortgage
interest payments and housing taxes.
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that between group inequality is highest for wealth and lowest for consumption.
Table 2: Summary statistics of total earnings, net worth & consumption
NS-SEC Mean Gini
total earnings
routine and semi-routine 0.549 0.314
intermediate low supervisory 0.794 0.263
lower management and professional 1.100 0.243
higher management and professional 1.454 0.235
total 1.000 0.308
net worthy
routine and semi-routine 0.387 0.775
intermediate low supervisory 0.696 0.662
lower management and professional 1.101 0.628
higher management and professional 1.702 0.593
total 1.000 0.670
consumptionz
routine and semi-routine 0.774 0.248
intermediate low supervisory 0.901 0.258
lower management and professional 1.068 0.260
higher management and professional 1.231 0.274
total 1.000 0.276
Source: Understanding Society, own calculations. Total earnings refers to the
sum of the weekly net earnings of the two spouses. We report the average
statistics over waves 1-8.
ySource: Wealth and Assets Survey, own calculations. We report the average
statistics over waves 1-5. Net-worth refers to the sum of property and net
nancial wealth of the household.
zSource: Living Costs and Food Survey, own calculations. Consumption refers
to equivalised weekly non-durable consumption plus real housing costs.
We report the average statistics over year 2009-2017. All monetary values for all
three variables in this table are expressed in 2015 prices as measured by CPIH.
5 Calibration, solution and model t
In this section, we discuss the calibration and numerical solution and establish that the
model does a good job in capturing the key stylised facts on within and between group
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inequality summarised in the previous Section.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters to match underlying dimensions in the data. We
capture stochasticity by using the transition matrix calculated from the UnSoc data as
explained in the previous Section. Regarding the utility function, we use a CRRA utility
function which is additively separable in consumption and leisure, augmented with relative
consumption considerations (see also Jappeli and Pistaferri (2017) and De Giorgi et al.
(2019)):
u(c; l; C) =
c1 
1  C
 + 
l1 
1   , (2.11)
where ;  > 1,  > 0. This functional form has the advantage that it nests di¤erent
possibilities regarding the type of social interactions that lead to peer pressure. In partic-
ular, conditional on  > 1, for  > 0 equation (2.11) implies that @u
@C
< 0 ("jealousy") and
@2u
@c@C
> 0 ("keeping-up-with-the-Joneses"), whereas for  < 0 equation (2.11) implies that
@u
@C
> 0 ("admiration") and @
2u
@c@C
< 0 ("running-away-from-the-Joneses").22 Therefore,
the sign of  determines the type of peer pressure.23 Naturally, when  = 0, equation
(2.11) delivers as a special case the benchmark model without social factors, and in this
case the utility function used is the same as in Pijoan-Mas (2006). The elasticity of own
consumption with respect to the target level of consumption is given by "cC   (see
Appendix D for details). Hence, conditional on a value for , the absolute value of 
determines the size of the responsiveness of agent-level choices to social targets, i.e. it
determines the strength of peer pressure.
We calibrate the utility function as follows. We rst set  = 1:5, which is a commonly
used value (see e.g. Harrison and Oomen (2010) for the U.K.). Then, following e.g.
Pijoan-Mas (2006), we choose  and  so that the models predictions are consistent with
working hours in the data, in terms of average and inequality in hours worked. More
specically, we calibrate  so that mean hours worked equal 0.33 and  so that the Gini
in hours worked predicted by the model is equal to 0:153 (see Table 1 for the data targets).
The calibrated values are shown in Table 3 (see also Table D1 in Appendix D which reports
the long form of the rounded up entries in Table 3). Finally, for our base results we choose
22See Appendix D for details.
23Note that for 0 <  < 1:5 equation (2.11) does not satisfy the su¢ cient condition of joint concavity
(the Hessian with respect to (c; l; C) is neither negative nor positive denite), although it is concave with
respect to c; l for given C. The theoretical results at the level of the household in this case still hold,
implying a unique invariant distribution. Moreover, although existence of a socio-economic equilibrium
is not guaranteed by Proposition 1, an equilibrium is found for the calibrations used below.
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a value for  so that "cC = 0:5, which is in the range of the estimates of this elasticity from
De Giorgi et al. (2019), who estimate the elasticity of own consumption with respect to
that of peers to be between 0.3 and 0.6. The predictions of the model and main qualitative
results are broadly similar in this range of elasticities.24 To investigate the importance
of peer pressure for the models predictions, we analyse in detail below, in Section 5,
the between and within group inequality implications of the type of peer pressure, by
re-calibrating the model parameters when  is such that "cC = 0 or "cC =  0:5.
Table 3: Calibrated parameters
      r w 
0.9655 1.50 1.6051 0.30 0.75 1.0347 0.0217 1.0367 0.0983
The prices r and w are set so that the model is consistent with a typical production
sector assumed in calibrated models. In particular, the interest rate is set to be 0:0217,
which is the average value of the real short-term yields in the data for U.K. for the period
1990-2013 (see Carvalho et al. 2016). We choose the wage rate so that is consistent
with this interest rate under the assumption that the production sector is given by a
prot maximising rm, using a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns
to scale with respect to its inputs, capital K and labour L:
Y = F (K;L) = TKL1 , (2.12)
) Y
L
= T

K
L

, (2.13)
for which we normalise T  1 and set  to 0:3 (see e.g. Harrison and Oomen (2010)),
and is subject to an annual depreciation rate, 0 <  < 1, that is set to  = 0:0983 so that
the capital over output ratio is 2.5.25 In other words, the rst order conditions for prot
maximisation:
r +  = @F (K;L)=@K  F1

K
L
; 1

, (2.14)
w = @F (K;L)=@L  F2

K
L
; 1

, (2.15)
determine  and w, given r and K
L
such that K=Y = 2:5 from equation (2.13).
Finally, the time preference parameter,  = 0:9655, is chosen so that the asset supply
24On balance, the model predictions are closer to the data for more inequality measures under "cC = 0:5,
compared with a lower elasticity of e.g. "cC = 0:33 (see Appendix D, Table D2 for these results).
25This is very close to the values in Faccini et al. (2011) and Harrison and Oomen (2010).
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predicted by the model given the remaining parameters matches the data, and, in particu-
lar, a net foreign asset (NFA) position, K A
Y
, of 8:1%.26 Note that the aggregate resource
constraint is given by Y = C + I + rNFA. In Appendix E, we explicitly integrate the
socio-economic equilibrium in an open economy general equilibrium setup also employed
in Angelopoulos et al. (2019), consistent with the above calibration for the U.K.. This
allows us to investigate the quantitative implications of peer pressure on inequality by
accounting for potential general equilibrium e¤ects via prices. Since the main results are
very similar, we focus on the case with xed prices for the analysis which follows.
5.2 Numerical solution
We solve for the socio-economic equilibrium, given prices, using the following algorithm:
Computational algorithm for the socio-economic equilibrium
1. Guess values for eCn =  C1; C2; ::; Cm from the domain C.
2. Solve the typical households problem to obtain g

a; z; eCn, q a; z; eCn and
l

a; z; eCn.
3. Use g

a; s; eCn and the properties of the Markov processes (zt) to construct the
transition function  eC . Using  eC , calculate the stationary distribution  eC .
4. Using 
eC , compute the consumption reference points eCn using (2.6) or (2.7).
5. If
 eCn   eCn < ", where " is a pre-specied tolerance level, a stationary equilibrium
has been found. If not, go back to step 1, and update eCn+1 = (1  &) eCn + & eCn with
0 < &  1.
An important theoretical result allowing the implementation of this algorithm is that

eC is the unique invariant distribution for the typical household for given eCn. This process
implies that we assume an upper bound cmax in step 1, to determine C. We check that in
equilibrium this is not binding. To implement this algorithm, we set " = 10 4 and m = 4.
To conrm uniqueness of the socio-economic equilibrium, we solve the model for a range
of social targets eC =  C1; C2; C3; C4 and check whether the corresponding equilibrium
quantities, obtained using equation (2.6) or (2.7), equal the social targets used for that
case in more than cases. We work as follows:
26This is the average value for the UK,1990-2013, in Extended External Wealth of Nations Mark II
database (see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)).
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1. We nd the socio-economic equilibrium following the computational algorithm de-
scribed above.
2. We construct a grid of 20 values for each of the consumption targets, Cj, j =
1; 2; 3; 4. We set a small value, 0.01 as the minimum of the grid, and three times
the mean consumption as the maximum of the grid.
3. Since the grid does not need to contain the original solution, we add to the grid
the equilibrium points we found in step 1. Thus, we have in total 21 grid points for
each consumption target.
4. We construct the Cartesian product of all the possible combinations of consumption
targets, i.e.
C  C1  C2  C3  C4 =
h
C
1
1; C
2
1; :::; C
21
1
i
 :::
h
C
1
4; C
2
4; :::; C
21
4
i
,
which implies 194,481 di¤erent combinations of consumption targets bC, where bC 2
C.
5. For each combination, bC, we solve the typical households problem to obtain
g

a; z; bC, q a; z; bC and l a; z; bC, construct the transition function  bC , calcu-
late the stationary distribution 
bC , and compute the consumption reference pointsbC using equation (2.6) or (2.7).
6. Check whether
 bCj   bCj  < ", for all j = 1; 2; 3; 4 in more than one of the 194,481
combinations, and that for bC that satises this condition it is true that bC = eCn.
We nd a unique equilibrium for all solutions presented in the tables with results
below.27 We represent this graphically in Appendix Figure D1, by noting that the
condition
 bCj   bCj  < ", for all j = 1; 2; 3; 4, implies and is implied by the condition
max
j
 bCj   bCj  < ". Hence, we order the values of max
j
 bCj   bCj  and plot the rst 14,000
in Figure D1. There is always a unique value of max
j
 bCj   bCj  < 10 4.28
27Each test for uniqueness, for each model solution presented below, requires approximately 36 hours
on a cluster computer, using parallel processing (16 cores) with Matlab 2018a.
28Note that we repeat this exercise for each model solution in Figures D2-D5, except for the  = 0 case
for which we know that there is a unique equilibrium.
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5.3 Within and between-class inequality predictions
We demonstrate the models ability to capture the patterns in the data on inequality
in HEWC, between and within socio-economic classes in Table 4.29 In the rst two
columns of Table 4, we report the mean assets, earnings, consumption and hours worked
for each of the four socio-economic classes in the data and for the model solution. For
wealth, earnings and consumption, quantities are normalised relative to the mean for the
aggregate economy. In the nal two columns of Table 4, we report the Gini indices for
the four variables, again for both the data and the model solution, for each of the four
classes, as well as for the total economy. The gures for the data in Table 4 are the same
as those in Section 3 (see Table 2), but are repeated here next to the model predictions
for convenience.
Overall, the model captures the main patterns regarding between and within group
inequality observed in the data. Starting with wealth, as discussed in Section 3, the data
show higher mean wealth for the higher mean wage socio-economic classes, but lower
within group wealth inequality. Both patterns are predicted by the model.30 Notably, the
lower Gini index in the model for higher mean wage classes is quantitatively signicant,
similar to what is observed in the data. On the other hand, the model under-predicts
wealth inequality quantitatively, as is typically the case for this class of models, where
wealth inequality is driven solely by uninsured idiosyncratic shocks that a¤ect earnings
(see e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Benhabib et al. (2017), and Stachurski and Toda (2019)).31
Similarly to the existing research using incomplete markets heterogeneous agent mod-
els, the model here correctly predicts lower consumption inequality relative to wealth
inequality, and under-predicts consumption inequality compared with the data.32 The
model predicts higher between group inequality compared with the LCF data, and lower
within group inequality. The model does not predict a specic pattern for within group
consumption inequality for groups with higher mean wages, while in the LCF data we see
a small increase in within group Ginis.
29In the next section, we further explain in more detail the contribution of peer pressure, in an envi-
ronment of stochastic social mobility, to generating the predicted patterns.
30About 11% of households have zero wealth in the model. In the WAS sample for which we calculate
the distributional statistics, the proportion of households with non-positive wealth is about 15%. Note
that the percentage of households with zero wealth is endogenously determined in the model, since we
do not impose an ad hoc positive borrowing limit.
31A large literature has recently focused on extensions to this class of models aimed at improving
predictions regarding the extent of wealth concentration at the upper end (see e.g. De Nardi (2015),
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015), and Benhabib et al. (2017) for reviews). In this paper, instead, our
interest is in the patterns of inequality between and within socio-economic groups.
32See e.g. Aiyagari (1994), De Nardi (2015) and Krueger et al. (2016) on the general properties of
these models in this respect, in particular the success with respect to predicting lower consumption versus
wealth inequality, despite predicting lower consumption inequality compared with the data.
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The models predictions regarding the overall earnings inequality are very similar to
the base model with incomplete markets and endogenous labour supply in Pijoan-Mas
(2006). In addition, the model also matches the main pattern of increasing means but
decreasing Ginis for earnings for socio-economic classes with higher mean wages. In
particular, the model matches between group earnings inequality to those observed in
the data. It slightly over-predicts the earnings Gini for the aggregate economy, which is
driven by a small exaggeration of the within group Gini for the two higher classes. In
other words, the within group earnings Gini does not fall in the model by as much as in
the data for the higher mean wage socio-economic classes.
The model has been calibrated to match mean hours worked of 0:333. Notably, the
model predicts that hours worked fall with higher mean wages across the socio-economic
classes. This success is important because the theoretical framework implies a negative
correlation between hours worked and assets at the household level33 (see Section 2, and
also Zhu (2018) for theoretical analysis and Pijoan-Mas (2006) for a quantitative exami-
nation).
Since as already discussed (see Table 4) mean assets per group increase with mean
wages, the negative correlation between hours and assets tends to generate a negative
relationship between higher mean wages and mean hours across the groups, which is at
odds with the empirical observations. Indeed, as will also be discussed below, in the
absence of "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure, the model predicts lower mean
hours for groups with higher mean wages relative to the groups with lower mean wages.
In contrast, for su¢ ciently strong "jealousy" and "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" e¤ects,
mean hours increase with mean wages across groups, despite the negative correlation
between assets and hours at the household level. As explained in more detail below,
under this form of social pressure, the relative importance of consumption versus leisure
increases with professional class. In particular, households in socio-economic classes with
higher mean wages, and thus higher mean assets and consumption, face an increased
return from consumption relative to leisure. This encourages higher work hours relative
to groups with lower mean wages, despite the e¤ect of higher assets, which tend, ceteris
paribus, to reduce hours. The model has also been calibrated to match the Gini index
in hours of 0.153. Further disaggregating di¤erences in hours worked within groups, the
model predicts that the Gini index decreases with higher mean wages across the socio-
economic classes. This is consistent with the data, although the relationship is steeper in
33This is in turn implied by the assumption that leisure is a normal good, leading to strong income
e¤ects, which is needed for boundedness (see Zhu (2018, Proposition 3)).
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the data.
Table 4: Base calibration
"cC= "cC=
Data 0:5 Data 0:5
AR
A
0.387 0.409 Gini AR 0.775 0.619
AI
A
0.696 0.644 Gini AI 0.662 0.573
ALP
A
1.101 1.044 Gini ALP 0.628 0.517
AHP
A
1.702 1.515 Gini AHP 0.593 0.470
A 1.271 Gini A 0.670 0.557
CR
C
0.774 0.563 Gini CR 0.248 0.106
CI
C
0.901 0.756 Gini CI 0.258 0.110
CLP
C
1.068 1.037 Gini CLP 0.260 0.103
CHP
C
1.231 1.362 Gini CHP 0.274 0.088
C 0.395 Gini C 0.276 0.186
ER
E
0.549 0.516 Gini ER 0.314 0.289
EI
E
0.794 0.721 Gini EI 0.263 0.286
ELP
E
1.100 1.033 Gini ELP 0.243 0.284
EHP
E
1.454 1.418 Gini EHP 0.235 0.272
E 0.368 Gini E 0.308 0.335
HR 0.296 0.298 Gini HR 0.223 0.180
HI 0.330 0.316 Gini HI 0.152 0.159
HLP 0.346 0.337 Gini HLP 0.127 0.147
HHP 0.346 0.358 Gini HHP 0.121 0.131
H 0.333 Gini H 0.153 0.153
6 Peer pressure with stochastic mobility
In this section we analyse how peer pressure and stochastic social transitions interact
to contribute to the patterns of inequality summarised in the previous Section. Recall
that the theoretical analysis and choice for the functional form allows for di¤erent forms
of pressure from the peers in ones social class to inuence economic decisions under
stochastic social class participation. In particular, for  > 0 the model incorporates
"jealousy" ( @u
@C
< 0) and "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" ( @
2u
@c@C
> 0), whereas for  < 0,
social pressure takes the form of "admiration" ( @u
@C
> 0) and "running-away-from-the-
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Joneses" ( @
2u
@c@C
< 0). In Table 5 we summarise the between and within group inequality
e¤ects of peer pressure, by comparing results under the base calibration of "keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses" peer pressure, "cC = 0:5, to a situation without peer pressure, "cC = 0,
and to one where peer pressure is of the "running-away-from-the-Joneses" type (i.e. "cC =
 0:5). In each case, we re-calibrate the model working as in Section 4. In particular, we
re-calibrate ,  and  to ensure that all cases match average hours, hours inequality and
assets as a share of output in the data respectively (the new parameters are recorded in
the notes to Table 5).
6.1 Hours & earnings (intra-temporal margin)
Peer pressure has signicant e¤ects on hours and earnings. Starting with hours, we see in
Table 5 (and Figure 1) that in an environment where "cC = 0 or "cC =  0:5, mean hours
fall as we move from groups with lower to those with higher mean wages, whereas in the
data and in the base case of "cC = 0:5, the relationship between mean hours and mean
wages across the groups is positive. As was noted in the previous Section, the negative
relationship between mean hours and mean wages when "cC = 0 and "cC =  0:5 is driven
by a negative correlation between hours worked and assets at the household level, resulting
from strong income e¤ects. Hence, in these cases, higher mean wages, implying higher
mean assets, lead to lower work hours on average. Peer pressure changes this relationship,
because the relative importance of consumption versus leisure increases with professional
class. As can be seen in the intra-temporal rst order condition:
we(zt)(Ct)
c t = l
 
t , (2.16)
when  > 0, a higher consumption target Ct, for the higher mean wage classes, increases
the relative weight to consumption between classes. In other words, social targets change
the relative weights between consumption and leisure di¤erentially across social groups,
and in the case of "cC = 0:5, this makes consumption relatively more valuable (or else,
leisure relatively less valuable) for the groups with higher consumption targets, which are
the groups with higher mean wages. Therefore, under peer pressure, there are stronger
incentives to work for the higher wage - higher assets groups. This e¤ect disappears when
"cC = 0, leading to the negative relationship between mean hours and mean wages across
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the groups in Table 5, and is reversed when "cC =  0:5, making this relationship stronger.
Table 5: Alternative calibrations
"cC= "cC= "cC= "cC= "cC= "cC=
Data 0:5 0  0:5 Data 0:5 0  0:5
AR
A
0.387 0.409 0.333 0.302 Gini AR 0.775 0.619 0.658 0.677
AI
A
0.696 0.644 0.571 0.543 Gini AI 0.662 0.573 0.602 0.612
ALP
A
1.101 1.044 1.030 1.026 Gini ALP 0.628 0.517 0.528 0.527
AHP
A
1.702 1.515 1.629 1.672 Gini AHP 0.593 0.470 0.464 0.457
A 1.271 1.238 1.217 Gini A 0.670 0.557 0.576 0.581
CR
C
0.774 0.563 0.678 0.742 Gini CR 0.248 0.106 0.121 0.129
CI
C
0.901 0.756 0.836 0.876 Gini CI 0.258 0.110 0.121 0.126
CLP
C
1.068 1.037 1.037 1.034 Gini CLP 0.260 0.103 0.107 0.108
CHP
C
1.231 1.362 1.241 1.181 Gini CHP 0.274 0.088 0.086 0.085
C 0.395 0.385 0.379 Gini C 0.276 0.186 0.149 0.133
ER
E
0.549 0.516 0.634 0.697 Gini ER 0.314 0.289 0.245 0.222
EI
E
0.794 0.721 0.793 0.829 Gini EI 0.263 0.286 0.264 0.249
ELP
E
1.100 1.033 1.026 1.020 Gini ELP 0.243 0.284 0.287 0.281
EHP
E
1.454 1.418 1.313 1.259 Gini EHP 0.235 0.272 0.296 0.300
E 0.368 0.358 0.352 Gini E 0.308 0.335 0.317 0.302
HR 0.296 0.298 0.363 0.396 Gini HR 0.223 0.180 0.133 0.109
HI 0.330 0.316 0.343 0.356 Gini HI 0.152 0.159 0.140 0.123
HLP 0.346 0.337 0.326 0.320 Gini HLP 0.127 0.147 0.154 0.146
HHP 0.346 0.358 0.319 0.300 Gini HHP 0.121 0.131 0.161 0.165
H 0.333 0.333 0.333 Gini H 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153
Notes: For the case where "cC = 0:5 the parameters are as in Table 3. For the "cC = 0 case,
 = 0:9625,  = 2:2134 and  = 1:5446 and the rest are as in Table 3. For the "cC =
 0:5 case,  = 0:9611,  = 4:4693 and  = 1:6632 and the rest are as in Table 3.
A similar qualitative change is noted when we examine inequality in hours within the
groups. As we see in Table 5, moving from an environment where "cC = 0 or "cC =  0:5
to one where "cC = 0:5, the relationship between within group hours inequality and
mean wages across groups changes from positive to negative, consistent with the data.
Peer pressure, when it has the "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" form, implies a desire for
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likeness in terms of consumption and thus in terms of hours worked, to nance this
closeness in consumption. In particular, as can be seen from equation (2.16), under
peer pressure, there is a social factor, which is common to all households, in addition
to idiosyncratic productivity. Under "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure, the
higher social targets, for the higher mean wage groups, imply that this common social
factor is relatively stronger, leading to a reduction in the spread of choices for these groups
relative to lower mean wage groups. Hence, there is less within-group hours dispersion in
higher mean wage groups, compared with lower mean wage groups.
The between group inequality in hours under "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pres-
sure, under "cC = 0:5, leads to increased between group earnings inequality (Table 5 and
Figure 1). In addition, the di¤erences in within group hours inequality lead to the dif-
ferences in within group earnings inequality. In particular, recall that the stochastic
process (and thus productivity risk) is the same for all model versions. Hence, within
group inequality in earnings follows within group inequality in hours. This is true for
all types of peer pressure. Therefore, since under "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer
pressure ("cC = 0:5 case), the relationship between the Gini in hours and mean wages
across the groups is positive, this is also the case for the relationship between the Gini in
earnings and mean wages. This pattern is consistent with the data. Under "cC = 0 and
"cC =  0:5, the absence of the social discipline mechanism associated with "keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses", for the given stochastic environment, leads to the reverse relationship.
Overall, "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure works to lower the mean and
increase the dispersion for both hours and earnings for the lower mean wage groups.
However, there is no pattern for the higher mean wage group (see also Appendix D, Table
D3 which shows the levels and of the means and variances). Note also that although mean
hours across the population have not changed between the cases considered, as  changes,
since we have in each case re-calibrated to adjust the relative weights to consumption
and leisure (see (2.16)), mean earnings increase when  increases. This happens because
the covariance between hours and wages across the population increases with  (recall
that mean e¤ective wages have not changed), which is related to the positive relationship
between mean hours and mean wages across the groups that is observed for higher values
of , as discussed above.34
34Indeed, cov(w; h) = f0:022; 0:015; 0:012g for "cC = f0:5; 0:  05g respectively. In contrast, there is no
clear pattern between the covariance between hours and wages and  within the socio-economic groups.
90
6.2 Consumption & wealth (inter-temporal margin)
We next examine the e¤ect of increases in  on between and within group inequality on
consumption and wealth. In general, the higher earnings in the economy with "keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure imply higher wealth and consumption on average.
However, the results in Table 5 show that households in all groups, apart from the top
mean wage group, increase their wealth (both in absolute terms and as a share of total
assets), while households in the highest mean wage groups decrease savings on average
and own a lower share of total wealth. This result is driven by a di¤erential "prospect for
upward mobility" and its implications for the expected future peer pressure.
The mechanism by which the "prospect for upward mobility" creates these e¤ects can
be illustrated by examining the inter-temporal rst order condition:
(Ct)
c t = (1 + r)Et(Ct+1)
c t+1. (2.17)
As can be seen, a type of "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" ("running-away-from-the-Joneses")
peer pressure, a¤ects the weight attached to current consumption, as well as the weight
attached to future consumption. The magnitude of the relative e¤ect Et(Ct+1)=Ct) de-
pends on the current social class of the household, because this will determine the value
of the conditional expectation relative to the current target. In particular, consider the
case when  > 0, relative to the base case of  = 0 (and vice versa when  < 0). In
this case, the added e¤ect on the valuation of future consumption relative to current
consumption is higher conditional on being on a lower mean wage class, given that pos-
sible mobility is mainly upwards, thus towards a social group that will exert pressure
for higher future consumption, relative to the current target. The e¤ect is reversed for
households in higher mean wage social classes. Hence, the prospect of upward mobility,
under "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" peer pressure, contributes to a decrease in between
group wealth inequality. On the contrary, and despite the reduction in between group
wealth inequality, between group consumption inequality is increased, under "keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses" peer pressure. This is the result of the signicant e¤ect of such peer
pressure to increase between groups earnings inequality, as was discussed in the previous
subsection.
The e¤ects of peer pressure on between group inequality in HEWC, as well as the
e¤ects on within group earnings inequality, contribute to explaining the changes in within
group inequality in wealth and consumption. Note, rst, that social groups with lower
mean wages decrease mean earnings and increase mean wealth as  increases. Therefore,
in relative terms, asset income becomes more important than earnings, as  increases.
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Given that the stochastic environment has not changed, the increased share of asset
income implies that the variation in earnings is less important for total income, and thus
for savings, leading to a reduction in within group wealth inequality (which falls for the
rst two groups and increases for the top one). For the third one there is no pattern. These
e¤ects are reversed for the higher mean wage groups, leading to an increase in within group
wealth inequality. At the aggregate level, the e¤ects associated with the lower mean wage
groups (i.e. the decrease in the importance of asset income), and the decrease in between
group wealth inequality dominate, so that wealth inequality for the whole economy is
lower. The e¤ects on within group consumption inequality follow from the changes in
within group wealth inequality, although they are signicantly less pronounced. As a
result, the increase in between group consumption inequality is strong enough to lead to
an increase in overall consumption inequality.
7 Peer pressure and aspirations
The prospect of upward mobility, associated with stochastic socio-economic class partic-
ipation, embeds an upward looking element in peer pressure. We examined the e¤ects
of this component of peer pressure on inequality in the previous Section, documenting
that it works to decrease between group wealth inequality, further contributing to the
asymmetric change in within group inequality. Moreover, peer pressure has an aspira-
tional element, because it instills a desire to match a pre-specied level of success. In the
previous section, this level was determined by mean group consumption. Here, we study
forms of social pressure that imply stronger aspirational e¤ects than those studied in the
previous section, and we examine their inequality implications.
We rst consider the case of an increase in the aspirational element embodied in peer
pressure, and we then consider a situation where social pressure is explicitly aspirational
in nature. Such di¤erences may arise as social norms change following socio-economic
development (e.g. greater social interaction, television, internet and social media) or long-
term policy interventions to support integration and build condence for higher aspirations
(e.g. role models and success stories and well as increased information).35
35Examples of such policies in the UK include: "Careers strat-
egy: making the most of everyones skills and talents", see as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/le /664319/Ca-
reers_strategy.pdf and "Learning to improve the lives and aspirations of young people in Scotland", see
education.gov.scot/Documents/LearningtoImprove LivesYoungPeople.pdf.
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7.1 The aspirational element of peer pressure
We consider the situation where the reference point for consumption in the utility function
is the consumption of a specic type of the socio-economic class that a household belongs
to, capturing social norms that dene aspirations by promoting specic group-relevant
attributes that the household aims to achieve. By dening social targets as those asso-
ciated with the consumption of higher percentiles of the distribution of consumption, we
examine the inequality implications of a stronger aspirational element of peer pressure.
Di¤erent aspirational strengths of peer pressure
To implement this, we plot, in Figures 1-2, mean quantities and Ginis, per socio-economic
class, for HEWC, for a range of consumption targets, and in particular ranging from con-
sumption at the 10th percentile, to consumption at the 90th percentile. To contextualise
the e¤ect of stronger aspirations, we compare the results when the target is a very success-
ful type of the group of peers, namely the 90th percentile, to the situation in the previous
Section, where the social target was determined by mean consumption, which captures
average behaviour. In the columns of Table 6 under the heading p90, we summarise the
between/within group inequality implications when the social target is given by the con-
sumption of the household at the 90th percentile of the distribution of consumption for
the class that the household belongs to. We compare these results to the base case of
peer pressure analysed above, i.e. when the target is the mean consumption of the mem-
bers of the socio-economic class (repeated in Table 6, in the columns under the heading
"cC = 0:5).
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Table 6: The e¤ects of aspirational pressure
"cC= mean p90 "cC= mean p90
0:5 p90th above above 0:5 p90 above above
AR
A
0.409 0.411 0.388 0.386 Gini AR 0.619 0.616 0.633 0.634
AI
A
0.644 0.641 0.601 0.598 Gini AI 0.573 0.573 0.588 0.589
ALP
A
1.044 1.039 1.010 1.013 Gini ALP 0.517 0.518 0.524 0.522
AHP
A
1.515 1.523 1.607 1.606 Gini AHP 0.470 0.469 0.456 0.454
A 1.271 1.317 1.457 1.518 Gini A 0.557 0.557 0.564 0.563
CR
C
0.563 0.567 0.606 0.616 Gini CR 0.106 0.106 0.111 0.113
CI
C
0.756 0.765 0.810 0.815 Gini CI 0.110 0.111 0.116 0.117
CLP
C
1.037 1.041 1.061 1.057 Gini CLP 0.103 0.104 0.106 0.106
CHP
C
1.362 1.347 1.264 1.261 Gini CHP 0.088 0.088 0.084 0.084
C 0.395 0.428 0.422 0.453 Gini C 0.186 0.183 0.163 0.161
ER
E
0.516 0.524 0.558 0.568 Gini ER 0.289 0.272 0.265 0.25
EI
E
0.721 0.731 0.763 0.769 Gini EI 0.286 0.269 0.266 0.254
ELP
E
1.033 1.036 1.044 1.042 Gini ELP 0.284 0.269 0.273 0.263
EHP
E
1.418 1.402 1.348 1.343 Gini EHP 0.272 0.261 0.278 0.267
E 0.368 0.399 0.390 0.420 Gini E 0.335 0.270 0.318 0.306
HR
H
0.895 0.905 0.961 0.977 Gini HR 0.180 0.159 0.153 0.135
HI
H
0.951 0.962 1.000 1.006 Gini HI 0.159 0.139 0.138 0.123
HLP
H
1.013 1.014 1.014 1.009 Gini HLP 0.147 0.128 0.135 0.121
HHP
H
1.075 1.060 1.002 0.996 Gini HHP 0.131 0.117 0.137 0.122
H 0.333 0.365 0.359 0.389 Gini H 0.153 0.134 0.139 0.124
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As can be seen in Figures 1-2, a stronger aspirational element of peer pressure has
a signicant and positive e¤ects on all mean quantities, while decreasing within group
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inequality in hours and earnings and between group inequality in hours and earnings,
in terms of the gap between the highest mean wage group and the other groups. On
the other hand, between and within group inequality in consumption and wealth do not
change much and do not follow an obvious pattern. We analyse the mechanism behind the
e¤ects of a stronger aspirational element of peer pressure by comparing the results from
the two specic experiments in Table 6, which summarise the patterns in Figures 1-2.
Overall, the e¤ects of stronger within class aspirations are quantitatively small when we
move from the mean to the 90th percentile, consistent with Figures 1-2. However, given
the monotonicity of the e¤ects summarised in the gures, the direction of the e¤ects is
the same for bigger or smaller changes in the strength of aspirations.
As can be seen by comparing the two rst columns of Table 6, the higher aspira-
tions implied by social targets that refer to members with higher consumption encourage
an increase in mean hours worked,36 which leads to increases in mean earnings, wealth
and consumption for all socio-economic groups. However, the increase in mean hours is
stronger for the lower socio-economic classes (relative to the highest class). This is be-
cause the lower socio-economic classes have higher within group consumption inequality,
which means that the distance of the 90th percentile to the mean is higher. Hence, when
the social target changes from the mean to the 90th percentile, the increase in the social
target is bigger, and thus the aspirational pressure for higher hours is greater for these
classes. As a result, between group inequality in hours is reduced, and more specically
the three lower mean wage groups close the gap with the top mean wage group. Moreover,
the increased pressure to converge to a higher target induces more similarity in terms of
hours within the socio-economic classes, so that within group inequality is reduced for
all.37 The changes in hours pass through to earnings, for which between and within group
inequality follows a similar pattern.
The pattern of wealth inequality between the groups is more complex. Mean wealth
increases in absolute terms for all groups. However, relative mean wealth increases for the
groups with highest and lowest mean earnings, while decreasing for the middle groups.
Changes in the social target from the mean (or a lower percentile) to the 90th percentile
of consumption have two e¤ects on the consumption-savings margin. On one hand, the
higher aspirational component in social pressure works to increase the relative weight of
future consumption, and thus of savings. This works via the prospects for upward mobility
that determine the expected value of the social target (and thus the relative weight of
36For example, via equation (2.16), we can see that the increase in the left hand side, as a result of the
more aspirational social target, implies that leisure must fall, so that the right hand side increases too.
37In particular, the importance of the common (social) factor, relative to the idiosyncratic (productiv-
ity), in determining choices, is increased, leading to a reduction in the spread of choices.
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future consumption) in equation (2.17). The strength of this channel di¤ers between the
social classes, depending on the social transition matrix. On the other hand, a higher
social target increases the relative weight to current consumption too, and the strength
of this channel depends of the extent of within group consumption inequality.
The trade-o¤ that a more aspirational peer pressure introduces in the inter-temporal
margin leads to relative increases in wealth for the highest and lowest mean wage groups
and relative reductions for the others. For the highest mean wage groups, this happens
because consumption inequality is relatively low, implying that the e¤ect of a higher social
consumption target on the left hand side of the Euler equation, described above, is low.
On the other hand, for the lowest mean wage group this happens because the prospect for
upward mobility implies that the next period e¤ect, on the right hand side of the Euler
equation described above, is relatively big. In contrast, for the two middle groups, both
e¤ects are relatively smaller, hence the increase in mean savings is not as big. The e¤ects
on within group wealth inequality are small and do not exhibit a clear pattern between
the groups. Finally, consumption is a¤ected by changes in both wealth and earnings,
which together lead to a reduction in between group consumption inequality following
the pattern of changes in earnings inequality, and, in e¤ect, no change in within group
inequality.
7.2 Above-peer aspirations
We next consider a scenario where social pressure is related explicitly to aspirations to
achieve the consumption levels of a higher class, compared with aspirations constrained
by pressure to conform to peers. In particular, we consider the case where the reference
point in the utility function is given by the mean or the 90th percentile of the socio-
economic group with the immediately higher mean wage than the current group. For the
highest mean wage group, there is no change. In this sense, the consumption level that
the household aspires to achieve is determined by the behaviour of higher socio-economic
groups, for the rst three mean wage groups, giving rise to upward looking aspirations.
We summarise the between group inequality e¤ects of above-peer aspirations in the
columns of Table 6 under the headings "mean above" and "P90 above". There are sub-
stantial quantitative di¤erences between the distributional implications of aspirational
targets and those of peer pressure. The results are similar when comparing the change of
the target from mean of the group of peers to mean of the group above peers, with the
change of the target from the 90th percentile of the group of peers to the 90th percentile
of the group above peers.
To understand the e¤ects of above-peer aspirations, relative to peer pressure, the
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following observation is helpful. Comparing peer pressure to above-peer aspirations, there
is a di¤erence between the rst three and the highest mean wage groups regarding how the
change in social targets a¤ects decision making. In particular, for the rst three groups,
the intra-temporal decision margin is a¤ected directly and most signicantly, since only
one side of it is a¤ected, compared with the inter-temporal margin, where both sides of
the Euler equation are a¤ected. In contrast, the inter-temporal margin is not directly
a¤ected for the highest mean wage group, which means that the e¤ects work rst via
the inter-temporal margin, and then a¤ect the intra-temporal margin via the equilibrium
e¤ects on the social target that they imply. Therefore, to understand the e¤ects of above-
peer aspirations for the rst three groups, we examine rst hours and earnings, where the
e¤ect is direct; whereas, for the highest mean wage group, we examine the inter-temporal
margin e¤ects since they are stronger.
Di¤erential e¤ects on group averages
Mean hours and earnings increase when the social targets change from those determined
by peers to those determined by the group that has a higher mean wage than the peers. On
the other hand, the increase in mean hours and earnings for the highest mean wage group
is relatively smaller, so that between group inequality in hours and earnings decrease, in
that the lower mean wage groups close the gap with the top. As can be seen in equation
(2.16), there is an increase in the relative weight to consumption for the lower mean wage
groups (compared with the top mean wage group), since the new, aspirational, target
refers to the higher mean consumption of the higher mean wage socio-economic group in
each case and hence increases directly the relative weight to consumption. In contrast, for
the highest mean wage group, there is no direct change in aspirations/social target, and
thus in the relative weight to consumption. However, as will be explained below, mean
wealth and mean consumption have increased in this group as well, implying, via equation
(2.16), an e¤ective increase in the social target (Ct), which tends to incentivise higher
consumption and work hours (and thus earnings), leading to the changes in mean hours
and earnings observed. Since this is only an equilibrium e¤ect, this increase is relatively
smaller for the highest mean wage group. As a result, between group inequality in hours
and earnings is reduced.
The increased earnings tend to increase wealth and consumption for all groups. How-
ever, relative wealth falls for the three lower mean wage groups, leading to increased
between group wealth inequality. Looking at equation (2.17), we can see that upward
looking aspirations, compared to peer pressure, increase the relative weight to current
consumption directly and thus create disincentives to save. On the other hand, this ef-
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fect is not present for the highest mean wage group; on the contrary, the higher social
targets for the lower groups increase the expected value of future consumption targets in
equation (2.17) for this group, whilst leaving the current consumption target unchanged.
Thus, for the highest mean wage group, the relative weight to current consumption falls,
which works to increase savings. These e¤ects combine to lead to the reduction in relative
wealth for the three lower mean wage groups and the increase in the highest mean wage
group. The increased wealth in the higher mean wage group further drives the increase
in consumption in this group, setting in motion a consistent increase in hours and earn-
ings, which was described above. Between group consumption inequality falls in terms of
the relative consumption of the highest to the remaining groups, driven by the positive
earnings e¤ects for the three lower mean wage groups, which are very strong.
Overall, regarding between group inequality, stronger aspirations increase between
group wealth inequality, by increasing the gap between the top earners and the remaining
socio-economic classes. Although driven by a di¤erent mechanism, aspirations also lead
to an increase in between group wealth inequality in Genicot and Ray (2017) (see also
footnote 4 in the Introduction). However, in the framework employed in Genicot and
Ray (2017), income is the wealth (inherited from the parents) and consumption follows
only from wealth, i.e. there is no distinction between asset and labour income. By
distinguishing asset from labour income, and studying wealth inequality in conjunction
with hours, earnings and consumption, we nd that above-peer aspirations lower between
group inequality in these three economic variables, by closing the gap between the top
group and the rest. The e¤ect of aspirations on between group inequality is thus not
symmetric across economic outcomes.
Within group inequality
Above peer aspirations, compared with the situation where social pressure implies confor-
mity with peers, further lead to a complex pattern of changes in within group inequality.
For the three lower mean wage groups, there is a reduction in hours and earnings within
group inequality, because the higher social targets create stronger, and common to all
households within a group, incentives to increase hours and earnings. There is thus an
increase in the relative importance of the social, common factor driving hours and earn-
ings, relative to the idiosyncratic, productivity related factor, which induces higher equity
within the groups. However, the increased levels of earnings in absolute terms for these
groups, mean that even a lower hours Gini implies a higher earnings variance. Thus, a
greater di¤erence in the level of earnings between those with high and those with low
earnings. In turn, these greater di¤erences in earnings lead to greater di¤erences in sav-
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ings. Hence, leading to an increase in within group wealth inequality for these groups
alongside the increase in mean wealth. In turn, this feeds into an increase in within group
consumption inequality.
For the highest income group, the substantial increase in mean wealth works to reduce
the variation in income due to earnings risk (especially since the increase in the level
of (mean) earnings is small). Thus, reducing wealth and consumption inequality. The
higher level (mean) of consumption implies that the lower Gini in consumption is in fact
consistent with a higher spread in terms of distance from the mean. Via equation (2.16),
this is consistent with a higher spread in leisure, which leads to the marginally higher
Gini in hours and earnings, despite the lower Gini in consumption for this group.
Overall, a qualitative strengthening of aspirations (by comparing above-peer aspira-
tions to peer pressure) does not imply a universal decrease in within group inequality
across all economic outcomes, suggesting instead a complex pattern of changes in within
cluster inequality. Even when focusing on the three lower mean wage groups, for which
there are truly "higher" aspirations, we note that by disentangling hours and earnings as
sources of income that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, from asset income, we nd that
wealth and consumption inequality within groups increases under above-peer aspirations,
implying that social dissatisfaction may accompany the positive average e¤ects for these
groups that were discussed earlier.38 This increase in within group asset and consump-
tion inequality is obtained despite the reduction in within group inequality in hours and
earnings, and thus highlights the importance of allowing for idiosyncratic variation and
the insurance value of wealth when examining wealth inequality.
8 Conclusions
This paper developed a theoretical framework to examine inequality between and within
groups of households (peers) that are dened based on socio-economic class. The model
incorporated both peer pressure, where consumption levels achieved by members of the
socio-economic class (the group of peers) determine a social target which acts as a ref-
erence point for consumption for each member of the class; and above-peer aspirations,
dened as aspirations for consumption that are determined by the social class that has the
next higher mean wage (and earnings) than the group of peers. We showed existence of
stationary equilibrium, when the social targets are determined jointly with the distribu-
tions of HEWC, under stochastic social class participation and idiosyncratic productivity.
38Note that this is without introducing explicit aspiration failure and frustration as in e.g. Genicot
and Ray (2017).
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We calibrated a model that belongs to this framework to British data, under keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses peer pressure, and we found that it predicts all main patterns in
the data regarding between and within group inequality. In particular, the contribution
of keeping-up-with-the-Jonesespeer pressure, calibrated based on econometric evidence
on peer pressure from De Giorgi et al. (2019), is critical in helping the models predictions
match the empirical patterns regarding between group hours inequality and cross-group
qualitative di¤erences with respect to within group hours and earnings inequality.
More generally, we nd that in stationary equilibria characterised by "keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses" peer pressure, for groups with higher mean wages, within group inequality
is lower in terms of hours and earnings, and higher in terms of wealth and consumption,
relative to economies without peer pressure. In contrast, for lower mean wage groups,
within group inequality is higher in terms of wealth and consumption and lower in terms
of hours and earnings. At the same time, between group inequality is lower for hours,
earnings and consumption, but higher for wealth.
Compared with peer pressure, above-peer aspirations allow the groups with the higher
aspirations (lower mean wage groups) to close the gap with the top mean wage group
in terms of hours, earnings and consumption, while this increases in terms of wealth.
However, wealth and consumption inequality within-group is higher, despite a reduction
in within-group inequality in hours and earnings.
We conclude from our analysis of the properties of stationary equilibria under dif-
ferent social norms regarding peer pressure and above-peer aspiration that: (i) social
pressure determined with reference to a group of peers, directly (peer pressure) or indi-
rectly (above-peer aspirations), has a di¤erential e¤ect on households, depending on their
class; and it incorporates forces that, other things equal, tend to generate convergence
within cluster and divergence between classes; (ii) the prospect of upward/downward mo-
bility also contributes to the e¤ects of peer pressure and above-peer aspirations, tending
to lower between group divergence; and (iii) there are important insights for the study
of consumption/wealth inequality under peer pressure and aspirations, in a framework
where wealth inequality reects both the dispersion of earnings and motives for wealth
accumulation stemming from inter-temporal smoothing and the insurance value of wealth.
In this environment, peer pressure and above-peer aspirations a¤ect incentives to work
and save di¤erently, thus implying non-uniform changes in wealth and earnings inequality,
which in turn implies that there are opposite e¤ects on consumption inequality and social
dissatisfaction.
Our ndings suggest that above peer aspirations, compared with a situation where
households aim to meet targets dened by the behaviour of peers, lead to increased within
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group dispersion in economic achievement, despite improvements in material wealth and
consumption on average. This nding implies that in a more socially connected world,
when aspirations become more upward looking, improvements in wealth and consumption
may nevertheless be accompanied by social dissatisfaction.
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9 Appendix A
We summarise the properties of the solution to the household optimisation problem,
following the approach taken in Zhu (2018). The main idea is to study the problem
of the household in two steps. First, we examine the intratemporal problem in which
the consumer chooses consumption and leisure to maximize the intratemporal utility
given expenditure. Second, we examine the intertemporal problem which determines the
optimal expenditure and saving decisions over time. To do this, we use the indirect utility
function from the rst step as the objective function in the second step.
The intratemporal utility function is given by u(c; l; C(s (z))), or u(c; l; z; eC), making
explicit the dependence on the elements in eC. Dene y as the expenditure on consumption
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c and leisure l, i.e. y = c+ we (z) l. The intratemporal problem is then given by:
J(y; z; eC) = max
c;l
u(c; l; z; eC),
s:t: c+ we (z) l = y, (A.1)
l  1,
c; l  0.
The rst order condition of this problem is:
u2(c; l; z; eC)
u1(c; l; z; eC)  we (z) , with equality if l < 1. (A.2)
Proposition 1 in Zhu (2018) also applies for the household problem in Section 2 and
implies that for given z and eC, J(y; z; eC) is bounded, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave in y, and continuously di¤erentiable in y, with J1(y; z; eC) = u1(q(y; z); l(y; z); z; eC);
8y 2 (0;+1).
The original intertemporal optimisation problem (2.3) becomes:
max
at+1;yt
E0
1X
t=0
tJ(yt; zt; eC),
s:t: yt + at+1 = (1 + r)at + we(zt), (A.3)
yt  0,
at+1  0.
Letting V (a; z; eC) be the value function, the Bellman equation that describes the house-
holds decision problem is:
V (a; z; eC) = max
a02 (a;z)
fJ

(1 + r)a+ we(z)  a0; z; eC+ (A.4)
+ E
h
V (a0; z0; eC)jzig,
where
 (a; z) = fa0 : 0  a0  (1 + r)a+ we(z)g . (A.5)
Let g(a; z; eC) and y(a; z; eC) be the optimal decision rules of the asset for next period
and the total expenditure for the current period respectively. Given the properties for the
indirect utility function J(y; z; eC), Proposition 2 in Zhu (2018) then shows that V (a; z; eC)
is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave in a; V (a; z; eC) is continuously di¤er-
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entiable in a, and V1(a; z; eC) = (1 + r)J1(y(a; z; eC); z; eC); 8a 2 [0;+1); g(a; z; eC) is
continuous and weakly increasing in a; and y(a; z; eC) is strictly increasing in a.
Let q(a; z; eC) and l(a; z; eC) represent q(y(a; z; eC); z; eC) and l(y(a; z; eC); z; eC). Then
(see Proposition 3 in Zhu (2018)), we have that q(a; z; eC) and l(a; z; eC) are continuous
and increasing with respect to a and that l(a; z; eC) = 1 8z 2 Z, when a is su¢ ciently
large. Finally, Lemmata 4-6 and Propositions 6-7 in Zhu (2018) provide the remaining
properties of the joint distribution summarised in Section 2.
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10 Appendix B
Lemma 1: The policy function q(a; z; eC) : X  C ! [0; cmax] is continuous in (a; eC).39
Proof:
Let eC =  C1; C2; ::; CM take values in C = [0; cmax] [0; cmax] ::: [0; cmax] which is a
compact and convex subset of RM . We write C

z; eC : Z C ! [0; cmax] as an indicator
function:
C =
8>><>>:
C1, if s (z) = 1
...
CM , if s (z) = M
, (B.1)
where the realisation of z determines which identity function is used. Note that for given
z, C

z; eC = C  z; C1; C2; ::; CM = Cm : s (z) = m, i.e. a given z denes C (z; )
as an identify function which is continuous, strictly increasing and (trivially) concave.
Given the assumptions on the utility function, for given z, u

c; l; C

z; eC = u(c; l; eC)
is jointly concave with respect to (c; l; eC).
The intratemporal problem is then given by:
J(y; z; eC) = maxc;l u(c; l; eC),
s:t: c+ we (z) l = y,
l  1,
c; l  0.
(B.2)
Following Zhu (2018) we can show that for given z, J(y; z; eC) is bounded and strictly
concave in y and eC for given z. To see the latter, note that given z for any y0; eC 0,
y00; eC 00 2 [0; cmax + we (zH)] [0; cmax] and for all  2 (0; 1), we have:
39Clearly, the policy functions and the value function depend also on the prices r and w. For notational
convenience we omit them since these remain xed at the level of the socio-economic equilibrium as dened
here.
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J [y0 + (1  )y00; z;  eC 0 + (1  ) eC 00],
= u(q(y0 + (1  )y00; z;  eC 0 + (1  ) eC 00); l(y0+
+(1  )y00; z;  eC 0 + (1  ) eC 00);  eC 0 + (1  ) eC 00),
 u(q(y0; z; eC 0) + (1  )q(y00; z; eC 00); l(y0; z; eC 0)+
+(1  )l(y00; z; eC 00);  eC 0 + (1  ) eC 00),
> u(q(y0; z; eC 0); l(y0; z; eC 0); eC 0)+
+(1  )u(q(y00; z; eC 00); l(y00; z; eC 00); eC 00),
= J(y0; z; eC 0) + (1  )J(y00; z; eC 00),
(B.3)
where the fth line follows from optimality of J(y; z; eC), while the eighth line follows from
the concavity of the utility function with respect to (c; l; eC).
Consider then the maximisation problem:
V (a; z; eC) = maxa02 (a;z)fJ (1 + r)a+ we(z)  a0; z; eC+
+E
h
V (a0; z0; eC)jzig, (B.4)
where
 (a; z) = fa0 : 0  a0  (1 + r)a+ we(z)g andeC =  C1; C2; ::; CM . (B.5)
Given continuity and concavity of J(y; z; eC), Theorem 9.8 in Stokey et al. (1989) implies
that V (a; z; eC)  V (a; z; C1; C2; ::; CM) is concave in (a; eC) and a0 = g(a; z; eC) : XC !
 (a; z) is single-valued (a function) that is continuous in

a; eC for given z. Therefore,
the optimal expenditure function y = y

a; z; eC = (1 + r)a+we(z)  g(a; z; eC) must be
also continuous in (a; eC). By the Theorem of the Maximum, which implies that q(a; z; eC)
and l(a; z; eC) are continuous in (y; eC) in the intratemporal problem of the household,
q(a; z; eC) and l(a; z; eC) are continuous in (a; eC) as well. 
Lemma 2: The integrals
R
X

q

a; z; eC : s = j eC(da; dz), j = 1; :::;m, are continuous
in eC 2 C.
Proof: The proof follows similar arguments as in Acikgoz (2018, Appendix G).
First, note that  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] in (2.5) is continuous in eC 2 C. To see this, re-
call from (2.5) that eC a¤ects  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] via the policy function g(a; z; eC),
which is dependent on eC, while Q(z; fz0g) is independent of eC. Since, by Lemma 1
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g

a; z; eC is continuous in eC (and thus measurable), we can write  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] =
1A

g

a; z; eCQ (z; fz0g) (see Theorem 9.13 in Stokey et al. (1989), which requires mea-
surability of g

a; z; eC to dene  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] as the transition function for the
joint Markov process in [0; a]ZC). By Stokey et al. (1989, Exercise 12.7), convergence
of
n

eCn [(an; zn) ; A0  fz0g]
o
to  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] for every sequence nan; zn; eCno
in [0; a]  Z  C that converges to

a; z; eC is equivalent to the operator (Tf) (a; z)
=
R
X
f
 
a0; z
0

eC [(a; z) ; d (a0; z0)] having the Feller property, i.e. for every continuous
function f , (Tf) is also continuous. By Stokey et al. (1989, Exercise 9.15),Z
X
f (a0; z0) 
eC [(a; z) ; d (a0; z0)] =
Z
Z
f

g

a; z; eC ; z0Q (z; dz0)  (TQf) (a; z) ,
so that (Tf) (a; z) = (TQf) (a; z). By Stokey et al. (1989, Lemma 9.5), (TQf) (a; z) has
the Feller property, i.e. if f is continuous, so is (TQf) (a; z) and thus so is (Tf) (a; z).
We have thus shown that  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] satises the required condition.
Second, continuity of  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] in eC, implies, using Theorem 12.13 in
Stokey et al. (1989), that the invariant distribution 
eC is continuous in eC 2 C. In partic-
ular, since (i) [0; a]Z is compact, i.e. closed and bounded, which is here as the Cartesian
product of compact sets; (ii) the sequence of the transition function
n

eCn [(an; zn) ; A0  fz0g]
o
converges weakly (pointwise) to  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] for every sequence nan; zn; eCno
in [0; a] Z  C that converges to (a; z; C); and (iii) there exists a unique invariant  for
each value of eC, which has been shown in this context. Then, Theorem 12.13 in Stokey et
al. (1989) establishes that the measure,  is continuous in eC, i.e. as eCn ! C,  eCn !  eC .
Finally, given that q

a; z; eC  cmax, the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem
and Theorem 12.3 in Stokey et al. (1989) establish that continuity of 
eC and of q a; z; eC
in eC 2 C imply continuity of R
X
q

a; z; eC eC(da; dz) and thus of
Z
X

q

a; z; eC : s = j eC(da; dz).
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11 Appendix C
Understanding Society (UnSoc) is a large longitudinal survey which follows approximately
40,000 households (at Wave 1) in the U.K.. UnSoc covers a wide range of social, economic
and behavioural factors making it relevant to a wide range of researchers and policy
makers. Data collection for each wave takes place over a 24-month period and the rst
wave occurred between January 2009 and January 2011. Note that the periods of waves
overlap, but the individual respondents are interviewed around the same time each year.
Thus, there is no respondent who is interviewed twice within a wave or a calendar year
(see e.g. Knies (2018)).
The Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) started in July 2006 with a rst wave of in-
terviews carried out over two years to June 2008. The WAS interviewed approximately
30,500 households including 53,300 adult household members in Wave 1. The same house-
holds were approached again for a Wave 2 interview between July 2008 and June 2010.
In this wave 20,170 households responded (around 70 percent success) including 35,000
adult household members. Waves 3-5 covered the periods between July and June for
the years 2010-12, 2012-14 and 2014-16 respectively. After Wave 2, due to sample attri-
tion, the WAS started implementing boost samples in each wave to keep the number of
interviewed households around 20,000 and 35,000-40,000 adult household members.
The Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) is a repeated cross section survey which
follows approximately 13,000 households in the U.K.. The Living Costs and Food Survey
(LCF) began in 2008, replacing the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and is conducted
by the O¢ ce for National Statistics. Data collection for each wave takes place over
a 12-month period, across the whole of the U.K., and is the most signicant survey
on household spending in the U.K.. The LCF not only covers a wide range of social,
economic measures and making it relevant to a wide range of researchers, policy makers,
but also provides key information for the consumer prices index and for National statistics
regarding consumption expenditure.
The WAS, UnSoc and LCF data sets employed in this paper refer to the free "End
User Licence" versions of the datasets. In particular, we use the following datasets:
 WAS: SN-7215.
 UnSoc: SN: 6614.
 LCF: SN-6655, SN-6945, SN-7272, SN-7472, SN-7702, SN-7992, SN-8210, SN-8351,
SN-8459.
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11.1 Demographics (WAS)
1. Head of the Household: We dene the head of household as the principal owner
or renter of the property, and, when there is more than one head, the eldest takes
precedence. This follows the ONS denition for the Household reference person
(HRP). We use of the following variables: (HhldrW), (HiHNumW), (DVAGEw)
and/or (DVAge17w).
2. Socio-Economic Class: Eight Class NS-SEC (NSSEC8W). We approximate the
socio-economic class of the household with the higher of the professional classes of
the head or of the spouse.
3. Employment Status: We use the variables for economic activity: (ecactw) for
Waves 1-3 and (DVecactw) for Waves 4-5.
11.2 Denition of income variable (WAS)
1. Individual earnings:40 it is the sum of gross annual earnings from rst and second
job. We use of the following variables: (DVGrsPayW), (DVGrsJob2W1) for wave 1
and (dvGrsempsecjobW) for waves 2-5.
11.3 Denition of wealth (WAS)
1. Net property wealth: is the sum of all property values minus the value of all
mortgages and amounts owed as a result of equity release. (HPROPWW).
2. Net nancial wealth: is the sum of the values of formal and informal nancial
assets, plus the value of certain assets held in the names of children, plus the value
of endowments purchased to repay mortgages, less the value of non-mortgage debt.
The informal nancial assets exclude very small amounts (less than £ 250) and the
nancial liabilities are the sum of current account overdrafts plus amounts owed on
credit cards, store cards, mail order, hire purchase and loans plus amounts owed
in arrears. Finally, money held in Trusts, other than Child Trust Funds, is not
included. (HFINWNTW_sum).
3. Net Worth: is the sum of the net property wealth and net nancial wealth.
40All monetary values are expressed in 2012 prices as measured by CPIH.
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11.4 Sample selection (WAS)
We keep households when the head is an employee and, if there is a spouse who also
works, when she/he is also an employee. We keep households when both the head and
the spouse (if any) have non-missing earnings. However, we keep households if one of
the two spouses does not work i.e. if there is a spouse with zero earnings. We drop the
households when either the head or the spouse (if any) is self employed and we drop the
households with no labour income (i.e. neither the head nor the spouse (if any) having
positive individual earnings). We further restrict the dataset by retaining households
where the head of the households is aged 25-59 and dropping observations with missing
values for socio-economic class.
Table C1: Household sample selection WAS
selection step Total
1. Whole sample of households 110,963
2. Drop households with mis-reported age variable 110,937
3. Drop households with duplicate hh grid numbers 110,910
4. Drop if head or spouse is self-employed 99,562
5. Drop if head or spouse has missing earnings 98,601
6. Drop if NS-SEC is missing 92,094
7. Keep if headsage 25, 59 47,328
8. Keep if positive household labour income 39,731
Average net worth obs per wave 7.946
11.5 Demographics (UnSoc)
1. Head of the Household: We use the UnSoc denition of the head of household
which follows the ONS denition for the Household reference person (HRP). The
head of household is dened as the principal owner or renter of the property, and,
where there is more than one head, the eldest takes precedence (w_hrpid, where
the prex w denotes wave).
2. Socio-Economic Class: Eight Class NS-SEC (w_jbnssec8_dv). We approximate
the socio-economic class of the household with the higher of the professional classes
of the head or of the spouse.
3. Employment Status: we use the variable reporting if the respondent is employed
or self-employed at the current job (w_jbsemp).
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11.6 Denition of wages, hours and earnings (UnSoc)
1. Weekly Gross Earnings: we use the usual gross pay per month at the current job
(w_paygu_dv) and we to weekly gross earnings by multiplying by 12 and dividing
by 52.
2. Typical Weekly Hours: number of hours normally worked per week (w_jbhrs).
3. Total Hours: sum of typical total weekly hours of the spouses.
4. Total Earnings: sum of weekly gross earnings of the spouses.
5. E¤ective Wages: it is the total household earnings over total household hours.
6. Average typical hours worked: sum of typical total weekly hours of the spouses.
11.7 Sample selection (UnSoc)
Our main sample consists of the General Population Sample plus the former British
Household Panel Survey sample (BHPS), and we exclude the Ethnic Minority Boost
Sample and the Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Boost Sample. For consistency with the
WAS dataset, we also drop the households located in Northern Ireland. The inclusion
of the boost samples and Northern Ireland sample, or the exclusion of the former BHPS
sample does not e¤ectively change our results either quantitatively or qualitatively. We
keep households when the head is an employee and, if there is a spouse who also works,
when she/he is also an employee. We keep households when both the head and the
spouse (if any) have non-missing usual gross earnings per month at the current job and
non-missing number of weekly hours normally worked. However, we keep households if
one of the two spouses does not work i.e. if there is a spouse with zero earnings and zero
hours. We also drop the households with positive incomes but reported zero hours. We
further restrict the dataset by retaining households where the head of the households is
aged 25-59 and dropping observations with missing values for socio-economic class. We
also drop the households when either the head or the spouse (if any) is self employed.
We drop the top 0:5% and the bottom 0:5% of the observations with positive households
e¤ective wage, to avoid extreme cases (e.g. possible outliers in e¤ective wages) which
may a¤ect results (see e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for similar treatment). This
e¤ectively means that we drop households that appear to be working for less than half
the minimum wage. Finally, we keep those households that have at least two consecutive
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observations with positive household e¤ective wage.
Table C2: Household sample selection UnSoc
selection step Total
1. Whole sample 208,200
2. Drop proxy & non-full interviews 157,187
3. Original sample & BHPS sample 122,193
4. Drop if relevant information is missing from either the head or spouse 116,261
5. Drop if either the head or spouse is self employed 103,731
6. Drop if total earnings are zero 51,884
7. Drop if total hours are zero 51,764
8. Keep if headsage 25, 59 43,056
9. Drop top and bottom 0.5% of observations per wave 42,635
10. Keep if present at least at 2 consecutive waves 35,812
Average obs per wave 4,476
Number of unique households 8,303
Table C3: State space and invariant distribution
s e 
Q1 0.4031 0.049218
R Q2 0.5351 0.050822
Q3 0.8076 0.053517
Q1 0.5015 0.058192
I Q2 0.6966 0.058168
Q3 1.0840 0.064639
Q1 0.6337 0.120355
LP Q2 0.9430 0.13237
Q3 1.4508 0.145599
Q1 0.8366 0.080876
HP Q2 1.2272 0.088263
Q3 1.8541 0.097982
Note: e0 = 1:
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11.9 Demographics (LCF)
1. Head of the Household: We use the LCF denition of the head of household
which follows the ONS denition for the Household reference person (HRP). The
head of household is dened as the principal owner or renter of the property, and,
where there is more than one head, the eldest takes precedence. (A003)
2. Socio-Economic Class: NS - SEC 8 Class of household reference person (A094).We
do not have information for the NS-SEC of the spouse, and consequently we can-
not approximate the socio-economic class of the household with the higher of the
professional classes of the head or of the spouse.
11.10 Denition of income (LCF)
1. Weekly Gross Earnings: is usual labour earnings plus any bonuses (p008 + p011
+ b312).
2. Total Earnings: sum of weekly gross earnings of the spouses.
3. Total Hours: sum of typical total weekly hours (a220) of the spouses.
11.11 Denition of Consumption(LCF)
1. Household Consumption: includes non-durable goods, services and semi-durable
goods. We use the classication of household consumption headings from ONS to
categorise the household expenditures into non-durable goods, services and semi-
durable goods. To have a user-cost measure of housing, we follow Blundell and
Etheridge (2010) and include rent, mortgage interest payments and housing taxes.
One drawback is that the LCF does not easily permit a calculation of imputed rents
for homeowners as it does not include house prices, and this might a¤ect the calcu-
lation of the consumption inequality, especially for the richer households. Analyti-
cally, household consumption includes the following variables - COICOP: total food
and nonalcoholic beverage (P601t); COICOP: total alcoholic beverages and tobacco
(P602t); COICOP: total clothing and footwear (P603t); COICOP: total housing,
water, electricity (P604t); COICOP: total health expenditure (P606t); COICOP:
total transport costs (P607t) minus acquisitions of cars/vans/motorcycles (b244,
b2441, b245, b2451, b247, c71111c, c71112t, c71121c, c71122t, c71211c, c71212t,
c71411t); COICOP: total recreation (P609t) minus acquisitions of durable recre-
ation equipment (c92111t, c92112t, c92114t, c92115c, c92116t, c92117t, c92211t,
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c92221t); COICOP: total restaurants and hotels (P611t); COICOP: total miscella-
neous goods and services (P612t).
2. Equivalence scale: We follow Blundell and Etheridge and we use the OECD
(1982) equivalence scale. This assigns a value of 1 to the rst household member,
of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child. (OECD (1982), The OECD
List of Social Indicators, Paris.)
3. Equivalised Consumption: is household consumption divided by the equivalence
scale.
11.12 Sample selection (LCF)
We keep households when the head is an employee and, if there is a spouse who also
works, when she/he is also an employee. We keep households when both the head and
the spouse (if any) have non-missing earnings. However, we keep households if one of
the two spouses does not work i.e. if there is a spouse with zero earnings. We drop the
households when either the head or the spouse (if any) is self employed and we drop the
households with no labour income (i.e. neither the head nor the spouse (if any) having
positive individual earnings). We also drop the households with positive incomes but
reported zero hours. We further restrict the dataset by retaining households where the
head of the households is aged 25-59 and dropping observations with missing values for
socio-economic class. Note that from 2015 and on, LCF changed to nancial year data
collection (Apr-Mar) instead of a calendar year data collection (Jan-Dec). Nevertheless, in
2015 LCF also collected the data for rst quarter of this year, and hence, we can calculate
the measures of interest in calendar year frequency for the whole sample.
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Table C5: Household sample selection LCF
selection step Total
1. Whole sample 49,326
2. Drop if 2018 47,856
3. Drop if heads region is N. Ireland 45,580
4. Drop if food consumption is zero 45,294
5. Drop if either the head or spouse is self employed 40,093
6. Drop if Total Earnings are zero 23,064
7. Drop if Total hours are zero 22,852
4. Drop if the socio-economic class of the head is missing 21,800
7. Keep if headsage 25, 59 18,574
11. Drop top and bottom 0.5% of observations 18,159
Average obs per year 2,018
Table C6: Summary statistics of total earnings from LCF
NS-SEC Mean Gini
total earnings
routine and semi-routine 0.555 0.371
intermediate low supervisory 0.821 0.328
lower management and professional 1.121 0.301
higher management and professional 1.459 0.283
total 1.000 0.358
zSource: Living Costs and Food Survey, own calculations. Consumption refers
to equivalised weekly non-durable consumption plus real housing costs.
We report the average statistics over years 2009-2017. All monetary values for all
three variables in this table are expressed in 2015 prices as measured by CPIH.
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12 Appendix D
The utility function is given by:
u(c; l; C) =
c1 
1  C
 + 
l1 
1   , (D.1)
where ;  > 1,  > 0. Note that:
@u
@C
= 
c1 
1  C
 1, and (D.2)
@2u
@c@C
= c C 1. (D.3)
Assuming that there is no uncertainty, the elasticity "cC  %c%C can be approximated
from the Euler equation as follows:
(Ct)
c t = (1 + r)(Ct+1)
c t+1,
)  ln(Ct)   ln(ct) = ln((1 + r)) +  ln(Ct+1)   ln(ct+1),
)  ln(ct+1) = ln((1 + r)) +  ln(Ct+1),
)  ln(cit+1) = ln((1+r)) +  ln(Ct+1),
(D.4)
but since ln((1+r))

is a very small number, we can approximate "cC as follows:
 ln(cit+1)   ln(Ct+1),
)  ln(cit+1)= ln(Ct+1)   ,
) "cC   .
(D.5)
The parameters (in long form) used for the base results in Tables 4 are in Table D1.
Table D1: Calibrated parameters
      r w 
0.965479 1.50 1.603704 0.30 0.75 1.035185 0.0217 1.036678 0.0983
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Figure D1: Uniqueness, Benchmark Case
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Figure D2: Uniqueness, Negative Elasticity Case
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Figure D3: Uniqueness, 90th Percentile Case
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Figure D4: Uniqueness, Mean Above Case
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Figure D5: Uniqueness, 90th Percentile Case above
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Table D2: Calibration with lower elasticity
"cC= "cC=
Data 0:333 Data 0:333
AR
A
0.387 0.373 Gini AR 0.775 0.637
AI
A
0.696 0.610 Gini AI 0.662 0.587
ALP
A
1.101 1.037 Gini ALP 0.628 0.523
AHP
A
1.702 1.569 Gini AHP 0.593 0.469
A 1.256 Gini A 0.670 0.567
CR
C
0.774 0.610 Gini CR 0.248 0.112
CI
C
0.901 0.789 Gini CI 0.258 0.115
CLP
C
1.068 1.037 Gini CLP 0.260 0.105
CHP
C
1.231 1.311 Gini CHP 0.274 0.087
C 0.392 Gini C 0.276 0.170
ER
E
0.549 0.564 Gini ER 0.314 0.271
EI
E
0.794 0.750 Gini EI 0.263 0.279
ELP
E
1.100 1.031 Gini ELP 0.243 0.288
EHP
E
1.454 1.374 Gini EHP 0.235 0.284
E 0.364 Gini E 0.308 0.329
HR 0.296 0.325 Gini HR 0.223 0.161
HI 0.330 0.328 Gini HI 0.152 0.154
HLP 0.346 0.333 Gini HLP 0.127 0.153
HHP 0.346 0.341 Gini HHP 0.121 0.147
H 0.333 Gini H 0.153 0.153
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Table D3: Levels of the means and variances
"cC= "cC= "cC= "cC= "cC= "cC=
0:5 0  0:5 0:5 0  0:5
AR 0.520 0.412 0.367 varAR 49.26 39.68 35.44
AI 0.819 0.707 0.661 varAI 86.02 75.55 70.216
ALP 1.327 1.275 1.249 varALP 163.16 159.51 153.47
AHP 1.926 2.017 2.035 varAHP 265.46 283.36 278.38
A 1.271 1.238 1.217 varA 182.99 190.84 188.24
CR 0.223 0.261 0.281 varCR 0.152 0.254 0.330
CI 0.299 0.322 0.332 varCI 0.296 0.399 0.458
CLP 0.410 0.399 0.392 varCLP 0.516 0.522 0.515
CHP 0.539 0.478 0.447 varCHP 0.672 0.505 0.433
C 0.395 0.385 0.379 varC 1.645 1.001 0.773
ER 0.190 0.227 0.246 varER 0.933 0.971 0.939
EI 0.265 0.284 0.292 varEI 1.772 1.752 1.649
ELP 0.380 0.368 0.359 varELP 3.592 3.436 3.146
EHP 0.522 0.470 0.444 varEHP 6.227 5.994 5.447
E 0.368 0.358 0.352 varE 4.873 4.139 3.616
HR 0.298 0.363 0.396 varHR 1.025 0.928 0.772
HI 0.316 0.343 0.356 varHI 0.908 0.861 0.733
HLP 0.337 0.326 0.320 varHLP 0.852 0.88 0.767
HHP 0.358 0.319 0.300 varHHP 0.735 0.876 0.802
H 0.333 0.333 0.333 varH 0.899 0.906 0.877
Notes: For the case where "cC= 0:5 the parameters are as in Table 3. For the
"cC = 0 case,  = 0:9625,  = 2:2134 and  = 1:5446 and the rest
are as in Table 3. For the "cC =  0:5 case,  = 0:9611,  = 4:4693
and  = 1:6632 and the rest are as in Table 3. All var terms are multipli-
ed by 100.
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13 Appendix E: Endogenous prices
We integrate the socio-economic equilibrium in a small open economy general equilibrium
also employed in Angelopoulos et al. (2019), since our calibration is for the U.K.. In
particular, we consider an open economy trading in global capital markets taking the
real interest rate as given, where aggregate household savings, A, can di¤er from capital
demanded by rms, K. The di¤erence between domestic savings and domestic capital
denes the net foreign asset position, NFA  K   A, for the domestic economy. Given
the countrys net foreign asset position, the country makes interest payments to foreign
households equal to rNFA, where r is the interest rate at which the country can borrow
from abroad.
We assume that the country faces a world risk-free interest rate r plus a risk premium
which is a function of the net foreign asset position (see e.g. Kraay and Ventura, (2000)
for foreign-assets-elastic interest rate or Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for debt-elastic
interest rate). In particular, we assume that the risk premium is positively correlated
with foreign debt relative GDP i.e. with NFA over output:
r = r +  

exp(
NFA
Y
)  1

, (2.18)
for 0 <  < r+, which is well dened for r > r  , and where  measures the elasticity
of the country specic interest rate premium relative to the net foreign asset position.41
Household optimisation and (2.18) jointly dene a constraint set for the interest rate in
general equilibrium, Rge, given by r 2 Rge =

r    ; 1

  1

. Firms borrow assets at the
rate r to maximise prots, giving rise to the usual rst-order conditions in (2.15)-(2.14)
and technology is given by a constant returns to scale production function satisfying usual
Inada conditions Y = F (K;L). Formally, we require that F displays constant returns to
scale, with F1; F2 > 0, F11; F22 < 0, and it satises the conditions limK!+1 F1(K; 1) = 0
and limK!0 F1(K; 1) = +1. Note, then, that the condition that  < r + , implying
r    >  , and given that r > r    , ensures that domestic rms demand is nite in
the international market, and also guarantees that r >  1.
We dene a stationary recursive general equilibrium in the open economy, establish
existence and present an algorithm to compute the equilibrium.
41Note that r > r    is automatically satised for a country with negative net foreign assets when
 > 0, as is the case in the calibration for the UK.
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Stationary Recursive Open Economy Equilibrium
A Stationary Recursive General Equilibrium is an aggregate stationary distribution

eC on X, policy functions a0 = g a; z; eC : X ! A, ct = q a; z; eC : X ! R+ and
l = l

a; z; eC : X ! [0; 1], value function V a; z; eC : X ! R, positive real numbers ineC, and real numbers K, L, w(K
L
) and r(K
L
) such that:
1. The rm maximises its prots given prices, so that the latter satisfy (2.15) and
(2.14).
2. The value function and the policy functions g

a; z; eC, q a; z; eC, and l a; z; eC
solve the households optimum problem in (2.4), given prices and aggregate quanti-
ties in eC.
3. Given prices and aggregate quantities, 
eC is a stationary distribution under the
transition function  eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] implied by households decision rules (de-
termined by (2.5)). In particular, 
eC satises

eC([0; a] fz0g) =
Z
X

eC [(a; z) ; A0  fz0g] eC(da; dz)
for all (a; z) 2 X, A0  fz0g 2 B (X).
4. When 
eC describes the cross-section of households at each date, the reference points
in eC = C1; C2; ::; Cm	 are given by the relevant percentiles of the distribution
of consumption across the relevant social class in (2.6) or by the means in (2.7).
Additionally, the domestic labour market clears:
L =
Z
X
e(z)

1  l

a; z; eC eC(da; dz)  Ls; (2.19)
and the world asset market clears, satisfying
r = r +  

exp

K   As
F (K;L)

  1

,
where
As 
Z
X
g

a; z; eC eC(da; dz). (2.20)
Given that we have shown the existence of a socio-economic equilibrium given r and
w, what needs to be shown is that r and w exist for market clearing. Conditions for this
are specied in the proposition below.
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Proposition 2
Assume that there exists a unique socio-economic equilibrium given r and w. Then,
for  su¢ ciently large,  > min satisfying K
Y
(r) > ln

r r+min
min

, a stationary recursive
general equilibrium exists.
Proof: The properties of the production function imply that the wage rate is a
monotonic function of the interest rate. Hence, w, and indeed the general equilibrium
quantities, can be expressed as a function of r. In particular, the capital to labour ratio
demanded by the rms, K
L
, is a decreasing function of r, as are the ratios Y
L
and K
Y
. Given
the interest rate, rm demand for assets and production implies a demand for assets over
labour,
 
A
L
d
, via the international market and in particular (2.18), given by

A
L
d
=

K
Y

  ln

r   r + 


Y
L

,
which is a continuous function in r. When r r
+

is small enough such that K
Y
>
ln

r r+


,
d(AL )
d
dr
< 0. Moreover, when r ! 1

  1,  A
L
d !  A
L
min
< +1, whereas
when r ! r + ,  A
L
d ! +1. Given r (and w (r)), there is a unique socio-economic
equilibrium, implying a unique aggregate supply of assets, As =
R
X
g

a; z; eC eC(da; dz)
and a unique aggregate supply of labour Ls =
R
X
e(z)

1  l

a; z; eC eC(da; dz), and
thus implying an asset-to-labour supply
 
A
L
s  As
Ls
. As shown in Zhu (2018), this is
continuous with respect to r and r ! 1

  1,  A
L
s ! +1. Moreover, when r !  1, 
A
L
s ! 0. Therefore, an intersection point of the supply and demand curves  A
L
s
and 
A
L
d
exists. This pins down r and
 
A
L
s
=
 
A
L
d  A
L
; these determine K
L
(from (2.14)), w
(from (2.15)), As (from (2.20)), Ls and L (from (2.19)), which, in turn, determine K and
F (K;L). 
Note that the su¢ cient condition  > min is easy to satisfy for realistic calibrations for
developed economies, where the interest rate r does not di¤er much from the international
interest rate and the capital to output ratio is higher than two, implying values for min
in the third decimal point. To solve the model allowing for feedback from the supply
of assets to the interest rate, we implement the following algorithm (which follows from
Proposition 2):
Computational algorithm for the open economy equilibrium
1. Guess a value for rn, which, given the rst-order conditions (2.15) and (2.14) implies
a value for
 
K
L
n
and wn.
131
2. Calculate the demand for domestic assets to labour implied by the international
asset markets via (2.18), given by
A
L
n
=

K
Y
n
  ln (rn   r + ) + ln

Y
L
n
,
where
 
Y
L
n
= T
  
K
L
na
.
3. Given r0 and w0, we solve the socio-economic equilibrium (implementing the algo-
rithm for the socio-economic equilibrium), check that it is unique, and calculate the
aggregate values of Ls (rn) and As (rn) and thus of
 
A
L
s
(rn) that is supplied by the
domestic economy.
4. Calculate the updated value of
rn

= r + 

exp

(K=L)n   (A=L)s
(Y=L)n

  1

.
5. If
 A
L
s    A
L
n < ", where " is a pre-specied tolerance level, a stationary open
economy general equilibrium has been found. If not, go back to step 1, and update
rn+1 = (1  &) rn + &rn with 0 < &  1.
To calibrate the open economy general equilibrium model, we use the same parameters
and procedure as above for the socio-economic equilibrium. In addition, we set the world
interest rate, r, equal to 2:15% which is the average short-run world real interest rate
over all the countries in the dataset in Carvalho et al. (2016). Moreover, we choose  so
that the interest rate is 0:0217 in equilibrium, as in the socio-economic equilibrium. In
particular, for given targets K A
Y
= 8:1%, r = 2:17%, and given r = 2:15%,  is given
by  = r r

[exp(NFAY ) 1]
= 0:0024. This implies that the predictions of the model for the
base calibration of  = 0:75 are identical to those from the socio-economic equilibrium
in Section 4. We then use this equilibrium to re-compute the results in Tables 5 and 6.
Results are very similar in both cases.
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CHAPTER 3
CYCLICAL INCOME RISK IN GREAT
BRITAIN
1 Introduction
This paper provides new evidence on the cyclical behaviour of household income risk in
Great Britain (GB) from 1991-2008 and assesses the role of social insurance policy in
mitigating against this source of income risk. To achieve this, we decompose stochastic
idiosyncratic household income into its transitory, persistent and xed components.1 We
measure risk by the second and the third central moment of the probability distribution
of shocks to the persistent component. Following the parametric approach of Storesletten
et al. (2004) and Busch and Ludwig (2016), we allow these two moments to depend on
the aggregate state and, in particular, to vary between expansions and contractions of
the aggregate economy. The advantage of this methodology is that we can identify the
di¤erences between booms and slumps by exploiting history dependent cross-sectional
moments that incorporate aggregate shocks outside the panel data sample period.2
Idiosyncratic risk has implications for the household, the aggregate economy and so-
cial insurance policy. Our interest in investigating the cyclical variation in third moments
for Great Britain is motivated by recent evidence for a number of countries, suggesting
1See, e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a review of the earnings dynamics models.
2Note that in earlier work, see Angelopoulos et al. (2017 ), we examined similar issues studied in this
paper for Great Britain using parametric free methods and alternative measures of skewness based on
quantile-based metrics. Whilst we draw broadly similar conclusions with respect to the time variation of
earnings risk, the method employed did not allow us to exploit past information to separately identify
the cyclicality of transitory and persistent shocks.
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that the skewness of the distribution of the growth of earnings is counter-cyclical (see e.g.
Guvenen et al. (2014) and Busch et al. (2018)). A preliminary investigation of the distri-
bution of the growth of annual labour income across households, using British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) data, reveals that the third central moment has signicantly more
variability over time than the variance of the same distribution.3
Figure 1: Volatility and Asymmetry of Labour Income Growth
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First note in Figure 1 that the overall time evolution of the variance is similar with
that reported in Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for shocks to the permanent component of
household earnings. The time variation of the third central moment, on the other hand, is
suggestive of a more volatile distribution of income growth with respect to its asymmetry.
Moreover, since it refers to changes to the overall labour income, we cannot infer from this
whether persistent shocks, which have stronger e¤ects on the household (see e.g. Meghir
and Pistaferri (2011) and references therein), exhibit cyclicality. The relative importance
of these shocks motivates our interest in whether cyclical variation is present in the third
3Details relating to the data, sample selection, and variable denitions used in Figures 1-2 and through-
out the paper are reported in Appendix A. Note that we use the third central moment in Figures 1-2 to
correspond to what we estimate in Tables 1-6 below. Also note that the conclusions we draw from these
Figures and Tables are qualitatively the same when we instead calculate the standardised third moments
(see Appendix C). In light of this, we use the term skewness when referring to both the third central
moment and the standardised third moment or Pearsons moment coe¢ cient of skewness.
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moments of shocks to the permanent component of household income. Busch and Ludwig
(2016) nd evidence of such cyclicality in Germany.
An evaluation of the extent to which di¤erent components of economic policy reduce
risk exposure, and in particular the increase in vulnerability during contractions, is im-
portant in informing policy making, as it suggests which policy instrument is likely to
be more e¤ective when insurance is most required. The evidence for Germany in Busch
and Ludwig (2016) and for U.S., Germany and Sweden in Busch et al. (2018) shows that
social insurance policy does reduce the increase in risk exposure associated with changes
in skewness. However, it also suggests that, at least when looking at distributions of
growth in earnings (Busch et al. (2018)), this is mainly driven by taxes, compared with
transfers. On the other hand, evidence from the U.K. (see e.g. Beleld et al. (2017))
suggests that benets have a stronger e¤ect in mitigating an increase in inequality, espe-
cially in contractions. Moreover, when we plot the variance and third moment of di¤erent
measures of pre- and post-government household income growth in GB, in Figure 2, we
also see that benets seem to be dominant in smoothing the time variation of household
income risk.
Figure 2 shows that policy does reduce the level of second and third moments in the
rst and second subplots respectively, as well as their volatility over time. Moreover, these
e¤ects are driven primarily by benets. This evidence further motivates our interest in
whether these e¤ects maintain when evaluating the ability of policy to provide insurance
by smoothing the cyclicality of shocks to permanent risk.
To assess whether cyclical variation is present in the second and third moments of
shocks to the permanent component of household income and whether these e¤ects re-
main post policy we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This dataset has
been used extensively for income dynamics analysis in the U.K. (see, e.g. Blundell and
Etheridge (2010), Bayer and Juessen (2012), Capellari and Jenkins (2014) and Etheridge
(2015)), since it provides measures of annual earnings at the individual and household
levels, in addition to observable characteristics. The latter allow us to partial out ob-
servable deterministic components (i.e. time, experience, education, region of residence
and household size e¤ects) to isolate idiosyncratic labour income in the data. We then
employ an estimation procedure that aims to match the theoretical moments of the model
of state-dependent income dynamics, with their empirical counterparts. To examine the
e¤ect of social insurance, we estimate risk for di¤erent measures of pre- and post-policy
household income, using the data in Bardasi et al. (2012) and evaluate the e¤ect of tax
and benets policies on the level and cyclicality of risk.
We nd that the volatility and left-skewness of the shocks to the permanent component
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of income are a-cyclical and counter-cyclical respectively. The latter implies a higher
probability of receiving large negative income shocks in contractions. In addition, we
nd that while taxes and benets help to reduce the levels of both measures of risk, it is
benets that signicantly reduce the increase in risk exposure associated with skewness
during bad times. More generally, benets have stronger risk mitigation e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the relevant
literature to provide the context motivating the approach used in our analysis. In Section
3 we discuss the methods employed to obtain the two measures of income risk and in
Section 4 the data and econometric estimation procedure. The results are presented in
Section 5 and Section 6 contains the conclusions.4
4Further details on the data are reported in Appendix A. Additional empirical results can also be
found in Appendices C and D relating to the robustness of our ndings.
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2 Related literature
Idiosyncratic risk matters for individual (or household) level behaviour and outcomes. In
response to labour income risk, individuals or households engage in a number of ex ante
precautionary and ex post corrective economic activities, which ultimately can a¤ect ag-
gregate economic outcomes (see e.g. Low et al. (2010) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2011)).
For example, precautionary behaviour related to higher labour income risk may lead to
increases in savings and labour supply as well as portfolio adjustments to include more
lower-risk lower-return assets. These responses are stronger under incomplete markets. In
contrast, ex post responses to negative shocks to labour income might include the liquida-
tion of assets and durable goods, changing jobs and family labour supply, and adjustments
in consumption. The e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk are typically stronger for persistent, rel-
ative to purely transitory, income shocks. This has motivated a decomposition of income
risk into persistent (or permanent) and transitory components, emphasising the impor-
tance of the former. The absence of market opportunities for insurance against negative
shocks to labour income typically motivates public insurance.5
The cyclical behaviour of labour income risk, and in particular the extent to which
risk exposure increases during periods of contraction, is thus important for individual
behaviour and outcomes. Moreover, the relationship between income risk and aggre-
gate economic conditions is also important for understanding macroeconomic phenomena.
Theoretical work has focused on the role of counter-cyclical risk in explaining asset prices
and economic uctuations (see e.g. the research reviewed in Storesletten et al. (2004)
and Guvenen et al. (2014)). The main idea is that idiosyncratic labour income risk
is increasing with respect to negative aggregate shocks. In this literature, some studies
have concentrated on the importance of the counter-cyclical variance of earnings shocks
(e.g. Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996) and Storesletten et al. (2007)) while others have
highlighted the signicance of the counter-cyclical left-skewness of earnings shocks (e.g.
Mankiw (1986), Brav et al. (2002), Krebs (2007), and McKay (2017)). From a policy
perspective, understanding the cyclical properties of household income risk, and the ex-
tent to which social insurance can mitigate increases in risk exposure, is important for
the evaluation of alternative policies.
These considerations have motivated empirical research which examines the relation-
ship between higher moments of the distribution of individual and household labour in-
come shocks and changes in aggregate outcomes. Given the importance of persistent
5Such negative shocks can take the form of unemployment or health shocks that reduce employment,
or shocks that reduce returns to work, e.g. shocks that lower productivity, technology shocks that make
skills less valuable and shocks leading to employer-worker mismatch.
137
income shocks, a small number of studies have directly examined the cyclical proper-
ties of the shocks to the persistent component of individual or household income. In a
seminal contribution, Storesletten et al. (2004), estimated a model for income dynamics
with a state dependent variance using U.S. survey data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and found that the variance of the persistent component of household
labour income (earnings plus benets) is counter-cyclical. Following the same approach
and dataset, Bayer and Juessen (2012) nd that household wages have countercyclical
variance in the U.S., but that the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to wages is a-cyclical
in GB, using BHPS data.6 Busch and Ludwig (2016), using data for Germany for indi-
viduals and households, extend the approach in Storesletten et al. (2004) and estimate a
model for income dynamics that allows for regime-switching variance and skewness. They
nd that both the variance and left-skewness of shocks to the permanent components of
income are counter-cyclical.
A relatively larger set of studies has studied the cyclicality of the distribution of in-
come shocks across individuals or households, approximating shocks with growth rates
of relevant measures of income, without statistically decomposing shocks to those a¤ect-
ing the persistent and the transitory component of income. For example, Ziliak et al.
(2011) used the U.S. matched Current Population Survey and found that the volatility of
individual male and female earnings growth are counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical respec-
tively, whereas Cappellari and Jenkins (2014), using BHPS data, nd that the variance
of individual earnings growth shows little time variation over the 1991-2008 period. In an
inuential contribution, Guvenen et al. (2014), using U.S. Social Security Administration
data without imposing restrictions on the shape of the distribution of shocks to individual
earnings, discover that the left-skewness is counter-cyclical and variance is a-cyclical. The
counter-cyclical property of the skewness of income risk has been further documented
in the literature using panel data surveys for Germany, Sweden and the U.S. in Busch
et al. (2018). These ndings have important implications for the cyclical properties of
risk exposure, as they suggest that in periods of contraction the probability of receiving
large negative shocks increases. Given the importance of shocks to the persistent compo-
nent of income relative to the transitory part, these results further motivate research into
examining the cyclical variation of such income shocks.7
The literature has also examined the risk mitigation performance of social insurance
6BHPS data have been frequently used to decompose earnings risk into its transitory and persistent
components in Great Britain (see also Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Etheridge (2015)).
7Guvenen et al. (2014) approximated permanent shocks by 5-year di¤erences in income. However, for
shorter time series, this approach becomes more di¢ cult and a statistical decomposition as in Busch and
Ludwig (2016) is required.
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policies. Regarding the cyclicality in risk exposure associated with changes in skewness
of the distribution of earnings growth, Busch et al. (2018) provide evidence from the
U.S., Germany and Sweden that social insurance policy does reduce the increase in risk
exposure. Their results suggest that taxes have the biggest e¤ect in reducing the cyclicality
of skewness. Their nding for the U.S. is in line with the results in Kniesner and Zilliak
(2002) who show that taxes have similar e¤ects in reducing the variance of the distribution
of household earnings growth than transfers. The e¤ects of the tax-benet social insurance
system in reducing the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks has been
demonstrated in e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for GB and in Domeij and Floden
(2010) for Sweden. However, evidence from e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and
Beleld et al. (2017) demonstrates that, in the U.K. benets have stronger e¤ects than
taxes in mitigating household income inequality.
Regarding risk mitigation associated with the cyclicality of the third moment of shocks
to the persistent component of income, Busch and Ludwig (2016) show that the tax and
transfer system in Germany reduces the increase in risk exposure arising from shocks to
permanent income in contractions. However, they do not disaggregate the e¤ects of taxes
and transfers. The importance of shocks to the persistent component of income relative
to the transitory part motivates us to further investigate which policy instrument is likely
to be more e¤ective in mitigating the increase in risk exposure in periods of contraction.
3 Idiosyncratic Income Risk
We next set out the method used to derive the measures of idiosyncratic income risk
which vary depending on the aggregate state of the economy. The basic object of analysis
for the various measures of income and risk is households whose head is aged between 25
to 60 in the time period 1991-2008.
3.1 Idiosyncratic income shocks
Following the literature on modeling earnings dynamics (see e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri
(2011)), we assume that idiosyncratic component of income, i;h;t, for household i of age
h, h 2 f1; 2; :::; H = 36g, in period t, t 2 f1; 2; :::; T = 18g, is driven by stochastic xed
e¤ects, i, persistent e¤ects, zi;h;t, and transitory shocks, "i;t:
i;h;t = i + zi;h;t + "i;t, (3.1)
zi;h;t = zi;h 1;t 1 + i;t, (3.2)
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where 0 <  < 1 and i;t captures innovations to the persistent e¤ects.
Following Busch and Ludwig (2016), the distributional assumptions for the three com-
ponents in (3.1) and (3.2) are:
i 
i:i:d:
F(0;m

2 ;m

3 ), (3.3)
"i;t 
i:i:d:
F"(0;m
"
2;m
"
3), (3.4)
i;t 
i:i:d:
F

0;m
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2 ;m
;f(t)
3

, (3.5)
where F, F", and F denote the density functions of i, "i;t and i;t respectively. All the
moments for the xed e¤ects, (m2 ;m

3 ) and the transitory shocks, (m
"
2;m
"
3), are constant.
In contrast, the innovations to the persistent shocks,

m
;f(t)
2 ;m
;f(t)
3

are assumed to be
time dependent since we wish to test whether they are driven by the aggregate state of
the economy.
Furthermore, following e.g. Storesletten et al. (2004), we assume that it is the history
of persistent shocks only after the age h = 1 that matters for idiosyncratic income. In
particular, we assume that zi;0;t = 0, implying that prior to joining the labour market
there are no persistent shocks that matter for earnings dynamics after h = 1 other than
the xed e¤ects. In other words, the xed e¤ects capture factors that matter for income
dynamics prior to joining the labour market.
Following Storesletten et al. (2004) and Busch and Ludwig (2016) we allow m;f(t)2
and m;f(t)3 to take two values each depending on the aggregate state, f(t), which is either
an expansion, e, or a contraction, c. For example, we dene an indicator variable If(t)=e
to be equal to 1 if period t is an expansion and If(t)=c to be equal to 0 if period t is a
contraction, i.e.:
m
;f(t)
2 
 
If(t)=e

m;e2 +
 
1  If(t)=c

m;c2 , (3.6)
m
;f(t)
3 
 
If(t)=e

m;e3 +
 
1  If(t)=c

m;c3 . (3.7)
3.2 Theoretical moments
The above assumptions imply a particular structure on the covariance matrix of the
stochastic processes zi;h;t and i;h;t. Applying expected value, variance, co-variance and co-
skewness rules to the above model for i;h;t yields the following set of theoretical moments
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which will be employed in our empirical analysis:8
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
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The moments of the idiosyncratic component of income, i;h;t, are thus a function of
past moments of innovations to the persistent component. Therefore, the estimation of
the parameters of interest requires knowledge of whether H   1 years prior to those in
the observed sample of the households were expansionary or contractionary. In turn, this
implies that more time variation in the aggregate state is exploited in the estimation, thus
helping to increase the accuracy of estimating moments separately for periods of expansion
and contraction (see also Storesletten et al. (2004), who introduced this identication
approach).
8We use the convention here that h = 1 when the age is 25, and goes through to h = 36 when the age
is 60.
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3.3 Empirical moments
To obtain the idiosyncratic component of household income, i;h;t, we follow the literature
on earnings dynamics and run a Mincerian-type regression to partial out non-stochastic
e¤ects from labour income. In particular, we assume that the process determining the
logarithm of annual household income, yi;h;t, is comprised of an observable deterministic
part, dt + bxi;h;t, and the unobservable random component, i;h;t:
yi;h;t = dt + bxi;h;t + i;h;t, (3.13)
where b is a vector of parameters. In particular, the regressors in (3.13) include calendar
year time e¤ects, dt, and a set of dummy variables, xi;h;t, for experience (approximated
by age), region of residence and household size. For the region dummies we use the U.K.
Government O¢ ce Regions classication which corresponds with the highest tier of sub-
national division in England, Scotland and Wales. Furthermore, following Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) we allow for the returns to the observable deterministic characteristics
to be skill specic. Hence, we estimate (3.13) for two separate skill groups, i.e. households
whose head has University education and those households whose head does not. Finally,
since in our econometric analysis we employ household quantities for the arguments in
(3.13), we dene the age and regional e¤ects in terms of the head of the household. We
denote by bi;h;t the estimated idiosyncratic component of household income.
Using a panel dataset of household incomes for time t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg, age h 2 f1; 2; :::; Hg
and i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng we rst calculate the empirical moments of the idiosyncratic income
shocks using the residuals from the Mincer regression. In particular, every year t, we
group agents in the sample into 5-year adjacent age cells indexed by h, i.e. we dene an
individual or a household as belonging to the age group h if her true age was between
h 2 and h+2. For example, the rst cell, i.e. age group 25, contains all workers between
23 and 27 years old, the second cell, i.e. age group 26, contains all workers between 24
and 28 years old, while the last cell, i.e. age group 60, contains all workers between 58
and 62 years old. Our sample length and age grouping imply T = 18 and H = 36 which
implies a total of 2 5; 187 empirical moments. In particular, the empirical moments are
given by:
1
Ih;t;
PN
i=1 i;h;t;
h bi;h;t  bi;h+;t+ i =
= 1
Ih;t;
PN
i=1 i;h;t;[

yi;h;t   bdt  bbxi;h;t


yi;h+;t+   bdt  bbxi;h+;t+ ],
(3.14)
where (;  ) 2 f(1; 1) ; (2; 1)g,  = 0; :::;min [T   t;H   h], Ih;t; =
PN
i=1 i;h;t; and  is
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an indicator function which is one when an individual i of age group h at time t is also
present in time t+ , and zero otherwise.
4 Data and estimation
In this section we provide information on the dataset and variables used for the analysis
as well as a brief description of the sample selection criteria, followed by a description of
the econometric methods used to estimate the model parameters.
4.1 Data
The BHPS is a comprehensive longitudinal study for GB, covering 1991 to 2008.9 It
includes information for up to 5000 households on earnings and other sources of income
for individuals and households over an annual period starting in September, as well as on
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. These characteristics include gender,
education, age, social (professional) class and region.10 BHPS was replaced in 2010 by
a new panel data survey, Understanding Society, which however does not include infor-
mation on annual earnings, and thus cannot be used to analyse earnings risk. We also
make use of the auxiliary dataset Derived Current and Annual Net Household Income
Variables (DCANHIV), compiled by Bardasi et al. (2012), which contains derived data
on household disposable income. Note that the Bardasi et al. (2012) dataset tracks the
same individuals/households for the same time as the BHPS i.e. 1991-2008.
Household level
We start with the allocation of individuals to households from BHPS and keep households
with a spouse/partner relationship (hence discarding those households comprised of a
single member or those that involve cohabiting but not family-related members) as well
as those where the head is between 23-62 years and reports non-zero labour income.11
Following e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) we dene the head to be the older married
(or in partnership) male. We also have measures on annual earnings of the households
individual members.
9Further details on the datasets and the denition and construction of variables and information on
sample selection can be found in Appendix A.
10Data on Northern Ireland are available from 1997 via the additional BHPS sub-sample European
Community Household Panel Survey. However, we focus on Great Britain to not restrict further the time
dimension, which is important for our analysis.
11Some households dened as such have additional members, e.g. other family members living in the
same household.
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Using the DCANHIV dataset we have consistent series of household labour income,
gross income, gross income less taxes and national insurance contributions, gross income
plus benets, and gross income plus benets less taxes and national insurance contribu-
tions. Labour income is the sum of annual earnings of the household members. Gross
income is equal to households labour income plus annual investment income, occupational
pension income and annual private transfers income. Taxes are the annual household in-
come taxes after credits, while benets are the annual social benets income, which totals
all receipts from state benets from all households members (including national insurance
retirement pensions).
To ensure strong attachment to the labour marker, we follow e.g. Guvenen et al.
(2014), Busch et al. (2016) and include in any year households in which their head reports
annual earnings greater than half of the product between the minimum legal hourly wage
times 520 hours, implying at least a few months of work during the year. For each year,
we order the households according to their labour income and we discard the observations
who are in the top 1%.
Aggregate Shocks
As a proxy for the aggregate state of the economy, we use the OECD Composite Leading
Indicators (CLI) for the United Kingdom "from the peak through the trough" which can
be found in Fred St. Louis website.12 The OECD identies months of turning points
without designating a date within the month that the turning points occurred. The
dummy variable adopts an arbitrary convention that the turning point occurred at a
specic date within the month. To be consistent with the BHPS data, we have chosen
the annual frequency and as an aggregation period the end of period (from September to
September). We aggregate on the monthly indices and set as contractions the years with
6 or more months of contraction.13 The OECD based aggregate cycle indicator can be
extended into the past until 1956 which corresponds with the year (i.e. 1991) that the
oldest individuals in the sample entered the labour market at age 25.
4.2 Estimation
The moment conditions employed in the GMM estimation are:
12The components of the CLI are time series which exhibit leading relationships with the reference
series (GDP) at turning points. Country CLIs are compiled by combining de-trended smoothed and
normalized components. The component series for each country are selected based on various criteria
such as economic signicance; cyclical behaviour; data quality; timeliness and availability.
13Note that, alternatively, following Busch and Ludwigs (2016) method to characterise years as either
contractionary or expansionary periods gives us exactly the same classication.
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E
b2i;h;t   2i;h;t () = 0, (3.15)
E
b3i;h;t   3i;h;t () = 0, (3.16)
E
bi;h;tbi;h+;t+   i;h;t ()i;h+;t+ () = 0, (3.17)
E
b2i;h;tbi;h+;t+   2i;h;t ()i;h+;t+ () = 0, (3.18)
where  is the vector of parameters to be estimated:
 = f;m2 ;m3 ;m"2;m"3;m;c2 ;m;e2 ;m;c3 ;m;e3 g .
The empirical moments in conjunction with the theoretical ones given by (3.8)-(3.12)
allow us to identify: (i) the persistence parameter ; (ii) the second and third moments of
distribution of the xed e¤ects, m2 and m

3 ; (iii) the second and third moments of distri-
bution of the transitory shocks, m"2 and m
"
3; and (iv) the time dependent higher moments
for innovations to the persistent component i.e. m;f(t)2 , m
;f(t)
3 . We show analytically
in Appendix B that the parameters in  can be identied if we have at least four time
periods and four age groups.14 In the data, we have 18 periods and 36 age groups, which
implies that the system (3.15)-(3.18) is over-identied.
Let m be the vector with all the available empirical moments constructed as above
and G() the vector of the respective theoretical moments. The goal is to estimate a
model for m:
m = G() + , (3.19)
where  captures sampling variability. For the estimation, we minimize the distance
between the empirical and the theoretical moments. Formally, we numerically minimize
the following objective function:
Q() = min

(m G())0W (m G()) , (3.20)
where W is a weighting matrix. Following Altonji and Segal (1996), the typical choice of
W in the literature is the identity matrix. However, notice that each moment is calculated
by a di¤erent number of observations. Moreover, since we are calculating higher moments,
14In particular, in Appendix B, we illustrate how to identify the persistence parameter, , using the
minimum number of consecutive time periods and age groups, i.e. 4 for each. Using equation, (3.14), this
example implies 60 empirical moments. The Appendix also illustrates, conditional on a given value of ,
how to identify: m2 ; m

3 ; m
"
2; m
"
3; m
;f(t)
2 and m
;f(t)
3 , again using the minimum number of consecutive
time periods and age groups, i.e. 3 for each. Using equation, (3.14), this example implies 28 empirical
moments.
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it is well known that bigger samples give more accurate results. Hence, we weight each
moment equation by the number of observations used to calculate its empirical part since
the panel is unbalanced.15
To compute the standard errors, we follow MaCurdy (2007), and use the block boot-
strap procedure for 1000 replications. The resulting condence intervals account for serial
correlation of arbitrary form, heteroskedasticity as well as for the fact that we use pre-
estimated residuals.16 Formally, the bootstrap p-values for an estimator  are calculated
as:
2 
"
1  
 b
b
!#
, (3.21)
where b is the GMM estimator and b its bootstrap standard errors.  denotes the
Normal cumulative distribution function.17
5 Results
The estimated parameters  = [;m2 ;m

3 ;m
"
2;m
"
3;m
;c
2 ;m
;e
2 ;m
;c
3 ;m
;e
3 ] are reported in
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 concentrates on the main parameters of interest, i.e. the second
and third moments of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent component
of idiosyncratic income during expansions and contractions. Whereas, Table 2 reports
the remaining parameter estimates relating to the transitory shocks and stochastic xed
e¤ects. Tables 3-6 then report the results of statistical tests relating to the e¤ect of tax
and benet policy on the levels of persistent and transitory income risk as well as on the
cyclicality of persistent income risk.
5.1 Cyclical risk
Columns 1-2 and 4-5 in Table 1 present estimates of [m;c2 ;m
;e
2 ;m
;c
3 ;m
;e
3 ] for households
across ve di¤erent measures of labour income. Columns 3 and 6 in Table 1 also report
the di¤erence between each moment in expansions and in contractions to test whether
income risk increases in bad times.
15For similar treatment see Heathcote et al. (2010) and Domeij and Floden (2010).
16See also Hall and Horowitz (1996) and Horowitz (2003).
17Note that the histograms of the estimated parameters are approximately normally distributed. Fur-
ther note that our results are robust to the use of either percentile or bias corrected condence intervals.
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Table 1: Cyclical household income risk
m;e2 m
;c
2 m
;e
2  m;c2 m;e3 m;c3 m;e3  m;c3
labour income
est 0.0370 0.0389 -0.0019 -0.0105 -0.0336 0.0231
s.e. (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0124) (0.0154)
gross income
est 0.0346 0.0402 -0.0056 -0.0049 -0.0373 0.0324
s.e. (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0098) (0.0126)
gross income  taxes  NI
est 0.0286 0.0329 -0.0043 -0.0031 -0.0273 0.0242
s.e. (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0076) (0.0099)
gross income +benets
est 0.0240 0.0267 -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0076 0.0072
s.e. (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0050)
gross income +benets  taxes  NI
est 0.0185 0.0214 -0.0029 0.0001 -0.0049 0.0051
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0060) (0.0042) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0036)
The Bootstrap standard errors are included in parentheses (1000 sims) and the Bootstrap
p-values are denoted as p < 0:01;p < 0:05;p < 0:1. Note that the p-values for all
columns are for a two-tailed test, except the di¤erence tests which are for a one-tailed test.
The notation adopted here for the statistical tests apply throughout the paper. NI refers to
national insurance contributions.
5.2 Second moments
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 reveal statistically signicant second moments, m2, across
all ve income measures in both expansions and contractions. Counter-cyclical volatility,
implies that income risk is higher in contractions than in expansions, i.e. m;e2 < m
;c
2 or
that m;e2   m;c2 < 0. The signs associated with the di¤erence, m;e2   m;c2 , in column
3 of Table 1 qualitatively suggest counter-cyclical volatility for all measures. However,
a one-sided test of the null hypothesis that H0 : m
;e
2  m;c2  0 against the alternative
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hypothesis that HA : m
;e
2  m;c2 < 0 implies an a-cyclical volatility for all measures since
the null cannot be rejected for any case considered.
These results broadly cohere with the nding of Bayer and Juessen (2012) who also
nd a-cyclical volatility of wage risk for the U.K.. However, it should be noted that our
results are not directly comparable to Bayer and Juessen (2012) given that we employ
di¤erent measures of household compensation. In particular, we use labour income which
includes both wages and employment for households, whereas Bayer and Juessen (2012)
use the average hourly wage of the head and spouse. Nonetheless, evidence from both
papers points in the same direction. These ndings are also generally consistent with
evidence for GB reported in Blundell and Etheridge (2010) who decompose household
earnings shocks into permanent and transitory components. The estimated variances of
both earnings shocks components over 1991-2003 in their Figure 6.1 do not show evident
co-movement with the aggregate conditions.
5.3 Third moments
Column 4 in Table 1 shows statistically insignicant third moments, m3, across all ve
income measures in expansions. Whereas, column 5 in Table 1 shows statistically signi-
cant (negatively signed) third moments, m3, for all ve income measures in contractions.
Several observations regarding the third moment results are worth pointing out. First, the
time variation in m3 between expansions and contractions implies that the idiosyncratic
income shocks are clearly drawn from a non-normal distribution. Second, two distribu-
tions of income shocks with the same variance can imply very di¤erent amounts of risk if
they di¤er in m3. For example, the asymmetry in the distribution of idiosyncratic income
shocks implied by a non-zero third moment suggests that, depending on its sign, one of
the two tails of the distribution is longer.
A negative third moment signies that the distribution is skewed to the left and the
left tail is longer than the right tail. In our case, since the left tail represents the bad
shocks to income, a longer left tail in contractions than in expansions implies that there is
a higher probability of a household receiving a large negative income shock in bad times.
Thus, income risk which is higher in contractions than in expansions, i.e. m;e3 > m
;c
3 or
that m;e3  m;c3 > 0 can be characterised as pro-cyclical asymmetry. Note that Guvenen
et al. (2014) refers to this relationship as counter-cyclical left-skewness since left-skewness
is simply dened as the negative of skewness. Nonetheless, the interpretation is the same,
in a contraction the third moment is smaller (i.e. more negative) than in an expansion.
A one-sided test of the null hypothesis that H0 : m
;e
3  m;c3  0 against the alterna-
tive hypothesis that HA : m
;e
3  m;c3 > 0 suggests a signicant pro-cyclical asymmetry
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or counter-cyclical left-skewness across all ve income measures since we can reject the
null in all cases considered. This constitutes new evidence for GB and coheres with in-
ternational evidence, as discussed in Section 2. Notably, Busch and Ludwig (2016) is the
only other study that we are aware of that explicitly decomposes shocks to earnings to
investigate statistically the counter-cyclicality of third moments of shocks to the perma-
nent component separately from possible xed e¤ects and transitory shocks. Although
we allow for persistent, as opposed to permanent shocks (see Table 2 below for evidence
in support of this), our ndings for GB are similar to those in Busch and Ludwig (2016)
for Germany.
Table 2: Persistence and remaining moments
 m"2 m
"
3 m

2 m

3
labour income
est 0.8530 0.0320 -0.0441 0.0556 -0.0156
s.e. (0.0580) (0.0132) (0.0066) (0.0136) (0.0122)
gross income
est 0.8358 0.0268 -0.0339 0.0654 -0.0152
s.e. (0.0493) (0.0081) (0.0049) (0.0113) (0.0090)
gross income  taxes  NI
est 0.8473 0.0239 -0.0233 0.0521 -0.0099
s.e. (0.0450) (0.0068) (0.0037) (0.0096) (0.0071)
gross income + benets
est 0.8572 0.0206 -0.0116 0.0487 -0.0059
s.e. (0.0394) (0.0059) (0.0021) (0.0083) (0.0041)
gross income +benets  taxes  NI
est 0.8697 0.0188 -0.0064 0.0361 -0.0031
s.e. (0.0397) (0.0056) (0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0033)
Note that the p-values for all columns are for a two-tailed test.
5.4 Persistence and remaining moments
Table 2 above presents the results relating to the AR(1) parameter, , for the persistent
component of idiosyncratic income given in equation (3.2) as well as the second and third
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moments of the probability distribution of shocks to the transitory and xed e¤ects parts
of idiosyncratic income in equations (3.3) and (3.4) respectively. These result suggest
that the vast preponderance of the 30 parameter estimates are signicantly di¤erent from
zero at the 1% level of signicance. Only the third moment of shocks to stochastic xed
e¤ects appears to play little role in the estimation.
The estimates reveal that the distribution of transitory shocks is also skewed to the
left and the left tail is longer than the right tail. Finally, the estimate for the persistence
parameter is signicantly lower than 1, implying that shocks to the persistent component
have high persistence but are not permanent.
5.5 E¤ects of policy on the levels of risk
Using row-wise comparisons of the moment estimates reported in Table 1, starting with
gross income, we next test whether policy signicantly lowers the levels of risk that
households face. To this end, Table 3 reports the results of a one-sided test of the
null hypothesis that H0 : [m
;f(t)
2 ]
g [m;f(t)2 ]pp against the alternative hypothesis that
HA :[m
;f(t)
2 ]
g >[m;f(t)2 ]
pp, where f(t) = e for expansions and f(t) = c for contractions; g
refers to gross income; and pp refers to post-policy income. Table 4 repeats this test for
the third moments.
Table 3: Policy e¤ects on income risk (volatility)
expansions contractions
[1] [m;e2 ]
g [m;e2 ]g t ni [m;c2 ]g [m;c2 ]g t ni
est 0.0060 0.0073
s.e. (0.0105) (0.0124)
[2] [m;e2 ]
g [m;e2 ]g+b [m;c2 ]g [m;c2 ]g+b
est 0.0106 0.0135
s.e. (0.0095) (0.0117)
[3] [m;e2 ]
g [m;e2 ]g+b t ni [m;c2 ]g [m;c2 ]g+b t ni
est 0.0161 0.0189
s.e. (0.0091) (0.0113)
The superscripts g, b, t and ni refer to gross income, benets, taxes,
and national insurance respectively in Tables 3-6.
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The positive di¤erences between gross income and the various measures of income
net of policy reported in Table 3 indicate, qualitatively, that tax and benet policy is
working in the right direction and reduces the spread of the distribution of shocks to
the persistent component of idiosyncratic income. However, when considering the e¤ects
of public insurance, only gross income plus benets net of taxes and national insurance
is statistically signicant in both expansions and contractions (see row [3]). In other
words, it is the combination of taxes and benets that reduces the variance of risk, in
either aggregate state. The results regarding the overall e¤ect of social insurance policy
in reducing the level of the variance of shocks to income are consistent with the ndings
in Blundell and Etheridge (2010), who also nd big reductions in the variance of shocks
to the permanent component of household income when comparing household earnings
with disposable income (see their gure 6.1).
Turning to Table 4 we can see that public policy has not statistically signicantly
reduced the level of income risk reected by left-skewness during expansions. This is not
surprising since we learned from the fourth column in Table 1 that during expansions
the third central moments are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. However, during
contractions, public benets on their own and public benets net of taxes and national
insurance have signicantly reduced this level of risk (see rows [2] and [3] respectively in
Table 4).
Table 4: Policy e¤ects on income risk (asymmetry)
expansions contractions
[1] [m;e3 ]
g [m;e3 ]g t ni [m;c3 ]g [m;c3 ]g t ni
est -0.0018 -0.0100
s.e. (0.0087) (0.0125)
[2] [m;e3 ]
g [m;e3 ]g+b [m;c3 ]g [m;c3 ]g+b
est -0.0044 -0.0296
s.e. (0.0078) (0.0102)
[3] [m;e3 ]
g [m;e3 ]g+b t ni [m;c3 ]g [m;c3 ]g+b t ni
est -0.0050 -0.0323
s.e. (0.0076) (0.0101)
Finally, using a row-wise comparisons of the moment estimates reported in Table 2,
starting with gross income, we next test whether policy signicantly lowers the levels of
transitory risk that households face. The results in Table 5 suggest that while policy
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qualitatively reduces the level of risk for the volatility measure of transitory income risk,
this change is not statistically signicant. In contrast, taxes and national insurance on
their own, benets on their own and benets net of taxes and national insurance all
contribute to signicantly to lowering the asymmetry measure of transitory income risk.
Table 5: Policy e¤ects on transitory income risk
volatility asymmetry
[1] [m"2]
g [m"2]g t ni [m"3]g [m"3]g t ni
est 0.0029 -0.0105
s.e. (0.0107) (0.0061)
[2] [m"2]
g [m"2]g+b [m"3]g [m"3]g+b
est 0.0062 -0.0222
s.e. (0.0103) (0.0053)
[3] [m"2]
g [m"2]g+b t ni [m"3]g [m"3]g+b t ni
est 0.0080 -0.0274
s.e. (0.0099) (0.0051)
Overall, our ndings regarding the benecial impact of social insurance policy generally
are consistent with existing evidence for GB in Blundell and Etheridge (2010), for Sweden
in Domeij and Floden (2010), for Germany in Busch and Ludwig (2016), for the U.S. in
Kniesner and Ziliak (2002), and for the U.S., Germany and Sweden in Busch et al. (2018),
among others. Importantly, we nd that in all cases of second and third central moments
considered, for both persistent and transitory shocks, the e¤ects of benets in reducing risk
exposure are bigger than taxes and national insurance. This is consistent with evidence
from di¤erent analysis in the U.K. (see e.g. gure 7a Beleld et al. (2017) and gures
4.5 and 4.6 in Blundell and Etheridge (2010)), which suggests that benets have stronger
e¤ects in reducing household income inequality than taxes. In contrast, Kniesner and
Ziliak (2002) nd that, in the U.S., the e¤ects of taxes and transfers are quantitatively
similar when studying the reduction in the variance of household earnings growth.
5.6 E¤ect of policy on the cyclicality of risk
In Table 6 we compare the cyclical behaviour of income risk (based on the third moment)
pre- and post-policy to assess the e¤ectiveness of social insurance to mitigate this risk.18
18Note that since the cyclical income risk measures, based on the second moments, were not signicantly
di¤erent from zero in Table 1, we do not test for post policy e¤ects in this case.
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To this end, we make row-wise comparisons of the moment estimates in the last column
reported in Table 1 in columns 1 and 2 in Table 6, starting with gross income. In column
[3] of this Table we formally test whether the cyclical asymmetry of gross income risk
is greater than the cyclical asymmetry of income risk post-policy. In other words, has
counter-cyclical left-skewness been reduced by social policy? To this end, we employ a
one-sided test of the null hypothesis that H0 : [m
;e
3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]pp against the
alternative hypothesis that HA :[m
;e
3  m;c3 ]g >[m;e3  m;c3 ]pp.
Table 6: Policy e¤ects on the cyclical asymmetry of income risk
[1] [2] [3]
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g t ni [1]-[2]
est 0.0324 0.0242 0.0082
s.e. (0.0126) (0.0099) (0.0159)
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g+b [1]-[2]
est 0.0324 0.0072 0.0252
s.e. (0.0126) (0.0050) (0.0132)
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g+b t ni [1]-[2]
est 0.0324 0.0051 0.0273
s.e. (0.0126) (0.0036) (0.0132)
The results reported in column 3 in Table 6 rst suggest that taxes and national
insurance contributions do not signicantly reduce the pro-cyclical asymmetry of gross
income. In contrast, the degree of pro-cyclical asymmetry in gross income has been
signicantly reduced when benets on their own are taken into account and when benets
net of taxes and national insurance are considered.19
These results underline the importance of benets as a policy instrument to mitigate
the increase in risk in contractions. This e¤ect is distinct from existing results for the
U.S., Germany and Sweden in e.g. Busch et al. (2018) which emphasise the importance
of taxes in reducing income risk. The di¤erent results may be driven by di¤erences in risk
measures and methodological approaches employed. In particular, we study the e¤ect of
policy on the cyclicality of the skewness of the distribution of shocks to the persistent
19To assess the robustness of our key results reported in Tables 1, 2 and 6, we use the time-series
information to restrict the number of moments to estimate. In particular, we average the moments
across the age groups for each period t (see Domeij and Floden (2010)). This procedure produces
2T  (T +1)=2 = 2 171 moments to match instead of 2 5; 187 moments. These results are reported
in Appendix D and cohere very well with our key results.
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component of household income, whereas Busch et al. (2018) examine the e¤ect of policy
on the reducing the cyclicality of the skewness of the distribution of annual earnings
growth across households. Nonetheless, as discussed above, our results for GB cohere well
with the data reported in Figure 2 and provide evidence which complements other U.K.
ndings relating to the importance of benets in reducing income volatility and inequality
in the U.K. (see e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Beleld et al. (2017)).
6 Conclusions
Using the BHPS data from 1991-2008, this paper conrmed existing ndings in the lit-
erature and established new evidence relating to the cyclical behaviour of idiosyncratic
household income risk and the e¤ect of social insurance (tax-benets) policy in reducing
this risk. State dependent persistent income risk was measured by the variance and the
skewness of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent component of idiosyn-
cratic income in both expansions and contractions of the aggregate economy. In contrast,
constant transitory income risk was measured by the variance and the skewness of the
probability distribution of shocks to the transitory component of idiosyncratic income.
To examine the consequences of social insurance, we estimated risk for di¤erent measures
of pre- and post-policy household income and evaluated the e¤ects of tax and benets
policies on the level and the cyclicality of risk.
Our key nding for GB is that household income risk rises in contractions implying
a higher probability of receiving large negative income shocks during this state. This
nding conrms, using British data, similar ndings for other countries. It adds to this
literature by providing evidence that in GB it is the skewness of the distribution of the
shocks to the persistent component of idiosyncratic income that falls in contractions.
However, we also nd that a large part of the increased risk in bad times is mitigated
by social insurance policy. This e¤ect in GB is distinct from results for the U.S., Germany
and Sweden reported in Busch et al. (2018), which emphasise the importance of taxes in
reducing income risk. In contrast, we nd that cyclical asymmetric income risk is reduced
mainly via benets policy, conrming the importance of this instrument in mitigating
income volatility and inequality previously noted by other UK studies using di¤erent
methods than those employed here (see e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Beleld
et al. (2017)).
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7 Appendix A: Data
7.1 BHPS
The main dataset used in this paper is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
The BHPS is a comprehensive longitudinal study for the U.K. running from 1991 to
2008. As a panel data survey, the BHPS tracks individuals across households over time.
In the rst wave, the BHPS achieved a sample size of around 5000 households (10,000
adult interviews) or a 65% response rate. After the rst wave, due to sample attrition,
the sample size shrank slightly. For example, in 2000 it achieved around 4200 complete
interviews or a 75% response rate (see Taylor et al. 2010).
Since the start of BHPS in 1991, a number of additional sub-samples have been added
to the survey. For example, the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP)
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sub-sample started in 1997. It was added mainly to include respondents from Northern
Ireland and a low-income sample from the U.K. Moreover, in 1999 two more additional
boost samples, for Wales and Scotland, have been added. Since the focus is on GB, to
maintain the longest possible time-series dimension in our analysis, we only use the data
starting in 1991 i.e. the original panel dataset. Finally, following Blundell and Etheridge
(2010), we also make use of an auxiliary dataset called "Derived Current and Annual Net
Household Income Variables" compiled by Bardasi et al. (2012).
The BHPS contains detailed information on key magnitudes of interest for this paper.
In particular, earnings, hours worked and other income. Compared to other U.K. panel
datasets for earnings, e.g. the New Earnings Survey (NES) for the period 1975-2002
and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), for the period 1997-2015, BHPS
is much smaller in the cross-sectional dimension. The obvious advantages of NES and
ASHE are the accuracy and the sample size, which covers the 1% of the total working
population. Additionally, the time span is large enough for time series analysis since it
covers the years from 1974 to 2015. However, these datasets do not provide information
relating to: (i) household physical and human capital; (ii) why individuals disappear from
the survey, e.g. due to an injury, unemployment spell or move to self-employment; (iii)
self-employed individuals, which are a considerable percentage of the working population
(approximately 14%); and (iv) individual annual earnings which are only available from
1999 onwards.
In contrast to the NES and ASHE, the BHPS has information on both individual and
household characteristics. Therefore, it allows the examination of compositional e¤ects
(i.e. di¤erences between individuals and households) and thus issues relating to household
insurance mechanisms. Moreover, BHPS provides important human capital variables such
as educational attainment. Another, important advantage of the BHPS relates to hourly
pay. As noted by Stewart and Swa¢ eld (2002), the BHPS does not su¤er from the
potentially serious sample selection bias that exists in the NES. Workers earning below
the pay-as-you-earn tax threshold are under-represented in the NES sample. Furthermore,
BHPS also covers the self-employed, the unemployed or even those who do not participate
in the labour market for any reason. Finally, it provides a consistent measure of annual
earnings/incomes over the whole period at hand.
7.2 Demographic and socioeconomic variables
1. Head and relationship to head: For each individual in the sample, BHPS reports
the relationship to the head of household in any given wave. In our analysis we focus
on households whose head is married. Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010), the
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head of the household is dened as the oldest married (or living in partnership) male
within the household.
2. Education level: BHPS includes information on educational attainment. For the
BHPS we have used the variable wQFEDHI (where the prex w denotes wave). To
examine potential heterogeneity of earnings risk in the main text, the sample is split
into degree holders and non-degree holders. The former are the individuals who hold
either a Higher Degree or 1st Degree, while the latter are the individuals who hold
either Higher National Certicate/Diploma or teaching qualications or A-levels/AS
level/Highers or GCSE/O level/other qualication or they have no qualications.
7.3 Income and hours variables
1. Labour income: is obtained from the Derived Current and Annual Net Household
Income Variables dataset (Bardasi et al. 2012) and is equal to total household
annual labour income, wHHYRLG. Imputed values can be included in "Household
total earnings" only if they do not correspond to the head of the household earnings.
2. Gross income: is obtained from the Derived Current and Annual Net Household
Income Variables dataset (Bardasi et al. 2012). Gross income is equal to "Labour
income", plus annual investment income, wHHYRI, plus annual private transfers
income, wHHYRT, plus annual occupational pension income, wHHYRP. Private
transfers income totals all receipts from other transfers (including education grants,
sickness insurance, maintenance, foster allowance and payments from TU/Friendly
societies, from absent family members) while occupational pension income totals
all receipts from non-state pension sources. Investment income sums the estimated
income from savings and investments, and all receipts from rent from property or
boarders and lodgers.
3. Gross income   taxes   NI: is obtained from the Derived Current and An-
nual Net Household Income Variables dataset (Bardasi et al. 2012) and is equal
to "Labour income" minus annual national insurance contributions, wYRNI, minus
annual income tax after credits, wYRTAXNT, plus annual investment income, wH-
HYRI, plus annual private transfers income, wHHYRT, plus annual occupational
pension income, wHHYRP.
4. Gross income + benets: is obtained from the Derived Current and Annual Net
Household Income Variables dataset (Bardasi et al. 2012) and is dened as "Gross
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income" plus annual social benets income, wHHYRB. Social benets income totals
all receipts from state benets including national insurance retirement pensions.
5. Gross income + benets   taxes   NI: is obtained from the Derived Cur-
rent and Annual Net Household Income Variables dataset (Bardasi et al. 2012)
and is dened as "Gross income  taxes  NI" plus annual social benets income,
wHHYRB.
7.4 Sample selection
For all of the measures discussed below, to employ a consistent sample throughout, we
use the original BHPS sample excluding the observations from the boost samples after
1997.
7.5 Household income
We construct households from 1991-2008 by starting with the allocation of individuals to
households from BHPS and retain households with a spouse/part-ner relationship. The
household heads must be between 23-62 years of age, report non-zero labour income and
their individual earnings should be reported, not imputed and above than half of the
product between the minimum legal hourly wage times 520 hours. Households comprised
of a single member or those that involve cohabiting but not family-related members are
discarded. Moreover, the head must not be in the military and must not have missing
values for region and educational attainment. Then, we discard the observations belonging
to the highest 1% of the household earnings observations in each year. For the remaining
households, we only keep households who are in the sample for at least three consecutive
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periods.
Table A.1: Sample selection in steps
selection step households (obs.)
1. Whole sample 130,974
2. Drop proxy & non-full interviews 128,348
3. Original sample 82,355
4. Full interview of all members in household 74,602
5. Drop if no heads educational info 73,739
6. Drop if head in military 73,662
7. Drop if heads region missing 73,638
8. Keep if more than 2 adults 48,912
9. Keep if heads earnings>threshold & living with spouse 27,304
10. Keep if headsage 23, 62 25,794
11. Drop if top1% of household total earnings 25,545
12. Keep if present at least 3 consecutive observations 21,870
ave. N obs per wave 1,215
N of unique households 2,483
ave. obs per household 8.8
Table A.2: Summary of Selected BHPS Data (1991-2008)
Variable mean s.d. min max
Heads age 41.1 9.8 23 62
HH size 3.3 1.1 2 9
Heads earnings 31,163.5 16,590.6 1,128.9 152,725.3
labour income 46,667.1 22,140.4 1,128.9 160,989.5
gross income 48,752.5 23,480.0 1,128.9 487,313.9
gross income  taxes  NI 38,328.0 17,427.0 1128.9 463,554.8
gross income +benets 50,553.6 22,965.3 2,246.1 488,819.7
gross income +benets  taxes  NI 40,129.2 16,955.3 2246.1 465,060.7
Note: All monetary values are expressed in 2012 prices using the RPI deator.
The summary statistics refer to sample selection step 12 in Table A.1.
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8 Appendix B: Persistence and Identication
The persistence parameter  is identied as:
 =
"
Cov
 
i;1;1; i;4;4
  Cov  i;1;1; i;3;3
Cov
 
i;1;1; i;3;3
  Cov  i;1;1; i;2;2
#
. (3.22)
This expression implies that we need at least 4 consecutive time periods and age groups
of data to estimate , otherwise the model is under-identied.
However, in order to keep the exposition tractable, for the rest of the exercise we assume
that t 2 T = f1; 2; 3g and h 2 H = f1; 2; 3g and that  is given.20 This additional
restriction implies a total of 28 empirical moments to identify 8 parameters, m2 , m

2 , m
"
2,
m"3, m
;c
2 , m
;e
2 , m
;c
3 , and m
;e
3 . To illustrate this example, we next need to specify the
function that splits the time periods into expansions and contractions, e.g.:26666664
-1: contraction
0: expansion
1: contraction
2: expansion
3: contraction
37777775 ,
which implies 26666664
m
;f( 1)
2 = m
;c
2 m
;f( 1)
3 = m
;c
3
m
;f(0)
2 = m
;e
2 m
;f(0)
3 = m
;e
3
m
;f(1)
2 = m
;c
2 m
;f(01)
3 = m
;c
3
m
;f(2)
2 = m
;e
2 m
;f(2)
3 = m
;e
3
m
;f(3)
2 = m
;c
2 m
;f(3)
3 = m
;c
3
37777775 .
Note that the time periods 0 and  1, i.e. past periods appear in the table above. The
reason is that since an agents income has a persistent component, then she is accumulating
shocks. In turn, this means that some of the agents in the sample bring with them these
past shocks, and thus, the central moments of these past shocks appear in the theoretical
moments. Consequently, we have extra information which we exploit to get more accurate
estimates for m;c2 , m
;e
2 , m
;c
3 , and m
;e
3 .
20Recall in the model estimated in the main body of the paper T = 18 and H = 36.
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8.1 Second and third moments for transitory shocks
Using periods t = 1; 2 and ages h = 1; 2, m"2 is identied via equations (3.9) and (3.11):
m"2 = E
 
2i;1;1
   1Cov  i;1;1; i;2;2 , (3.23)
and likewise m"3 is found employing equations (3.10) and (3.12):
m"3 = E
 
3i;1;1
   1CoSk  i;1;1; i;2;2 . (3.24)
8.2 Second moments for xed e¤ects
Using periods t = 1 and ages h = 1, m2 is identied via equation (3.9):
m2 = E(
2
i;1;1) m"2  m;c2 , (3.25)
and likewise m3 is determined employing equation (3.10):
m3 = E(
3
i;1;1) m"3  m;c3 . (3.26)
Thus, we can pin down m2 and m

3 conditional on the identication of m
;c
2 and m
;c
3 .
8.3 Moments for innovations to the persistent component
Using equation (3.11) along with periods t = 1; 2; 3 and h = 1; 2; 3, m;c2 at t = 1 is
identied as:
m;c2 =
Cov
 
i;1;1; i;3;3
  Cov  i;1;1; i;2;2
 (  1) . (3.27)
Likewise, using equation (3.12) for the same t and h, m;c3 is given by:
m;c3 =
CoSk
 
i;1;1; i;3;3
  CoSk  i;1;1; i;2;2
 (  1) . (3.28)
Thus, having identied m;c2 and m
;c
3 , we have implied m

2 and m

3 via (3.25) and (3.26)
as well. Indentifying equations (3.27) and (3.28) are crucial in order to determine m2 and
m3 which will help us pin down the rest of the parameters. Without these two conditions
we cannot proceed further. That is the reason why we need at least 3 consecutive time
periods and age groups of data to identify m;c2 and m
;c
3 .
So, based on the values for m2 , m

3 , m
"
3 and m
"
2; m
;e
2 is identied via equation (3.9) using
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t = 2 and h = 1 :
m;e2 = E(
2
i;1;2) m2  m"2, (3.29)
and likewise m;e3 is identied employing equation (3.10):
m;e3 = E(
3
i;1;2) m3  m"3. (3.30)
Finally, note that when T = H = 3, and conditional on assumption that  is given, we
have 8 parameters to identify, m2 , m

2 , m
"
2, m
"
3, m
;c
2 , m
;e
2 , m
;c
3 , and m
;e
3 , and a total of
28 moment conditions. However, in demonstrating identication we have used exactly 8
moments, (3.23)-(3.30), but many parameters of the statistical model are already over-
identied even with the minimal requirements, i.e. size(T ) = size(H) = 3. Clearly the
parameters will be even more over-identied as T and H increase.
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9 Appendix C: Standardised third moments
Table C.1: Cyclical household income riskem;e3 em;c3 em;e3  em;c3 em"3 em3
labour income
est -1.473 -4.381 2.908 -7.717 -1.190
[-4.762,-0.291] [-7.997,-2.075] [0.642,+1) [-24.937,-3.364] [-1.940,1.171]
gross income
est -0.757 -4.620 3.863 -7.719 -0.912
s.e. [-2.255,0.888] [-7.322,-2.834] [1.834,+1) [-17.830,-4.341] [-1.532,0.188]
gross income  taxes  NI
est -0.634 -4.578 3.944 -6.336 -0.831
s.e. [-2.331,0.909] [-7.378,-2.811] [1.878,+1) [-12.460,-3.376] [-1.464,0.465]
gross income +benets
est -0.129 -1.748 1.619 -3.930 -0.552
s.e. [-1.865,1.033] [-3.400,-0.545] [0.007,+1) [-7.737,-1.700] [-1.011,0.316]
gross income +benets  taxes  NI
est 0.045 -1.585 1.630 -2.497 -0.445
s.e. [-2.202,1.295] [-3.196,-0.321] [-0.230,+1) [-5.022,-0.869] [-0.955,0.741]
Note that the CI90s for all columns are for a two-tailed test, except the di¤erence tests
which are for a one-tailed CI90. Also note that the standardised measures in this and
the next two tables are dened as em;e3 = m;e3(m;e2 )1:5 ; em;c3 = m;c3(m;c2 )1:5 ; em"3 = m"3(m"2)1:5
and em3 = m3(m2 )1:5 .
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Table C.2: Policy e¤ects on income risk (asymmetry)
expansions contractions transitory
[1] [em;e3 ]g [em;e3 ]g t ni [em;c3 ]g [em;c3 ]g t ni [em"3]g [em"3]g t ni
est -0.123 -0.042 -1.383
s.e. (-1;1.727] (-1;2.484] (-1;3.725]
[2] [em;e3 ]g [em;e3 ]g+b [em;c3 ]g [em;c3 ]g+b [em"3]g [em"3]g+b
est -0.628 -2.872 -3.7891
s.e. (-1,1.292] (-1,-1.029] (-1,0.285]
[3] [em;e3 ]g [em;e3 ]g+b t ni [em;c3 ]g [em;c3 ]g+b t ni [em"3]g [em"3]g+b t ni
est -0.802 -3.035 -5.223
s.e. (-1,1.366] (-1,-1.217] (-1,-1.864]
Table C.3: Policy e¤ects on the cyclical asymmetry of income risk
[1] [2] [3]
[em;e3   em;c3 ]g [em;e3   em;c3 ]g t ni [1]-[2]
est 3.863 3.944 -0.081
s.e. [1.834,+1) [1.878,+1) [-3.182,+1)
[em;e3   em;c3 ]g [em;e3   em;c3 ]g+b [1]-[2]
est 3.863 1.619 2.244
s.e. [1.834,+1) [0.007,+1) [-0.161,+1)
[em;e3   em;c3 ]g [em;e3   em;c3 ]g+b t ni [1]-[2]
est 3.863 1.630 2.233
s.e. [1.834,+1) [-0.230,+1) [-0.257,+1)
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10 Appendix D: Robustness
The following results are based on the restricted set of 2  171 moments discussed in
footnote 17 of the main text.
Table D.1: Cyclical household income risk
m;e2 m
;c
2 m
;e
2  m;c2 m;e3 m;c3 m;e3  m;c3
labour income
est 0.0546 0.0560 -0.0014 -0.0155 -0.0341 0.0186
s.e. (0.0077) (0.0093) (0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0101) (0.0133)
gross income
est 0.0460 0.0498 -0.0038 -0.0054 -0.0335 0.0282
s.e. (0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0096) (0.0123)
gross income  taxes  NI
est 0.0378 0.0401 -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0241 0.0210
s.e. (0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0063) (0.0050) (0.0075) (0.0096)
gross income +benets
est 0.0295 0.0339 -0.0044 0.0005 -0.0061 0.0066
s.e. (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0050)
gross income +benets  taxes  NI
est 0.0232 0.0280 -0.0048 0.0010 -0.0040 0.0050
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0034)
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Table D.2: Persistence and remaining moments
 m"2 m
"
3 m

2 m

3
labour income
est 0.7846 0.0170 -0.0439 0.0683 -0.0246
s.e. (0.0388) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0123) (0.0104)
gross income
est 0.7907 0.0166 -0.0343 0.0722 -0.0222
s.e. (0.0392) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0124) (0.0099)
gross income  taxes  NI
est 0.8059 0.0157 -0.0242 0.0587 -0.0162
s.e. (0.0352) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0104) (0.0080)
gross income + benets
est 0.8222 0.0146 -0.0129 0.0536 -0.0090
s.e. (0.0325) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0105) (0.0035)
gross income +benets  taxes  NI
est 0.8301 0.0131 -0.0074 0.0419 -0.0057
s.e. (0.0275) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0080) (0.0024)
Table D.3: Policy e¤ects on the cyclical asymmetry of income risk
[1] [2] [3]
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g t ni [1]-[2]
est 0.0282 0.0210 0.0071
s.e. (0.0123) (0.0096) (0.0159)
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g+b [1]-[2]
est 0.0282 0.0066 0.0216
s.e. (0.0123) (0.0050) (0.0133)
[m;e3  m;c3 ]g [m;e3  m;c3 ]g+b t ni [1]-[2]
est 0.0282 0.0050 0.0231
s.e. (0.0123) (0.0034) (0.0128)
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SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis studied inequality in several dimensions, with an emphasis on the analysis of
wealth inequality within and between groups (including by social class, occupation and
education). It aimed to identify factors that a¤ect inequality and how income and wealth
are distributed within society. In the rst two chapters, we considered the role of saving
externalities and peer pressure on wealth and income inequality, both at the aggregate
and at the within- and between-group levels. We found that the distributional e¤ects,
especially between and within groups can be substantial, even if e¢ ciency (Chapter 1) or
aggregate distributional e¤ects (Chapter 2) are small. In the third chapter, we focused
on a major determinant of income and wealth inequality, namely unexplained income
risk. This chapter found that household income risk rises in contractions and that social
benets play a bigger role in mitigating the increased risk than taxes.
Chapter 1
This chapter quantied the implications of pecuniary externalities on inequality and inef-
ciency due to the heterogenous savings behaviour of di¤erent groups in the population.
We developed an open-economy incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic earnings risk
and ex ante skill heterogeneity. We focused on di¤erences in skill, proxied by education,
more specically, whether individuals hold a university degree or not. The two groups
di¤ered with respect to their specic earnings processes. In particular, with respect to
their expected earnings and the conditional and unconditional risk associated with their
earnings streams. We calibrated the model to the U.K. and nd that its predictions
regarding between and within-group inequality are consistent with the data.
The key nding of this chapter is the di¤erent savings behaviour of the university and
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non-university educated groups generates a form of pecuniary externality. This external-
ity operates via the interest rate. Intuitively the savings of each group a¤ect the saving
behaviour of the other groups via the interest rate. Specically, the equilibrium interest
rate is determined by the aggregate asset supply function, which is higher (lower) than
the asset supply functions of the university (non-university) group. Consequently, house-
holds in the university (non-university) groups raises (lowers) their savings. As a result,
within-group wealth inequality increases for the non-university group and decreases for
the university group, while between-group inequality rises. Although the e¤ects of the
externality on within and between-group inequality are signicant, its e¤ects on e¢ ciency
are marginal.
The key contribution of this chapter is that it demonstrates that these types of xed
di¤erences have a signicant impact on between and within-group as well as aggregate
wealth inequality despite having only modest e¤ects on aggregate savings. Another con-
tribution is that the ex ante skill heterogeneity helps the benchmark heterogeneous agent
model predict inequality, which is closer to the observed inequality in the U.K.. Finally,
the modelling of the open-economy with a partially elastic interest rate in this class of
model is novel.
Chapter 2
In this chapter we set out to synthesize the theory of macroeconomics of inequality with
the theory of social economics. We specied a theoretical framework that allowed us
to study how social phenomena such as peer pressure and aspirational pressure a¤ect
individual choices, and as a result the distributions of earnings, incomes, consumption
and wealth. We dened peer pressure as the case where consumption levels achieved by
members of the socio-economic class (the group of peers) determine a social target that
acts as a reference point for consumption for each member of the class. Whereas we dened
aspirational pressure (or above-peer aspirations) as aspirations for consumption that are
determined by next highest socio-economic class (as dened by the mean wage/earnings).
We showed existence of a stationary equilibrium, when the social targets are determined
jointly with the distributions of hours, earnings, wealth and consumption, under stochastic
social class participation and idiosyncratic productivity.
Motivated by recent empirical studies on peer pressure we calibrated a benchmark
model to the British data under keeping up with the Joneses peer pressure and we
found that it predicts all main patterns in the data regarding between and within group in-
equality. We further examined alternative forms of peer pressure. However, we found that
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keeping up with the Jonesespeer pressure is critical in helping the models predictions
match the empirical patterns regarding between group hours inequality and cross-group
qualitative di¤erences with respect to within group hours and earnings inequality.
In the quantitative analysis we made two broad comparisons, in terms of inequality.
First, we compared economies under "keeping up with the Joneses" peer pressure, with
economies with no peer pressure. We found that for groups with higher mean wages,
within group inequality is lower in terms of hours and earnings, and higher in terms of
wealth and consumption. Conversely, for lower mean wage groups, within group inequality
is higher in terms of wealth and consumption and lower in terms of hours and earnings.
Whereas, between group inequality is lower for hours, earnings and consumption, but
higher for wealth. Second, we compared economies under "keeping up with the Joneses"
peer pressure, with economies under aspirational pressure. We found that aspirational
pressure allows the groups with the higher aspirations (lower mean wage groups) to close
the gap with the top mean wage group in terms of hours, earnings and consumption,
but the gap becomes bigger in terms of wealth. At the same time, although there is
a reduction in within-group inequality in hours and earnings, wealth and consumption
inequality within-group are higher.
We concluded that the e¤ects of social pressure are not uniform across the socio-
economic groups, either when we consider peer pressure or above-peer aspirations. We
saw that social pressure incorporates forces that, other things equal, tend to generate con-
vergence within cluster and divergence between classes. We further concluded that the
prospect of upward/downward mobility matters in determining the e¤ects of peer and as-
pirational pressure, tending to lower between group divergence. Moreover, we established
that peer and aspirational pressure a¤ects incentives to work and save di¤erently. Thus,
social pressure implys non-uniform changes in wealth and earnings inequality, which in
turn implies that there are opposite e¤ects on consumption inequality and consequently
social frustration. The reason is that in the proposed framework wealth inequality re-
ects both the dispersion of earnings and motives for wealth accumulation stemming
from inter-temporal smoothing and the insurance value of wealth.
The importance of examining within and between group inequality has been empha-
sized within the economics literature. This thesis stressed the importance of examining,
not only aggregate inequality, but also its between and within group components. Such
a focus might help economists identify policies that can moderate inequality and in turn
its consequences. For example, policies aimed at mitigating aggregate inequality might
have di¤erent e¤ects on between group inequality and within group inequality. Moreover,
policies tackling between group inequality might have adverse e¤ects on within group
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inequality, and ultimately might increase social dissatisfaction. As we have suggested in
this chapter, above peer aspirations, compared with a situation where households aim
to meet targets dened by the behaviour of their peers, lead to increased social frustra-
tion, despite improvements in material wealth and consumption on average. This nding
implies that in a more socially connected world, when aspirations become more upward
looking, improvements in wealth and consumption may nevertheless be accompanied by
social dissatisfaction.
This chapter lled a gap in the literature of macroeconomics of inequality by formally
introducing socialpeer or aspirationalpressure into the heterogeneous agents incomplete
markets model. We extended the notion of equilibrium in this context by taking into
account the social interactions stemming from social pressure. We have shown that given
the social targets, the households problem admits a unique household-level invariant
asset-shock distribution and that a socio-economic equilibrium exists. Also, we suggested
an algorithm to compute the equilibrium and verify uniqueness. Most importantly, this
model allowed us to examine the richness of distributional e¤ects of social pressure and
hopefully may be used for policy analysis in the future.
Chapter 3
In this chapter, we examined the cyclical behaviour of idiosyncratic household income risk
and the e¤ect of social insurance, i.e. tax-benet policy, in reducing this risk. Our key
variable is the unexplained or idiosyncratic component of household income. Following
the literature, this component was assumed to be a composition of three subcomponents, a
xed, a persistent and a transitory. We measured income risk by the variance and skewness
of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent component of idiosyncratic
income in expansions and contractions of the aggregate economy. The transitory income
risk was assumed to be time invariant and measured by the variance and skewness of the
probability distribution of transitory shocks. Using the BHPS dataset from 1991 to 2008,
information about the aggregate state of the economy from 1952 to 2008, and the seminal
approach of Storeslettern et al. (2004) and Busch and Ludwig (2016), we estimated the
risk for di¤erent measures of pre- and post-policy household income and evaluated the
e¤ects of tax and benets policies on the level and the cyclicality of risk. The advantage
of this methodology is that we can identify the di¤erences between booms and slumps by
exploiting history dependent cross-sectional moments that incorporate aggregate shocks
outside the panel data sample period.
Our key ndings for Great Britain (GB) was that household income risk rises in
172
contractions driven by a higher probability of receiving large negative persistent income
shocks during this state. This nding is similar to ndings for other countries, but is
new for Great Britain. We also found that social insurance policy plays a bigger role in
mitigating the increased risk in contractions than taxes. This e¤ect is in stark contrast to
ndings for U.S., Germany and Sweden reported in Busch et al. (2018), which emphasises
the importance of taxes in reducing income risk.
Future Research
This thesis identied factors that generate or amplify inequality. However, it did not
deal with the problem of how to reduce inequality in environments with those factors at
place. Thus, a possible future path of research could be to make use of the frameworks
(in chapters one and two) and perform policy analysis. For example, since in chapter
one inequality is to some extent a result of an externality, we can consider policies that
reduce overall inequality and within group inequality and examine possible trade-o¤s.
This exercise could be extended to cover cases where the exogenous income processes
exhibit higher order risk, cyclical risk, alternative production function or endogenous
educational choice.
In the same vein, as we saw in chapter two, the e¤ects of social pressure are not
uniform, and hence, the e¤ect of taxes and benets might not be uniform as well. For
example, we could consider having taxes and benets, possibly income dependent, and
examine the e¤ects on between and within group inequality. Since peer pressure works
through consumption, we could even consider non-mainstream policy schemes such as
progressive consumption taxes or a universal basic income.
Furthermore, in chapter two we focused on the e¤ects of social pressure on inequality
and we took the upward or downward mobility as exogenous. A very interesting, and non-
trivial, extension to this framework is to analyse a situation where the prospect of upward
or downward mobility interacts with the prospect of increased peer pressure to determine
jointly cross-sectional distributions, in addition to decision making that inuences class
participation.
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